Lecture 3. Trading Lives for Tasty Snacks (the written version is co-authored with Yoaav Isaacs). 

The targets of this talk are deontological theories that reckon it impermissible to do something that will, with certainty, kill someone while generating  an enormous number of tasty snacks for a large population  (at least in a setting where one can instead perform an innocuous act that will yield neither killings nor tasty snacks). Two foundational problems are explored. First, there seems to be no happy way of extending this kind of deontology to  decision-making under uncertainty. To drive the challenge home,  an instructive impossibility result will take centre stage.  Second, this kind of theory will have a hard time dealing with actions that hasten death but which are not quite killings. One important question here is whether there is a penumbral connection between 'to kill' and 'permissible'.