Abstract: In Spreading the Word, Simon Blackburn suggested an approach to understanding moral conditionals on which accepting a conditional is having an attitude toward the attitudes involved with accepting its antecedent and its consequent. In 1996, Mark van Roojen posed a problem for this view which I argued in Noncognitivism in Ethics to be a decisive and perfectly general problem for any view of its kind. In this paper I set up this background and then show that there is a loophole in the van Roojen Problem, as I've previously conceived of it. A view like Blackburn's can avoid this problem - but only by taking striking and interesting views about the nature of truth, belief, and propositions. I conclude that the real lesson of the van Roojen Problem is that Higher Order Attitudes views like Blackburn's are best interpreted as committed to these striking consequences.
For more information: http://danielwodak.wix.com/pwnp