Abstract: The goal of this talk is to outline a research program—the primitive intentionality research program—that extends and revises core ideas of two other allied research programs in the philosophy of mind. The first, championed by David Chalmers, can be called "the primitive phenomenology research program." It takes phenomenal properties to be irreducible and seeks to discover the fundamental laws governing primitive phenomenology. The second is what Uriah Kriegel has dubbed “the phenomenal intentionality research program.” It (typically) takes on board primitive phenomenology and seeks to explain intentionality in terms of phenomenology. I argue that we should accept a broader mental primitivism, which embraces irreducible mentality beyond the phenomenal domain and regards the phenomenal as merely one species of primitive intentionality. A central conjecture of the proposed research program is that there is a close connection between the most basic mental properties and the most basic normative principles. Roughly, basic mental properties are the subject matter of basic normative principles, and the joints of mental reality correspond to the joints of normative reality. I suggest that we can make progress toward understanding the fundamental psychophysical and psychological laws—the causal or grounding laws linking mental states to physical states of matter and to one another—by appealing to essential normative properties of mental states.