Philosophy 525, Fall 2017: Recent Work on Responsibility
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The seminar will survey recent work on responsibility with an eye towards answering the main questions with which a theory of moral responsibility is concerned:

(a) What is it for X to be morally responsible for A?
(b) What are the conditions under which X is responsible for A?
(c) Why are those conditions as they are?
(d) Why does it matter whether X is responsible for A?

The first half will focus on the general part of the theory, with an emphasis on clarifying central concepts: praise, blame, praise- and blameworthiness, good/ill will, moral capacity, and so on. The second will focus on special topics, including responsibility and mental illness, retributive punishment, implicit bias, negligence, responsibility for consequences, and responsibility for structural injustice.

We will presuppose familiarity with the old chestnuts, including:

Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”
Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” and “Two Faces of Responsibility”
Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” and “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”
Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility

Readings for Session 1 and 2 (in order of immediate relevance):

David Shoemaker, Responsibility at the Margins, Introduction and Part I.
Michael Zimmerman, “Varieties of Moral Responsibility”
Peter Graham, “A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness”

Readings will be posted on blackboard. A complete syllabus will be distributed at the first session.