Higher-Order Attitudes, Frege's Abyss, and the Truth in Propositions

Oct 11, 2013, 11:30 am1:00 pm
301 Marx Hall
Event Description

Abstract: In Spreading the Word, Simon Blackburn suggested an approach to understanding moral conditionals on which accepting a conditional is having an attitude toward the attitudes involved with accepting its antecedent and its consequent.  In 1996, Mark van Roojen posed a problem for this view which I argued in Noncognitivism in Ethics to be a decisive and perfectly general problem for any view of its kind.  In this paper I set up this background and then show that there is a loophole in the van Roojen Problem, as I've previously conceived of it.  A view like Blackburn's can avoid this problem - but only by taking striking and interesting views about the nature of truth, belief, and propositions.  I conclude that the real lesson of the van Roojen Problem is that Higher Order Attitudes views like Blackburn's are best interpreted as committed to these striking consequences.

For more information: http://danielwodak.wix.com/pwnp