Philosophy Colloquium: "Frankenvaluers, Sticky Attitudes and Stone-Swallowing: Three Objections to the Hybrid Theory of Valuing"

Date
Mar 9, 2018, 4:00 pm6:00 pm
Location
Julis Romo Rabinowitz Bldg Bowl A17 (Please note location)

Speaker

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Event Description

ABSTRACT: What is it to value something?  One might think that valuing is a form of believing—for instance, believing that the object of value is good or worthy.  Alternatively, one might identify valuing with desiring—for instance, desiring to protect, promote, or engage with the object of value.  A third possibility is that valuing is an emotional condition—a disposition to experience a range of emotions based on how things are with the object of value.  According to the recently popular hybrid theory of valuing (Kolodny 2003, Scheffler 2010, Wallace 2013, Callard 2018), (i) valuing cannot be reduced to believing, or to desiring, or to feeling, but (ii) it can be reduced to believing, desiring and feeling, taken together.  I argue that hybrid theorists are correct with respect to the first point but incorrect with respect to the second. 

I raise three problems for the hybrid theory:

(1) The Composition Problem—we can construct a Frankenvaluer who has the 3 attitudes but fails to count as a valuer.

(2) The Sticky Attitudes Problem—the hybrid theory fails to explain why the beliefs and desires of valuers respond differently than those of non-valuers to rational considerations

(3) The Value-Collapse Problem—the hybrid theorist cannot account for the psychological devastation that attends the unmasking of value:

“Sometimes you realize you’ve had a thing keeping you going that might be a lie. When you actually really understand that — that the whole thing might have been a lie the whole time — it’s like you’ve swallowed a stone. But not recently. You swallowed it years ago.”—Alyssa, End of the F***ing World

Finally, I use these arguments to articulate some desiderata for a theory of valuing.