

Relational Moral Address -- Prof Fricker and Professor McGeer
Wednesdays 9.00-11.50; 201 Marx Hall

These classes are student-oriented seminar discussions where everyone participates in close discussion of the two **asterisked readings** (these are the 'required' readings). Please read at least these required readings carefully ahead of time, taking your own notes, and bring them to class with you so we can all refer to the text if we need to. **Come ready to take an active part in constructive critical discussion.**

Part of our aim will be to provide an opportunity for students to cultivate certain key professional skills: **participation in constructive collective discussion**, and **giving presentations with a handout** (or PowerPoint, but we have a preference for always having a brief handout too). At the first meeting, we will invite students to sign up to do at least one **10-minute presentation** on a reading of their choice. The purpose of the presentation is to provide a springboard for collective discussion by giving a **brief summary of key points, and to raise a question, a point of confusion, or objection in order to open up the discussion**. It's also fun and great practice.

Overview:

'Moral address' is a phrase used to signify our moral responses to wrongdoing. We will explore explicitly second-personal conceptions of moral address, and also the ways in which our second-personal responses are relational, socially embedded and scaffolded. We will start, however, with the prior question of the relationality that is already involved in the business of determining one's own actions, with readings about autonomy and specifically the feminist re-envisioning of autonomy as essentially relational and socially embedded. These theorists saw that the capacity for autonomy was socially sustained in relation to others and could be eroded if those relations failed. Similarly, the second-personal responses of moral address might be viewed as essentially relational, and therefore similarly socially sustained and trained. We will explore various 'reactive attitudes and feelings' to invoke **P. F. Strawson's** conception developed in '**Freedom and Resentment**' (*NOTE: we would strongly recommend this as a background reading to the course as a whole, though it is not a set reading below*). These reactive attitudes form the basis of how we respond to wrongdoing and engage in the to and fro of moral address. We will also examine the idea of moral obligation from a relational point of view (for instance, what it is to have an *obligation to* someone else), and how proleptic mechanisms (i.e. taking up a 'hopeful' stance towards someone else's capacity to reason and behave better) can both be an essential part of our relations of moral address, and yet also sometimes tip over into corrupting them so that they deteriorate into forms of moral control.

All readings are available on dropbox:

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/n68a7x00w51wasq/AAB2QGRBJEhop7V_tbWzeaMca?dl=0

Or on the canvas course website: <https://princeton.instructure.com/courses/4647>

Seminar Schedule

1. Relational autonomy – Sept. 1st

*Marina Oshana (1998) ‘Personal Autonomy and Society’ *Journal of Social Philosophy* 29(1): 81-102.

*Andrea Westlund (2009) ‘Re-thinking Relational Autonomy’ *Hypatia* 24(4): 26-49

John Christman (2004) ‘Relational Autonomy, liberal individualism, and the social constitution of selves’ *Philosophical Studies* 117 (1-2): 143-64

Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth (2005) ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition and Justice’ in *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism*, eds. J. Christman & J. Anderson, 127–49 (CUP)

2. Blame – Sept. 8th

*Michael McKenna (2013) ‘Directed Blame and Conversation’, essay 7 in *Blame: Its Nature and Norms*, eds. D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini (OUP)

*Angela Smith (2013) ‘Moral Blame and Moral Protest’, essay 2 in *Blame: Its Nature and Norms*, eds. D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini (OUP) (-- responding in part to Scanlon’s view)

Miranda Fricker (2014) ‘What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation’, *Noûs* 50 (1) 165-183

Victoria McGeer (2010) ‘Coreactive attitudes and the making of moral community’, chap. 14 in *Emotions, Imagination and Moral Reasoning*, eds. R. Langdon & C. MacKenzie (New York: Psychology Press) -- especially pp. 299-306

3. Constraints on Moral Address – Sept. 15th

*Patrick Todd (2019) ‘A unified account of the moral standing to blame’ *Noûs* 53:2 (2019) 347–374

*Vanessa Carbonell (2019) ‘Social constraints on moral address’ *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research* 98(1): 167-189

Kyle G. Fritz and Daniel Miller (2018) 'Hypocrisy and the standing to blame', *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 99 (2018): 118–139

Linda Radzik (2011) 'On minding your own business: Differentiating accountability relations within the moral community' *Social Theory and Moral Practice* 37(4):574-98

4. Relational/Directed Obligations – Sept. 22nd

*Stephen Darwall (2012) 'Bipolar Obligation', *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, Vol. 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 337-67

*Adrienne Martin (2021) 'Personal Bonds: Directed Obligations Without Rights', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Vol. CII No. 1:

Onora O'Neill (1996) 'Structure: obligations and rights' chapter 5 in *Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

R. Jay Wallace (2012) 'Duties of Love' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Supp. Vol. 6: 175-198

5. Shame and Shamelessness – Sept. 29th

*Michelle Mason (2010) 'On Shamelessness' *Philosophical Papers* 39(3):401-25

*Marcia Baron (2018) 'Shame and Shamelessness' *Philosophia* 46(3): 721-731

Calhoun, Cheshire (2004) 'An apology for moral shame' *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 2 (2004)

Bernard Williams (1993) 'Shame and Autonomy', ch. 4 in *Shame and Necessity*

6. Remorse and Regret – Oct. 6th (NB *three* asterisked readings this week; the third is v short)

*Christopher Cordner (2008) 'Remorse and moral identity' in C. Mackenzie & K. Atkins eds. *Practical Identity and Narrative Agency*; pp. 232-251 (Routledge)

*David Batho (2019) 'Remorse' in Anna Gotlib ed. *The Moral Psychology of Regret* (Rowman & Littlefield International) pp. 121-143

and

*Raimond Gaita (1996) 'Remorse and the depiction of evil' *Quadrant* 40(5): 33–36

Audrey Anton (2019) 'Regret as a Reactive Attitude: The Conditions of Responsibility and Revision' *The Moral Psychology of Regret*, ed. Ana Gotlib (Rowman & Littlefield)

Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (2002) 'Remorse, forgiveness, and rehumanization: Stories from South Africa' *Journal of humanistic psychology*, 42(1): 7-32

7. Apology – Oct. 13th

*Adrienne Martin (2010) 'Owning Up and Lowering Down: The Power of Apology', *The Journal of Philosophy* 107(10): 534-553

*Jeffrey Helmreich 2015 'The Apologetic Stance' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 43(2): 75-108

Luc Bovens (2008) 'Apologies' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* Vol. CVIII Pt 3: 219-239

Murphy, Jeffrey G. (2006) 'Remorse, apology, and mercy' *Ohio St. J. Crim. L.*, 4, 423-453.

[No class Oct 20]

8. Trust – Oct. 27th

*Karen Jones (2017) 'But I Was Counting on You!' in *The Philosophy of Trust*, eds. Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson (OUP)

*Stephen Darwall (2017) 'Trust as a Second-Personal Attitude of the Heart' in Paul Faulkner & Thomas Simpson eds. *The Philosophy of Trust* (OUP)

Margaret Urban Walker (2006) 'Damages to Trust' ch. 3 in *Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing*

Benjamin McMyler (2017) 'Deciding to Trust' essay 10 in *The Philosophy of Trust*, eds. Paul Faulkner and Thomas Simpson

9. Hope – Nov. 3rd

*Victoria McGeer (2008) 'Trust, hope and empowerment' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 86(2): 237-254 --Tori to present

*Cheshire Calhoun (2018) 'Motivating Hope' in *Doing Valuable Time* (Oxford University Press): 68-89

Nancy Snow (2020) 'Is hope a moral virtue?' essay 10 in *The Moral Psychology of Hope* eds. Claudia Bloser and Titus Stahl

Margaret Urban Walker (2006) 'Hope's Value' ch. 2 in *Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing*

10. Forgiveness – Nov. 10th

*Eleonore Stump (2021) 'The Sunflower: Guilt, forgiveness and reconciliation', chapter 8 in *Forgiveness and its moral dimensions* (OUP): 172-196

*Lucy Allais (2021) 'Frailty and Forgiveness: Forgiveness for humans' chapter 12 in *Forgiveness and its moral dimensions* (OUP): 257-284

MacLachlan, Alice (2009) 'Practicing Imperfect Forgiveness', in Lisa Tessman ed. *Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal* (Dordrecht: Springer): 185-204

Michele Moody-Adams (2015) 'The Enigma of Forgiveness' *Journal of Value Inquiry* 49: 161-180

11. Proleptic Relational Response—to self and other – Nov. 17th

*Agnes Callard (2016) 'Proleptic Reasons' *Oxford Studies in Metaethics: II* ed. Russ Shafer-Landau.

[For her expanded view, see her 2019 book *Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming* (OUP)]

*Miranda Fricker (2018) 'Ambivalence About Forgiveness', *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*. Vol. 84. [prolepsis directed to (self and) other] -- [Miranda to present](#)

Bernard Williams (1995) 'Internal Reasons and The Obscurity of Blame', in *Making Sense of Humanity and other philosophical papers 1982-1993* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

James R. Gordon (2020) 'Solving the Self-Transformation Puzzle: The Role of Aspiration' *Educational Theory* 70/5: 617-32

[No class Nov 24]

12. Agency, Identity and Moral Self-transformation – Dec. 1st

*Marya Schechtman (2001) 'Empathic access: the missing ingredient in personal identity' *Philosophical Explorations*, 4(2): 95-111

*Catriona Mackenzie (2008) 'Imagination, identity, and self-transformation' in *Practical identity and narrative agency*, pp. 121-145

Ryan Kemp (2015) 'The Self-Transformation Puzzle: On the possibility of radical self-transformation' *Res Philosophica* 92/2: 389-41

Barry Vaughan, (2006) 'The internal narrative of desistance' *The British Journal of Criminology*, 47(3): 390-404

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