Opacity
Syllabus for Fall 2017

Harvey Lederman
harveyslederman@gmail.com

This class will introduce some recent and forthcoming work on opacity. The main topic will be whether considerations related to opacity motivate altering the logic of quantification and/or identity. The first part of the course will discuss approaches to this problem in the setting of higher-order logic. We’ll then turn to two applications of these approaches, spending a few weeks on vagueness, and turning ultimately to questions related to so-called “logical omniscience”. A subsidiary aim of the course is to give students access to recent work on the “fineness of grain” of reality.

Each week we’ll focus on the one listed paper – or, where indicated, on notes to be circulated a week in advance. “Background” materials will likely come up in class but won’t be the main topic of the session. (All course materials will be in a dropbox folder I’ll share on the first day.) I’ll prepare a fairly detailed handout and roughly an hour’s worth of comments and exposition. I expect to be interrupted, and for us to follow some of the interruptions into more extensive discussion. I will however have some material I’m hoping to get through in the presentation, and I may curtail discussion to get through it. The schedule below is tentative; it may well change as we go along. (The sessions which now require notes are especially tentative; they may be filled in with further readings.)

Any technical material needed for understanding the main text of the papers we discuss will be introduced in class. The course is designed so that a student who has never seen any type theory can follow it, and (moreover) so that students who do not do any of the reading at all will still get a basic sense of the landscape by attending the sessions.
Part 1: Logic of Opacity

1. Opacity, Identity and Quantification (Sep 19)
   Kaplan, “Quantifying In” Sections I-VII.
   Background: Kripke, “Puzzle about Belief”.

2. Identity in Higher-Order Logic; Intro to Type Theory (Sep 26)
   Dorr, “To be F is to be G” Sections 1-5.

3. Opacity (Oct 3)
   Bacon and Russell, “The Logic of Opacity”

4. Classical Opacity (Oct 10)
   Caie, Goodman and Lederman, “Classical Opacity”

5. Contextualism and Leibniz’s Law (Oct 17)
   Goodman and Lederman, “Verbalism”
   Background: Dorr, “Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports”

6. Catch-up / Notes on Fregeanism (Oct 24)

Part II: Vagueness

7. Vagueness and Ignorance (Nov 7)
   Bacon, Vagueness and Thought, Chapter 4

8. Notes on Vagueness (Nov 14)

Part III: Logical Omniscience

9. The problems of logical omniscience (Nov 21)
   Stalnaker “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”;
   Soames, “Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and Semantic Content”

10. Structure (Nov 28)
    Goodman, “Reality is not Structured”;
    Dorr, “To be F is to be G” Sections 6-10

11. Dorr to visit (Dec 5)

12. Notes on Reasoning (Dec 12)