Andronicus of Rhodes

In this chapter, I argue that a late ancient interpretation of the *Categories* can be traced to Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BCE. According to this interpretation, the treatise helps to train us in the demonstration of truth (ἀπόδειξις), and not merely in the practice of persuasive rhetoric or dialectic. Andronicus sought to breathe new life into Aristotle’s vision of demonstrative science, and he found the *Categories* especially valuable for this function. In particular, Andronicus believed that the *Categories* helps us to distinguish per se predications whose subject and predicate both fall in the first category (for instance: ‘Socrates is a man’) from per accidens predications whose predicate falls in one of the non-substance categories (for instance: ‘Socrates is pale’, ‘tall’, or ‘hungry’). The former, Andronicus argues, can be used to construct good definitions and so to engage in the rudiments of demonstration by way of division (διάίρεσις), while the latter cannot. This interpretation partially explains Andronicus’ motivation for placing the treatise in so prominent a position in his catalogue of the Aristotelian corpus and rechristening it,

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1 The dichotomy between demonstration and persuasion was, I think, treated as exhaustive by Andronicus, following the Hellenistic tradition (compare Diogenes Laertius 5.28, discussed below: rhetoric and dialectic are treated as proper subdivisions of persuasion, and both as distinct from demonstration of the truth). If my interpretation is correct, Andronicus treats the *Topics* as concerned with the latter, and used the word ‘dialectic’ in the sense of DL 5.28, as a subdivision of persuasion, not in the Stoic sense, where it might include demonstrative proofs.

2 Based on the examples that I draw from Boethius *De Div.* below, I think this argument was made primarily about the definition of substances (for example, ‘man is an animal’); defining non-substances (‘black is a colour’) seems to have been regarded as less interesting by Andronicus, or at least is less represented in the fragmentary sources. As I also discuss below, Andronicus seems to have treated the first category as (more or less) a category of substance (οὐσία).
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promoting the title *Categories* in place of the apparently earlier title *Before the Topics*.

I suggest that Andronicus found the *Categories* to be suitable for beginners in philosophy, primarily due to the relatively non-technical manner in which Aristotle wrote about the categories themselves—the central descriptions of the features of substances or real beings (ch. 5), quantities (ch. 6), relatives (ch. 7), qualities (ch. 8), and several other non-substance categories. I argue further that on Andronicus’ view, the descriptions of the ten ἴδια in the central chapters of the *Categories* articulate the beginner’s innate preconceptions (προλήψεις) of the most general kinds of being. The *Categories* is particularly effective in this introductory capacity because it offers only ὑπογραφαί, ‘sketch accounts’ or ‘delineations’, of each genus rather than attempting to provide formal definitions (which would be difficult for the beginner, and impossible to provide for the highest genera). Thus pedagogical considerations, underwritten by a more or less Hellenistic epistemology, also underwrite Andronicus’ value for the treatise. In addition, there is some pragmatic value in the *Categories* for use in debate: its ὑπογραφαί provide simple heuristics for checking the genus to which a given term belongs, enabling us to defeat various sophistical arguments that turn on equivocation by distinguishing clearly between essential and accidental modes of predication.

This way of exploiting the *Categories*, I think, helps to explain why Andronicus found the work interesting and relocated it to the front of his influential catalogue and publication of Aristotle’s treatises. That relocation in turn drew attention to the work and spurred wider interest in it. I do not want to argue that Andronicus’ substantive ideas about the treatise were *themselves* the source of that interest, but I do suggest that there are signs of engagement with Andronicus’ thought in the contemporary and later exegetical tradition on the *Categories*. His interpretation may have been followed in the main by Boethus of Sidon (see ch. 6), and in turn influenced Porphyry and the later Neoplatonist tradition. I also argue in ch. 3 that there are signs of philosophical engagement with Andronicus in the evidence for Eudorus’ interpretation of the *Categories* (and perhaps vice versa). And even if Andronicus did not think that the *Categories* was a work of ontology, his emphasis on the distinction that it drew—on his view—between talk of real beings (picked out through per se predication) and their accidents (picked out only in their relation to other
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things) anticipates the ontological reading of the Categories that would become common even to the present.

I. LIFE AND HISTORY

Andres δ’ ἐγένεντο ὑμήμης ᾧξιος πολλοὶ στρατηγάται τε καὶ ἄθληται, ἓν εἰς καὶ οἱ Παναιτίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρόγονοι τῶν δὲ πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περί λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίαν δ’ τε Παναίτιος αὐτὸς καὶ Στρατοκλῆς καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων καὶ Λεωνύθης ὁ στοικός.

Many men worthy of remembrance, commanders and athletes, were born [on Rhodes]. Among them are the forebears of Panaetius the philosopher. Among the statesmen, rhetoricians, and philosophers are Panaetius himself; Stratocles; Andronicus the Peripatetic; and Leonides the Stoic.

Strabo 14.2.13

Regrettably, we remember relatively little of Andronicus the Peripatetic, ἀνήρ ὑμήμης ᾧξιος. From Strabo we know that he was born on

Rhodes, a centre of Peripatetic learning since Eudemus; his later eponym Ὄπιδος (Plutarch, Sulla 26.1, 9) is consistent with this origin, and his philosophical affiliation is suggested in epithets such as ὁ ἐκ τῶν περιστάτων οἱ περιστατηγικοὶ by Strabo, Galen (An. Corp. 4.782 Kühn), and Porphyry (VP 24.7). His work was sufficiently familiar to later Peripatetic commentators that he could be mentioned as Ἀνδρώνικος without prior introduction or qualification (Alexander in An. Pr. 161,1; Porphyry in Cat. 125,22), and his lucidity as an exegete of the Aristotelian text was respected in late antiquity, particularly following Porphyry: he wins praise from Themistius (in De. An. 32,22–4), and Ammonius refers to him as a successor to Aristotle in the Peripatetic scholarchate (in De Int. 5.29).4 The tradition about his scholarchate seems to presuppose a degree of respect for Andronicus as a Peripatetic philosopher, either from his contemporaries (if the testimony is literally accurate) or from Ammonius’ later sources (if the testimony was invented, or a product of guesswork). The sources for Andronicus’ life and thought extend from the first century BCE to the sixth century CE, with their focus shifting from (1) biography and bibliography with Strabo and Plutarch (I BCE–I CE)5 to (2) psychology with Galen, Aspasius, and Themistius (I–IV CE)6 before coming to

4 But the credibility of Ammonius’ testimony has been doubted; elsewhere, he bestows the same number (‘eleventh [scholarch] after Aristotle’) on Boethus of Sidon (in An. Pr. 31,11); cf. Lynch (1972), 203–4 and Brink (1940), 938–40.

5 Strabo, the only contemporary source, mentions Andronicus as a ‘noteworthy’ Rhodian philosopher (14.2.13). A century later, Plutarch (Sulla 26.1–2) remarks on the reported role of Andronicus in the recovery and organization of the Aristotelian texts, completing the tale curiously left unfinished in (our text of) Strabo’s thirteenth book (13.1.64). Later, Porphyry (VP 24.7) is clearly interested in Andronicus as a bibliographer of Aristotle, and renews Strabo’s and Plutarch’s intrigue with the fate of the Aristotelian and Theophrastan library and Andronicus’ pinakes.

6 Galen (Quod animi mores 782,14) refers to an Andronicus account of the soul as a ‘blend’ (κράσις) or ‘power’ of the body: as we shall see, this doctrine is plainly expressed in a Stoic context. The Christian apologist Hippolytus (Ref. 5.21.1–5) curiously notes Andronicus’ doctrine of ‘blending’ as an authoritative resource for the Gnostic Sethians in describing the relationship of soul to matter. Aspasius (in Eth. 44,18–45,5) focuses on Andronicus’ account of pathos as a hupolépsis of the soul, echoed by the pseudo-Andronicus Peri Pathôn, itself a highly Stoicizing work. In the fourth century, Themistius (in An. 31,1–32,34) provides a first-hand quotation from Andronicus in defense of Xenocrates’ doctrine of the soul as a self-moving number. In this full paragraph Andronicus describes psychic χράσις in his own words, explaining that ‘the [self-moving] soul is the cause of the blend’ of ‘the primary elements in accordance with specific ratios and numbers’.

italicize replace “Ref.” with “if he is the author of Ref.” & italicize “Ref.”
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rest upon (3) logic with Porphyry\(^7\) and the later Neoplatonists (III–VI CE).\(^8\)

Andronicus is \(\mu\nu\eta\mu\rho\sigma\,\zeta\iota\sigma\) because his name is attached to a prodigious expansion in the study of Aristotle’s ‘esoteric’ texts during the first century BCE, whose causes are not yet clearly understood.\(^9\) (The label ‘esoteric’ applies to the technical treatises by Aristotle that we now possess, such as the *Topics* and *Physics*; it is used to contrast these treatises against Aristotle’s ‘exoteric’, published *Dialogues*, which were popular in antiquity but have survived only in fragments. Andronicus himself, in drawing attention to a series of letters attributed to Aristotle, may have done something to popularize the distinction and privilege the esoteric texts).\(^10\) Andronicus’ attachment

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\(^{7}\) Alexander of Aphrodisias (in *An. Pr.* 1 160,28–161,1), with later sources such as Ammonius (in *De Int.* 5,28 and 7,13) and Philoponus (in *Cat.* 27,18–26 and 45,8–12), takes an interest in Andronicus’ opinion, evidently unique in antiquity, that the *De Interpretatione* was not written by Aristotle. Porphyry famously develops an abiding interest in the *Categories*, and in this he seems to have taken his cue from Andronicus. Indeed Andronicus is quoted in Porphyry’s commentary by *Question and Answer* (125,22); and Porphyry’s full *Commentary on the Categories* addressed to Gedalius must have contained many more references, to judge by the array of named citations in Simplicius (including in *Cat.* 21,21–4; 26,17; 36,3; 54,8–21; 63,22–8; 134,5; 142,34–143,1; 144,7–15; 150,31–151,7; 153,29–155,2; 157,18–22; 159,32; 202,5; 214,22; 258,15; 163,19–22; 266,6; 269,21; 270,2; 332,15; 342,23; 347,6; 357,28; 359,16; 379,9–11; 385,3–9). The *De Divisione* of Boethius, which draws on an essay by Porphyry in his *Sophist* commentary, cites Andronicus and may be modelled on an Andronican publication of the same name (*Andronicus... de divisione liber editus*, 4,3–11 Magee).

\(^{8}\) We know that Iamblichus followed Porphyry’s lead in commenting on the *Categories*, and a notice in Simplicius indicates that Iamblichus ‘followed Andronicus’ in at least one point of exegesis (in *Cat.* 144,7–14). Simplicius himself offers the most prolific preserved resource for Andronican doxography in his own *Commentary on the Categories*. Simplicius appears to be heavily dependent on Porphyry, and the names of Andronicus and Boethus do not frequently occur except in Porphyry’s company. The later Neoplatonists, including John Philoponus (in *Cat.* 5,19) and Ammonius, offer some biographical details that have been doubted due to their late date, including Andronicus’ putative scholarchate and his relationship to Boethus of Sidon.

\(^{9}\) See for example Moraux (1973) I; Gottschalk (1987), 1089–97; Tarán (1981); and Sharples (2008).

\(^{10}\) On the distinction between exoteric works and esoteric (or ‘acroamatic’) works, and their respective readership in the Hellenistic period, see for example Barnes 1997: 12–16; Hatzimichali 2013: 12, 26. There is already some evidence in Aristotle for the distinction, for instance in *Eudemian Ethics* 2.1 1218b34 (‘All goods are either outside or in the soul, and of these those in the soul are more desirable; this distinction we make even in our popular discussions’). On the role of Andronicus’ publication of the ‘letters’ in helping to cement the distinction and privilege the esoteric works, see...
to the expansion of interest in Aristotle’s ‘esoteric’ treatises is first explicitly attested, in our record, by Plutarch (Sulla 26); a century earlier, Strabo, while speaking in markedly similar terms (Geog. 13.1.54),\(^\text{11}\) describes the sorry state of Aristotle’s works in the hands of inferior booksellers, but stops short of mentioning the editorial rescue allegedly mounted by Andronicus\(^\text{12}\)—whom Plutarch credits with a corrected, usable publication of Aristotle and Theophrastus. This collection served to revitalize a Peripatos previously incapacitated, on Strabo’s account, by the loss of its founder’s school texts. Coupled with the report of Porphyry (VP 24) that Andronicus organized the corpus into its contemporary form, these texts have traditionally substantiated the legend of a Roman ‘critical edition’ woven in Andronicus’ hands, constituting the foundation of our modern Aristotle. The evidence for this tradition is scanty,\(^\text{13}\) especially if we understand textual criticism to be the central activity of an editor;\(^\text{14}\) but if we understand the cataloguing and organization of the Aristotelian canon as Andronicus’ primary achievement, his claim to fame seems valid. This leads to the central point that I hope to highlight in the following sections: whatever the status of Andronicus’ editorial achievement, his organization of the reading order of the Aristotelian treatises had a lasting impact, as Plutarch (Sulla 26.1–2) and Porphyry (Life of Plotinus 24.7) both attest. Andronicus’ relocation of a (then little-known) Aristotelian treatise to the forefront of his catalogue deserves to be treated as an influential event in the history of philosophy.

Hatzimichali 2013: 26; Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights 20.5) links Andronicus to the correspondence attributed to Aristotle. I am grateful to Stephen Menn for comments on an earlier draft that helped to clarify this issue.

\(^{11}\) On the possibility of a common source, see Moraux I: 21–4, with Barnes 1999: 9, 19–20.

\(^{12}\) Perhaps, as Barnes suggests, because the text is corrupt. In that case, Plutarch may be simply reporting Strabo. On the other hand, H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879) 216 proposed that Plutarch simply fabricated a connection between Strabo’s Apellicon story and the fact that the current catalogue of the day carried the name of Andronicus. See Moraux I: 48 and following for discussion.

\(^{13}\) See Barnes (1997), with discussion below.

\(^{14}\) For the division of ‘editorial’ work into textual criticism and canon-organization, see Hatzimichali 2013:1, 18–23. Note for example that Andronicus did not read \(l\ddot{y}g\)os τις σῶτας in the opening lines of the Categories (in Cat. 54,8–21: his text omits τις σῶτας, perhaps in keeping with his wider point that predication of a subject is not limited to the first category), and was not followed in the later tradition.
When did Andronicus live and work? This is a knotty problem. It is widely agreed that he was active in the first century BCE. According to John Philoponus (in Cat. 5.16–19), Andronicus taught Boethus of Sidon, himself a ‘brilliant’ scholar (θαυμάσιος, Simplicius in Cat. 1.18) whose ‘quick-witted’ (πολλὴς ἀγχυνοίας, 11.23) defenses and exegeses of Aristotle’s Categories might appear, to a loyal reader of Simplicius, to have left his mysterious Platonizing opponent Lucius intellectually far behind. If we trust Philoponus, we can set a reasonably sure date for Andronicus’ activity. Boethus’ philosophized with Strabo (συνεφίλοσοφήσαμεν, Geog. 16.2.24) as a teacher or a fellow-student, and Strabo’s birth can be fixed around 63/64 BCE. That might place Boethus’ activity, as a student of Andronicus, not much before the middle of the first century BCE, and consequently establish Andronicus’ floruit around the late seventies (Moraux) or sixties (Gottschalk). (Boethus’ plain adaptation and defense of Andronicus’ definition of pathos (Aspasius in Eth. 44.24) lends weight, I think, to the biographical claim that he was Andronicus’ pupil.)

We might be reluctant to rely upon Philoponus’ isolated notice, however, which was composed centuries after the fact. Düring, following Brink, would view Andronicus and Boethus as near contemporaries, and date Andronicus’ publication of Aristotle and Theophrastus around the thirties BCE: after all, Cicero would surely have mentioned Andronicus had a seminal Peripatetic publication circulated under his name before 43 BCE, yet Cicero calls another man, Cratippus of Pergamon, the leading Peripatetic in Athens (Off.

15 The ambiguity turns on the force of συνεφίλοσοφήσαμεν + dat. in ὃς συνεφίλοσοφήσαμεν ἥμεις τὰ Λαοστεία; it could imply ‘as a teacher’, or ‘as a fellow-learner’.
16 On Strabo’s dates, see W. Aly, ‘Strabo (3)’, Realencyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft 4 (1932), 76–155.
19 It has been argued that the later Neoplatonists, such as Philoponus and Ammonius, really knew nothing about Andronicus, save what they read in the sources available to us: see L. Tarán, ‘Aristotelianism in the 1st century BC’, in Tarán, Collected Papers, Leiden/Köln/Boston 2001, pp. 479–524, in particular pp. 495–7.
20 Düring (1957), 420–5 proposes a date between 40 and 20 BCE; for earlier views see C.O. Brink in RE suppl. 7 (1940), 938.
21 On Cratippus see Moraux I: 223–56.
1.1.1, 3.2.5; *Tim*. 1.1). Conversely, if Barnes (1997) is right to doubt whether Andronicus’ work made any ‘splash’ at all during his lifetime, this line of reasoning loses its speculative bite; and Gottschalk (1987) casts doubt on it for other reasons. We shall return to this problem in more detail below.22

Where did Andronicus do his research, after an early life presumably (on Strabo’s testimony) occupied on Rhodes? If Ammonius of Alexandria is telling an historical truth when he claims the eleventh Peripatetic ‘scholarchate’ for Andronicus,23 then it is possible to infer, with Gottschalk and others, that Andronicus’ activity centred around Athens. Adopting the later chronology, it has been proposed that Strabo, Andronicus, and Boethus attended the same lectures,24 and even met as young men in Alexandria, where Strabo spent time (2.3.5); perhaps it was there that Strabo heard Tyrannio at some point in the middle forties (cf. 12.3.16). But this is pure speculation. It had at one point seemed fairly clear that Andronicus had to visit Italy in order to produce his collection, the putative ‘Roman edition’ of Aristotle. However, it is not self-evident from Plutarch’s text (*Sulla* 26) that Andronicus obtained physical access to the particular copies in Sulla’s library, as Tyrannio did.

What we do learn from Plutarch’s source, speaking in *oratio obliqua*, is that Andronicus had ‘ready access’ to the copies (τὰ

22 In this context (*De Off.* 1.1, 3.2) Cicero is praising a tutor who was ‘like a father’ to his son (cf. *Ad Tironem* xxii): even if word of Andronicus’ work had already reached him at the time of this composition, and even if he viewed these improved texts as philosophically important, why should Cicero retail the scholarly merits of Cratippus’ contemporaries or rivals here? There is no reason to suppose that one of the greatest contemporary Peripatetics (Cicero, *Tim* 1.1), renowned as a teacher, would lose his mystique as soon as booksellers replaced Tyrannio’s lousy text with a better edition. The argument *ex silentio* is more persuasive: but I do not see that an Andronican ‘edition’ or ‘collection’ could not have been published before 43 BCE just because Cicero fails to mention it (despite his readiness to give names); if Triclinius’ ground-breaking work on Greek tragedy and comedy, fifteen centuries later, is a fair comparandum, it could easily take decades until a critical mass of scholars—the sources of the tradition reported by Strabo and Plutarch—recognized the importance of such a work of close philology. There seem to be two variables in play: (1) when Andronicus made his collection public, and (2) when the sources of the tradition reported by Strabo and Plutarch resolved that it was a superior text, and worthy of primary attention. I return to this point below.


24 Düring (1957), 413, condemned by Barnes (3) as a ‘garbled invention’. *(1997: 3)*
II. WORKS AND EDITORIAL ACTIVITY:
BEGINNING WITH THE CATEGORIES

A number of works have been attributed to Andronicus, including his catalogue of the treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus, a paraphrase of the *Categories*, a book *On Division* (which was read by Plotinus and Porphyry, and later on influenced Boethius through Porphyry), and a spurious, surviving treatise Περὶ Παθῶν (ed. Glibert-Thirry 1977). But scholarly interest naturally focuses on reports of his ‘Roman edition’ of Aristotle. The available sources for this editorial activity can be read with varying results. Jonathan Barnes’ skepticism about the sources is surely healthy, and sounds a cautionary note about

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26 For this point see Hatzimichali 2013: 17–18.
27 For a brief review of these works with references, see Appendix 2.
the preconceptions latent in the earlier consensus broadly shared (with some differences) by Gottschalk, Düring, and Moraux.

Here I would like to focus on the evidence for the claim that Andronicus relocated the *Categories* in his catalogue of Aristotle’s works, and that he had philosophical reasons for doing so. (A more detailed overview of the issues relating to the ‘library’ of Aristotle’s esoteric works can be found in Appendix 2). For these purposes, we can leave aside the attractive image of Andronicus as textual critic and compositor of treatises, and focus on his status as a publisher and a cataloguer, and most importantly organizer, of the corpus. The order in which Andronicus presented the works, and the arguments that he made in favour of that order, appear to have been among his most lasting contributions to Peripatetic thought. He certainly published a catalogue (πίνακας) of Aristotle and Theophrastus. It was the source of the catalogues current in Plutarch’s day, on the cusp of the second century (τοῦς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας, Sulla 26.1–2), and it would function as an influential model for Porphyry in the third century, as discussed below. The catalogue of ‘Ptolemy the Unknown’ shows that a catalogue carrying Andronicus’ name also possessed ‘canonical’ status in Ptolemy’s own lifetime (whenever that might have been), and that it was not like the Hellenistic catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.22–27)—which, notably, omits our *Categories* (under that title) altogether.

More than a century after Plutarch, Andronicus’ stylistic example was followed by Porphyry—and presented, as the *Life of Plotinus* (24.7) implies, in order to underwrite and justify Porphyry’s own approach to the *Enneads*. Porphyry famously observed that he followed Andronicus who ‘divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises and collected related material together’ (τὰ

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30 See the edition of the catalogue of Ptolemy by Hein (1985); I am indebted to Stephen Menn for pointing me to this work. The name ‘Ptolemy the Unknown’ or ‘the Stranger’ likely derives from the misunderstanding of Πτολεμαῖος Χένος as Πτολεμαῖος Ξένος; see Rashed 2005: ccvii, Hatzimichali 2013: 19 n. 57. The catalogue had at least five books, if not more (see item 97 in Düring 1957: 23); Littig 1894: 18–25 offers a reconstruction, and Plezia 1946: 16–35 studies it in detail, as does Moraux 1973: 58–94. For the importance of Diogenes’ catalogue, and the fact that it is more than a mere ‘library list’, see Hatzimichali 2013: 23–4.

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Aristotelous καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διείλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταῖς ταύταις συναγαγών). This does not mean that Andronicus invented treatises by pulling together previously unrelated material and adding bridge passages, but that he pulled related treatises together, and within each collection organized the treatises, likely in such a way that easier or ‘lighter’ material came first (as Porphyry characterized his own practice: ἐκάστη δὲ ἐννεάδι τὰ οἰκεία φέρον συνεφόρησα δοὺς καὶ τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν, 24.14–16). This final point, I think, deserves somewhat greater emphasis than it usually receives: giving τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν, the starting position to the lighter material, is also the reasoning that Porphyry endorses in explaining the location of the Categories at the outset of the Aristotelian curriculum (in Cat. 59,21–22), and the argument that Porphyry provides for the introductory nature of his own Isagoge (1,8–9) as a precursor to the study of categories (εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Αριστοτέλει κατηγορίων διδασκαλίαν, 1,2–3).

We can infer from later reports that Andronicus’ catalogue opened with the Categories and the other books that comprise the Organon (probably including De Interpretatione, although this may have carried a mark of dubious authorship), and that here, or elsewhere, Andronicus provided some justifications for the position of ‘logic’ at the propylaea of Aristotelian studies (discussed below); this organization of the corpus was also to prove influential. Indeed, it was one area where the later tradition, including Porphyry and the Neoplatonists, favoured Andronicus’ view over that of his ‘pupil’ Boethus (cf. Philop. in Cat. 5,15–20), who recommended commencing the study of Aristotle with physics. As we have at least some evidence that Andronicus felt the need to argue for the usefulness and importance of logic in his effort to build an Aristotelian ‘system’ based on the corpus, we may infer that this was not taken for granted, and that Andronicus played something of an original role in asserting (or reasserting) the importance of logic in Peripateticism, and of

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32 Andronicus might have included De Int. in his catalogue, and maintained its usefulness, while ‘athetizing’ it as the work of another author. That is, he might consistently have endorsed the views represented in De Int. as useful and integral to the project of the Organon, while denying that Aristotle wrote it. In this context, it is worth considering that Andronicus did not think that the truth was coextensive with Aristotle’s written views: for instance, Andronicus appears to have disagreed with Aristotle concerning the names and functions of the categories ‘where’ and ‘when’.
32 Andronicus on the Categories

Peripatetic logic in general. This would be supported by the evidence that Andronicus paid special attention to the Categories, if this is not merely an artifact of the later sources.

III. ANDRONICUS ON THE CATEGORIES

Next is the third heading, where in Aristotle's writings one should start. Well, Boethus of Sidon says that one should always start from the treatment of physics, since this is more familiar and knowable for us, and one should start from the things that are more clear and knowable. But his teacher, Andronicus of Rhodes, examining [the issue] more exactly, said that one should first begin with logic, which is concerned with demonstration. (Philoponus, in Cat. 5,15–20, tr. Sharples 2010, lightly modified)

When Andronicus and his pupil Boethus defended their respective teaching routines, it was a commonplace that philosophical discourse (ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος) fell naturally into three provinces: logic, ethics, and physics. Antiochus of Ascalon had traced the tripartition to the Old Academy in the fourth century BCE (Cicero, Ac. 1.19; for the attribution to Xenocrates, see also Sextus, Adv. Math. 7.16). But its lasting influence was mediated by the Hellenistic Stoa, where the

33 We are aware that Andronicus provided a ‘paraphrase’ of the Categories (so Porphyry via Simplicius: in Cat. 26,17, 30,3), and we are not directly aware of any other such ‘paraphrases’; this may merely be an accident of preservation, but in other cases where Andronican ‘readings’ are cited, such as the Physics (cf. Simplic. in Phys. 440,13), it appears that Andronicus has offered a reading of the Aristotelian text rather than an interpretive paraphrase. This too might suggest some special concern with logic.

34 Τρίτον ἢ ἐφεξῆς κεφάλαιον τὸ πόθεν δεὶ ἄρχεσθαι τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων. Βόθρος μὲν οὖν φησιν ὁ Σιδώνιος δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἄρχεσθαι πραγματείας ἢτε ἦτον συνθετέρας καὶ γνωρίμων, δεῖν δὲ δεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σαφεστέρων ἄρχεσθαι καὶ γνωρίμων. ὁ δὲ τούτων διδάσκαλος Ανδρόνικος ὁ Ῥώδιος ἀκριβέστερον ἐξετάζων ἔλεγεν χρῆσαι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἄρχεσθαι, ὡς γάρ τινα ἀπόδειξιν καταγίνεται (ed. Busse 1898).

35 See for example Ierodiakonou 1993. Aristotle divides ethical, physical, and logical propositions at Topics 1.14 (105b19 ff.).

36 Although Sextus may be partially dependent on Antiochus in some of his doxography, See Sedley 2012: 88–93 (and against this Brittain in Sedley 2012: 108–13).

37 DL 7.39–41/LS 268. Academics used sceptical puzzles to undermine the foundations of ‘logic’; Peripatetics treated it as a tool (organon) of theoretical and practical
order of study had also attracted healthy debate: Zeno and Chrysip-
pus, for instance, had introduced philosophy with logic, Panaitius
and Posidonius with physics. Colourful analogies competed in sup-
port of each position, as philosophy was represented as an egg with
logic for its shell, or a living being with physics for its flesh.

Andronicus would not have accepted the tripartition in such terms,
since he treated logic as a tool serving philosophical inquiry rather
than a proper part of it (see below). Nevertheless, in disputing the
order of study Andronicus and Boethus were both conscious of
contributing new arguments to an old debate. Boethus’ case against
Andronicus builds on Aristotle’s text (λέξις)—a characteristically
Boethan strategy. The quest to understand principles, as Aristotle
suggests, begins from what is familiar to us, and proceeds toward
what is knowable by nature (see for example Physics A.1
184a17–21), a course that runs from the particular and perceptible
toward the universal and intelligible (An. Post. A.2, 71b33–72a5). The
particular and perceptible objects of physics (and of the Physics)
are undeniably ὁσῆστερος and γνώριμος. So we should begin there.

Andronicus, on the other hand, seems to have argued for logic’s
pedagogical priority based on the familiar Peripatetic characterization
of logic (cf. DL 5.28) as an instrument or tool (ὁργανοῦ):

[W]here to start on Aristotle’s writings... Andronicus of Rhodes, the
eleventh of the successive heads of the Aristotelian school, said with
logic... Those who said that one should begin with logic asserted that
logic is an instrument (ὄργανον), and that one should first know the
instrument and then, on this basis, where the instrument should be
used. For that is how it is in the case of the crafts; the trainee carpenter
first learns the ὄργανα, for example the augur and the gimlet, and then

philosophy rather than a proper part (cf. DL 5.28); and Epicureans simply denied that
it had any real function (e.g. Cicero, Ac. 2.97).

38 See Sharples (2010), 43.
39 Andronicus might also have summoned up some textual support for his alter-
native view: Metaphysics Z.4–5, for instance, might be interpreted as suggesting that
logical (λογικὸς) considerations are more ‘knowable to us’ and are the natural place to
begun philosophical inquiry (1029b7–13). But there is no evidence that Andronicus
relied on such textual authority; cf. Peramatzis 164. The Topics also presents dialectic
as useful to a wide range of disciplines: περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλέματος ἐξ
ἐνδοκοί... (A.1, 100a18–24).
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on this basis begins on the [craft] of carpentry itself. (Elias, in Cat. 117,17–118,31, tr. Sharples 2010)⁴⁰

That analogy, though firmly rejected by the Stoics,⁴¹ illustrated a carefully considered Peripatetic position⁴² that probably developed in response to Stoic doctrine.⁴³ The analogy highlights a preference for developing logic just so far as it is useful (χρήσιμον; cf. Alex. in An. Pr. 2,35–4,29) to two real domains of philosophical inquiry, namely practical and theoretical philosophy, while stopping short of Stoic hair-splitting and empty formalism.

Like these Peripatetics, and like Antiochus of Ascalon earlier in the first century (cf. Cic. Ac. 1.30–32, 2.91–92), Andronicus’ interest also

⁴⁰ τίς ἡ ἀρχή τῶν Ἀριστοτελίκων συγγραμμάτων... Ανδρόνικος δὲ ὁ Ῥώδιος ὁ Περιπατητικός ὁ ἐνδέκατος διάδοχος τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους σχολῆς ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἑλεγ... οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν ὅτι δεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ἀδρέσθαι ἐφασκὸν ὅτι ὀργανον (20) ἡ λογική καὶ δεῖ πρῶτον εἶδενα τὸ ὀργανον καὶ έλθεντο που δεὶ χρήσιμον τῷ ὀργάνῳ οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ θυσίας τεχνῶν ἔχειν ὃ γὰρ φοιτήσας εἰς τέκτων πρῶτον μαθάναι τὰ ὀργανα, ἵνα τρόπον ἐπεκείνων, καὶ έλθεντο οὕτως ἀδρέσθαι αὐτής τῆς τεκτονικῆς (ed. Busse 1900).

⁴¹ Generations of Stoics had already rejected the general thrust of this Peripatetic argument, denying that logic was merely an instrument (e.g. LS 26E): instead, it was the child of mother philosophy; or the shell of an egg; or the wall of a garden; or the bones of a living being.

⁴² The view that logic was a tool of philosophy seems fairly unlikely to have originated with Andronicus, as Gottschalk (1990: 66 and 1987: 1099) suggests, if the Stoics considered and refuted the possibility, and especially if the doxography in DL 5 is Hellenistic.

⁴³ Alexander’s treatment in the preface to his commentary on the Prior Analytics (1,3–2,34) might suggest that the exchange ran along the following lines: Zeno (who took logic to be a part of philosophy: DL 7.39) resisted an earlier Peripatetic systematization that subsumed logic under theoretical philosophy, by objecting that the subject-matter proper to logic was independent (1,10–2,2); the Peripatetics in their turn introduced their ‘instrumental’ language (organon not being deployed in this sense by Aristotle, at least in his school-treatises—unless, as Barnes et al. point out, Topics 163b9–11 provided them with inspiration) and maintained against the Stoa that logic was not an independent object of study, because it served a useful purpose apart from itself, as a hammer facilitates carpentry but is not a part of carpentry; the Stoa rejoined that philosophy produces logic as a parent produces a child (Ammonius in An. Pr. 8,20–22, 9,1–2 = LS 26E), whereas tools are not the product of the crafts which they serve; to which the Peripatetics replied that nothing in fact prevents a tool from being the product of its own craft, still maintaining the inclusion of logic under theoretical philosophy (where the doxography in DL 5 still finds it). The course of the debate—and its reliance on the details of an analogy—may seem a little silly and tendentious, but it does encode a crucial point: the Peripatetics felt that logical formalism, pursued too far in its own right (on the perceived line of the Stoics), could become empty and useless if it was divorced too far from its purpose. See also Sharples et al. Theophrastus 31.
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ran toward the utility of logic (the demonstrative sort of logic that Antiochus called ‘dialectic’, although Andronicus likely reserved that title for the practice of the Topics). What exactly was logic useful for? Hellenistic Peripatetics had developed the view that logic served two functions, namely persuasion and judgement; so runs the (probably Hellenistic) doxography in Diogenes Laertius:

Logic is developed... as a tool (δραγνων). [Aristotle] clearly proposed that it has two goals, what is persuasive and what is true. He used two capacities for each of these, dialectic and rhetoric for what is persuasive, analytic and philosophy for what is true... With a view to discovery, he handed down [to us, in] the Topics and Methodics, a multiplicity of premises, from which one may have an abundance of persuasive arguments... For judgement [he handed down] the Prior and Posterior Analytics. (DL 5.28)

Andronicus, as we shall see below, appears to have divided logic along similar lines (for he argued that a logical treatise by Aristotle, the Categories, must belong either to dialectic or to demonstration, but not to both). According to such a view, if you divide logos in two you will find persuasive speaking, on the one hand, and demonstrative proof, on the other; a Peripatetically minded student with access to Aristotle’s school-treatises might choose to study the Topics for the first, and the Analytics for the second.

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44 As an essential ‘judge of truth and falsehood’; similar views can be found (for example) in Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories. Thus, for example, Andronicus celebrated the utility of division (diatresis) as it was practised by the Peripatetics, and Porphyry followed him (Boethius De Div. 875D): ‘Quam magnos studiósos afferat fructus scientia dividendi, quamque apud peripateticam disciplinam, semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronic, diligentissimi senis, de divisione liber editus...

45 Καὶ τοσαῦτα μὲν αὐτῷ πεπραγμάτευται βιβλία. βούλεται δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τάδε- διττόν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον, τὸν μὲν πρακτικὸν, τὸν δὲ θεωρητικὸν· καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸν τὴ ἥβης καὶ πολιτικοῦ, ὡς τὰ τε περὶ πόλιν καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀϊκῶν ὑπογεγραμμάτων τοῦ δὲ θεωρητικοῦ τὸν τὴ φυσικοῦ καὶ λογικοῦ, ὡς τὸ λογικοῦ ὦχ εἶ (5) ὡς ὄλου μέρους, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὄργανον προσηκριβωμένον. καὶ τούτου διπτοῦ υποθέμενος σκοποῦ τὸ τε πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ ἄληθες διασάφης. δίῳ δὲ πρὸς ἐκάστων δυνάμεων ἐχρήσατο, διαλεκτική μὲν καὶ ρητορική πρὸ το πιθανόν, ἀναλυτική δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία πρὸ τὸ ἀληθής· ὡς ὑπολειπόμενος οὔτε τῶν πρὸς εὑρέσεα, οὔτε (10) (29.) τῶν πρὸς κρίσιν, οὔτε μὲν τῶν πρὸς χρήσαν, πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν εὑρέσεα τά τε Τοπικὰ καὶ Μεθοδικὰ παρέδοκε <καὶ> προτάσεων πλήθος, ἢ δὲ πρὸς τὰ προβλήματα πιθανῶν ἑπεξεργαμάτων οίνω τε εὑροειν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν κρίσιν τὰ Αναλυτικὰ πρώτα καὶ ύστερα (ed. Long 1964).
1. The *Categories* introduces demonstration, not dialectic

Bearing in mind this division of persuasive dialectic from rigorous proof, we can trace a more sophisticated complex of concerns running behind Andronicus’ organization of the *Organon*, concerns which are reflected in Philoponus’ comment that Andronicus began philosophy from ‘logic, which is concerned with demonstration (ἀπόδειξις)’ (in Cat. 5,15–20). Andronicus’ basic concern, I think, is suggested by his attempt to dissociate the *Categories* from the *Topics* and dialectic, and associate the treatise instead with the *Analytics* and demonstration.

During his researches into Aristotelian manuscripts, Andronicus found something like our text of the *Categories* prepended to Aristotle’s *Topics* and entitled ‘Preliminary to the *Topics*’.46 This title and positioning struck him as a mistake, made by the same troublemaker who

entitled this book *Preliminary to the Topics* because he thought these things [the post-praedicamenta47 beginning at Cat. 10, 11b17 discussing opposition, priority and posteriority, simultaneity, change, and the senses of ‘having’] necessary for that work [*Top.*] in the same way as the *Categories* themselves help with understanding the *Topics*... Thus far Andronicus.48 (Andronicus ap. Boethium in Cat. 263B)

Andronicus reasonably replied that the *Topics* already has an introduction and does not need another one. More surprisingly, he also contended that association with the *Topics* ran ‘against the purpose (παρὰ τὴν προθέσεαν)’49 of the book that he would retitle *Predications*

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46 Προ τῶν τόπων: Simplicius in Cat. 379,9–11; cf. Προ τῶν τοπικῶν at 15,30, 16,14 and Porph. in Cat. 57,13.
47 So called because they follow after (post) the central list of ten categories (praedicamenta).
48 quod hunc libellum ante Topica scripsit, quodque haec ad illud opus non necessaria esse putauerit, sicut ipse Categoria possunt ad sensum Topicorum (ed. Migne 1891).
49 Prothesis, which Porphyry seems to have used in the same sense as Iamblichus’ later prevalent skopos, is an Aristotelian usage: for example, the *Topics* plainly proclaims that its prothesis is ‘to discover a method by which we will be able to syllogize from endoxa about every problem we encounter...’ (A, 100a18–20); in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle considers that he will accomplish his prothesis when he has gone through each of the subjects he promised to discuss (957a30); and the *Categories* itself uses the word in a somewhat similar sense (‘someone might say’ that Aristotle has gotten off the beaten track by discussing relatives when ‘we proposed to discuss quality [ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεαν ποιησαμένου, 11a20–1’).
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or Categories (Simplic. in Cat. 379.9–10), perhaps in order to emphasize its role as a training-text in predication, itself a propaedeutic to division and demonstration. His latter remark invites scrutiny: while it is easy to grant to Andronicus that the Categories was not written for the purpose of introducing the Topics, it is odd to conclude that the Topics is irrelevant or somehow distracting from the purpose of the Categories. The Categories, after all, could be read as an elementary handbook for an important component of the practice that Aristotle calls ‘dialectic’ in the Topics: it offers intuitive tests for establishing under which genus any term falls.

A parallel passage in Porphyry’s shorter surviving commentary on the Categories, I think, expresses what Andronicus had in mind (56.22–31):

It would be absurd to call the book Introduction to the Topics, for why call it Introduction to the Topics rather than Introduction to the Analytics or Introduction to On Interpretation? It is not for the sake of studying the Topics that one first has to learn about predications (kategorai), but also for the sake of learning about the Analytics and about categorical propositions and just about any other subject. This work is the most elementary one, and serves as an introduction to all the parts of philosophy.

Some later Peripatetics rejected this view and defended the title Πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν. But this passage and its counterparts in Simplicius and Boethius seem like (a precis of) the only serious argument preserved against that title. Andronicus appears to be the strongest

50 On the association, see Menn 1995, Bodéus 2001: lxiv–lxxix.

51 Πρὸ μὲν τῶν τοπικῶν ἀτόπως ἔν τις ἐπιγράφω· διὰ τί γὰρ Πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ μάλλον Πρὸ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν καὶ Πρὸ τοῦ περὶ ἐμμηνείας· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν τῶν τοπικῶν διαδικασίαν προμαθήσων δεῖ τὰ τῶν κατηγορίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν κατηγορικῶν προτάσεων μάθημαν καὶ σχεδόν διὰ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας μάθησιν· στοιχειώδηταν γὰρ τούτοι καὶ εἰσαγωγικόν εἰς πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ βιβλίον· καὶ μάλιστα πρὸ τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἂν εἰς μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἢ πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν φύσεως γὰρ ἐργον οὐσία, τοιὸν καὶ τὰ ὁμοία. Περὶ δὲ τῶν γενόν τοῦ ἄντος ἢ Περὶ τῶν ὕδων οὐδαμῶς χρῆ ἐπιγράφειν (ed. Busse 1887).

52 See Simplicius’ discussion at in Cat. 15.26–16.5, and Elias in Cat. 241.30.

53 On Porphyry’s view, the preliminary study of predications is useful both for the Analytics and the Topics. Andronicus would presumably have allowed this as well: it would have been very odd for him to insist that the study of predications was useful only for the Analytics. But he clearly rejected an exclusivist position that the study of predications was useful only for the Topics. (It is not clear that anyone ever held such a position, but Andronicus took some such argument to underwrite the title Before the Topics.) For Andronicus’ role in the title controversy, see Bodèus (2001: xxv). The
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candidate for the origin of the argument, although Porphyry does not name him here. The point is simply that the Categories is not (only or primarily) an introduction to the Topics’ dialectic, the art of reasoning from plausible endoxa without self-contradiction. Instead, its primary function is to introduce demonstrative argument—that is, the Analytics. It is not yet clear why this should be so, but it does seem clear that Andronicus wishes to associate the Categories with demonstration and to dissociate it from dialectic, or anything else ‘against its purpose’ (Simplic. in Cat. 379.9–10), perhaps including rhetorical uses more broadly. (Indeed, the list of ten categories may well have been in rhetorical use already.)

Furthermore, there seems to be a good deal at stake for Andronicus pedagogically in this association, since he thinks that philosophy begins with logic precisely because logic includes an education in demonstration (Philop. in Cat. 5.19), and that training in this ‘tool’ will enable us to apply judgement and discover the truth in theoretical and practical philosophy (for this view, cf. Simplicius in Cat. 6.4–5,

argument is matched, with trivial variations, at Simplic. in Cat. 15.26–35 (and, renewed in response to Adrastus, from 15.36–16.16), and Boethius in Cat. 162C–D, 263B, etc.

Andronicus, one might suggest, must have offered an argument; if he offered the only argument in the tradition, this is it; if someone else offered an importantly different argument, we could reasonably expect to find them both preserved, but this is all we find.

Porphyry here mentions On Interpretation, which Andronicus athetized; but the substance of the argument has nothing to do with De Int., focusing instead on the function of Cat. as an introduction to the Analytics and demonstration, designedly contrasted against the Topics and dialectic. It is also worth noting that De Int. is mentioned after the Analytics here and in the parallel passages; if Andronicus had argued that the Cat. constituted a good argument to the Analytics and demonstration, a later commentator steeped in the tradition that embraced De Int. between Cat. and An. might easily have added ‘... or Introduction to On Interpretation’ to the skeleton of Andronicus’ case against the title Πρὸ τῶν τῶν. (It might also be added that Andronicus only marked the De Int.’s authorship as questionable: he would not have deleted it from his catalogue, and he need not have deleted it from his logical curriculum; he was, after all, prepared to introduce other non-Aristotelian innovations.) It is perhaps interesting to note that the De Int. itself has been read as a work primarily about dialectic and the study of contradictory premises; if Andronicus interpreted it along similar lines, he might have supposed it had no place between Categories and Analytics, both being concerned with demonstration and not with dialectic.

Quintilian, at least, bears witness that the list of categories were in rhetorical use close to Andronicus’ lifetime: Inst. 3.23–34. cf. Bodéüs 2001: xxii.
Ammonius 6.3–8, Olympiodorus 9.9–11), whereas dialectic will be less useful for this function. Thus Andronicus, like many later students of Aristotle, strives to highlight a method ‘stronger’ than dialectic in Aristotle.\(^{57}\)

Can we obtain any insight into the reasons behind Andronicus’ association of the \textit{Categories} with demonstration? First, to set the scene, we should notice that the endorsement of logical demonstration as a way to the truth, emphasizing division and definition, was a long-lasting Stoic commonplace. The Stoics had championed the value of dialectic through the Hellenistic period, including ‘definition and division and neat syllogistic proof’ (e.g. Cicero \textit{Ac.} 1.5), in order to get at the truth of things. Antiochus endorsed this Stoic methodology and wrapped it into the collective practice that he attributes to the ‘Old Academy’, embracing Plato and Aristotle as well as the Stoics themselves (Cicero, \textit{Ac.} 1.302; cf. Karamanolis 2006, 62–71): Antiochus stressed how the followers of Plato pursued definitions, and etymology, in order to obtain more certain knowledge (\textit{scientia}) than was unavailable in the transient realm of particular things.\(^{58}\) (Cicero, speaking on behalf of Philonian scepticism, believes that sophistical puzzles turning on ambiguity represent a serious challenge to the Antiochean celebration of dialectic. Similar puzzles resurface later in criticism of the \textit{Categories}.)\(^{59}\)

\(^{57}\) Compare for example Irwin 1988, who distinguishes between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ dialectic.

\(^{58}\) Cicero introduces the notion of species (\textit{idea}) and explains that the ‘Old Academics’—including Platonists and Aristotelians—‘approved the method of defining things’ (\textit{definitiones rerum}) in order to gain knowledge (\textit{scientia}) unavailable from the transient world of particulars, and thus ‘approved the explication of words (\textit{verborum explicatio}), the statement of the reason why each class of things bears the name that it does—the subject termed by them \textit{etymologia}...and under this head was imparted their whole discipline of Dialectic’ (tr. Rackham/van den Berg 2008).

\(^{59}\) Cicero offers the following reply to this Antiochean celebration of dialectic. The pro-dialectic crowd, he suggests, has not yet managed to resolve sophistical puzzles turning on ambiguity—such as the sophistical syllogism proposing that a coat is manly, but being manly is brave, so a coat is brave—nor puzzles turning on equivocation, nor old chestnuts like the liar or sorites, nor other cases of ambiguity, in response to which Chrysippus had famously advocated a policy of ‘quiescence’ (\textit{\v{y}a\v{n}y\v{a}\u{c}e\u{v}n}): \textit{Ac.} 2.92–6 = \textit{LS} 37H; cf. Atherton 1993, 180–3, and Bobzien 2005 for the Stoic response to puzzles of this kind. Note that Nicostratus cites such a puzzle against the \textit{Categories} in the newly discovered fragmentary commentary (Chiaradonna, Rashed, Sedley, and Tchernetska 2013, 1,26–3,1).
Andronicus will inhabit this Antiochean atmosphere, exhibiting confidence in the value of dialectic and division, and demonstrating, and tracing these methods to the ancient authority of the Old Academy. Andronicus too is sympathetic to the methods of dialectic in this Stoic sense, and particularly divisio or diaîreîseis, as we have seen both in the Greek sources and will see below in Boethius (De Divisione). Andronicus is also explicitly sympathetic to some views adopted by the Old Academic Xenocrates (cf. Simplic. in Cat. 63,22–8, Themistius in De An. 31,1–32,34). In the generations following Andronicus, however, there is something new, not (so far as our evidence suggests) to be found in Antiochus: where the virtues of division and demonstration are extolled, the ‘ten categories’ are now described a crucial tool, whose value was anticipated by both Plato and Aristotle. Plutarch (perhaps drawing here on Eudorus of Alexandria) and Alcinous offer illustrative examples of this development:

Again he [Plato] gives indications of the ten categories both in the Parmenides and elsewhere, and in the Cratylus he goes thoroughly into the whole topic of etymology. In general, the man was supremely competent in, and a connoisseur of, the procedures of definition, division <and analysis>, all of which demonstrate particularly well the power of dialectic. [...] The imposition of names is according to the nature (φύσις) of the reality (πράγμα). [...] The name is an instrument which teaches about and divides the essence of each reality, as the shuttle does for the weaving of cloth [cf. Cratylus 388B13–C1]. (Alcinous, Didasc. 6, 159,43–160,30, tr. Dillon, 1993).

Not only do the souls of mortal beings possess the capacity to know the sensible (γνωστικήν τοῦ αἰσθητού δύναμιν), but [Plato] adds that the
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soul of the cosmos—whenever she touches the scattered being or the undivided being of anything—is moved throughout her entire being and announces what the object is identical with, and from what it is different, and in what relation (προς τί), and where and how, and when, it comes about that each thing exists (εἶναι) and is acted upon by others (πάσχειν), both in the sphere of becoming and in that of the ever-one. In these words he is also giving an outline of the ten categories; likewise in what follows, he makes the case more clearly ... (Plutarch, de proc. an. 1023D–E)

There is at least a prima facie case that Andronicus may have played a role in this development, absent in Antiochus but growingly important in the following generations, by ‘foregrounding’ the Categories in his catalogue of Aristotle’s technical treatises, representing it as a crucial tool for demonstration and division. I think that this case can be strengthened and clarified by exploring the role that division plays in Andronicus’ view of demonstration.

2. The *Categories* introduces demonstration by cultivating the use of division to construct essential definitions

This section falls into two parts. (a) In the first part, I offer a more general exploration of the fragmentary sources for Andronicus’ interest in the value of division, focusing on the importance of distinguishing *per se* from *per accidens* predication, and drawing primarily on Boethius’ treatise *De Divisione.* Evidence for the relationship of

63 καὶ μὴν οὐ μόνον αἱ τῶν θυτῶν φυχαὶ γνωστικῆς τοῦ αἰσθήτου [E] δύναμιν ἔχουσα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν κόσμων φήσαν [Tim. 37A] ἀνακυκλομένην αὕτην πρὸς ἐνευτή, ὅταν οὐδὲν σκεδασμὸν ἔχοντος τινος ἐφαπτόμετα καὶ ὅταν ἀμέριστον, λέγειν κυκλομένην διὰ πάσης ἐνευτῆς, ὅτι τ’ ἐν τὶ ταὐτῷ ὡς καὶ ὅτου ἡ ἐπορεία, πρὸς δ’ τι τε μᾶλτα καὶ ὅπτη καὶ ὅπως συμβαίνει κατὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα πρὸς ἐκαστόν ἐκαστάτα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν. εἰν τούτου ἀρία καὶ τῶν δέκα κατηγοριών συνωμείους ὑπογραφῆν ἐτι μᾶλλον τοῖς ἐφεξῆς διασαφεῖ (ed. Hubert 1954).

64 This text mentions Eudorus several times previously, in connection with the transmission of Academic views on the *Timaeus* and the construction of the soul, and quotes or cites Eudorus at several points in the treatise; as we know from other sources that Eudorus was interested in the *Categories*, expounded his interest Pythagorically (based on the tenfold nature of reality), and influenced or was influenced by Andronicus of Rhodes, this attribution of the ten categories to Plato here might also be ascribed to Eudorus. For Eudorus’ possible influence here, see also Bonazzi 2013.

these views to the Categories is circumstantial, but bolstered, I believe, in the following section. (b) In the second part, I examine the sources specifically for Andronicus’ overarching division of the ten categories into two, absolute and relative (καθ’ αὐτό and πρὸς τί), and suggest that the motivations for this division might be understood in terms of the sources offered in part (a); in this discussion I rely primarily on the evidence of Simplicius. Broadly, I argue that, on Andronicus’ view, the Categories helps us to distinguish between essential and accidental kinds of predication without prior training in logic, in order that we can begin to study division, and eventually construct good definitions based on essential differentiae rather than accidental features. The Categories’ fourfold division (1a20–1b9) and sketch of the attributes that characterize substances (οὐδέα, 2a12–4b19) in contrast to non-substantial predicates (4b20–11a39) are understood as a framework for the application of Aristotelian essentialism in dialectic or demonstration.

(a) Andronicus on division

Good ancient evidence strongly suggests that Andronicus saw division as crucial for the construction of good definitions, and so for demonstration (cf. Donini 1982: 90–2, Gottschalk 1987: 1115). Combined testimony from Boethius, Porphyry, and Simplicius offers helpful guidance for deducing Andronicus’ position. Recall, Boethius informs us that Andronicus especially praised the art of division (scientia dividendi, διαιρετική):

The book On Division published by Andronicus, a most diligent scholar of old (diligentissimi), treats of the considerable advantages the science of dividing brings to scholars and of the high esteem in which this branch of knowledge was always held within the Peripatetic discipline. Plotinus, a most profound philosopher, thought highly of Andronicus’ book and Porphyry adapted it in his commentary on Plato’s dialogue entitled The Sophist. It was also Porphyry who acknowledged the utility of his Introduction to the Categories with reference to this science.

1982: 90–2 and Gottschalk 1987: 1115 argue that Andronicus intended to connect division and definition. Mansfeld 1992: ch. 5 offers a very helpful excursus on substance, division, and the Categories, including the early commentary tradition: see 74–5 on Andronicus’ De Divisione.
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For he says that a knowledge of genus, species, difference, property, and accident is a necessary prerequisite to, among other things, partitioning, which is of the greatest utility.66 (De Div. 875D–6D, 5,1–11 Magee, 1998)

Andronicus’ evaluation of division as a useful technique for philosophy67 may be partially motivated by the appreciation that he expresses for demonstration (ἀποδεικτικός). As we have seen above, Andronicus believed that mastering Aristotle’s Analytics would be fundamental to a grasp of scientific demonstration, and as a good reader of the Analytics, he would certainly have come away with the impression that the art of division and demonstration are closely intertwined (see for example An. Post. 2.5, 2.13), even if division cannot alone achieve all the results that the Academics had claimed for it (cf. An. Pri. 1.31). Andronicus’ appreciation for διαιρετικός also proved highly influential into late antiquity:68 his influence on Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, especially Porphyry, is also attested in other contexts (cf. Wilberding 2005: 452). I argue here that this emphasis on division will help to understand Andronicus’ reasons for treating the Categories as a crucial introduction to the Analytics.

Of particular relevance for us here, in a passage from the same treatise On Division that John Magee (1998) has persuasively argued to reflect Andronicus’ views, Boethius writes:

The later sect of Peripatetic wisdom [sc. Andronicus]69 discerned in the most diligent manner (diligentissima) the difference between divisions:

66 Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi quamque apud Peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronic diligientissimi senis De diuisione liber editus; et hic idema Plotino grauissimo philosofo comprobatus et in Platonis libri qui Sophistes inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus, et ab eodem per hanc Introductionis laudata in Categorias utilitas. (ed. Magee 1998).
67 See also Donini 1982: 90–1.
68 Marwan Rashed has also drawn attention to the influence of Andronicus’ views on διαιρετικός, as preserved in Boethius, on his ontology, as it was criticized by Alexander of Aphrodisias in two unedited fragments surviving in Arabic (Rashed 2004). Porphyry’s appreciation for ‘division’ in the Isagoge, where he follows various ‘old masters’ (1.8, 1.15), might follow the same source as his discussion of division in his Sophist commentary alluded to by Boethius.
69 On the association with Andronicus, see Magee 1998 ad loc. (167–8) and his introduction. The evidence is circumstantial, but strong. Boethius, reporting a tradition that presumably stems from Porphyry, believes ’that the later sect and Andronicus form a unity... although the historical accuracy of his view is in the end a question of the reliability of his source, Porphyry, or of his interpretation thereof’
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it separated division *per se* and division *secundum accidentem* from one another, and distributed them both. Its predecessors, on the other hand, indiscriminately employed both an accident in place of the genus and accidents in place of species, or differentiae.\(^{70}\) (De Div. 891–2, 48,26–50,5 Magee)

The closing sentence of this passage suggests a criticism of earlier Peripatetics’ lack of care in distinguishing between *per se* and *per accidentem* predication, which in some way vitiated their practice of division. By contrast, the later Peripatetics methodically organized the differentiae used in divisions into the correct silos, recognizing which apply per se and which apply *per accidentem*, and further subdividing these two classes (I take this to be the force of *distribuit* at 48,28–50,1, perhaps generating the kind of ‘tree’ offered by Boethius himself in the *De Divisione*).\(^{71}\)

Some illustration will be useful here. Suppose that I am investigating what a human being (\(\Delta\nu\theta\rho\alpha\pi\tau\omicron\sigma\)) really is (see for example *Metaphysics* 7.17, 1041a25–32), that I have arrived at the genus ‘animal’, and that I plan to divide this genus using differentiae in order to arrive at a specific definition (cf. *Topics* 6.4, 141b26). Suppose next that I use differentiae such as the following: sleeping, sitting, standing, being awake, curly-haired, and grey-eyed.\(^{72}\) I will not get far in Aristotelian science this way, for these accidental or incidental differences—attributes that an animal might lose or gain without ceasing to exist as a member of its kind—are unsuitable for arriving

(Magee 1998: 167). *Diligentissimus* described Andronicus at 4,5 Magee, ‘which suggests that Andronicus is the figure intended here as well’ by the descriptive *diligentissima* at 48,27. Other sources suggest that the division of ‘later’ Peripatetics (*posterior . . . Peripateticae secta*) belongs to the first-century BCE (based on Strabo *Geog.* 13.1,54 and Aspasius in *Eth. Nic.* 44,20). I would add the passage *Simplic. in Cat.* 63,22–6, quoted below, where Andronicus is associated with a division of the *Categories* into absolute and relative, or substantial and accidental; I will discuss this further below.

\(^{70}\) Posterior quidem Peripateticae secta prudentiae differentias diluisionum diligentissima ratione perspexit et per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidentem ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distribuit, antiquiores autem indifferenter et accidente pro genere et accidentibus pro speciebus aut differentiis utebantur . . . (ed. Magee 1998).

\(^{71}\) *Diuisio secundum se* may be *genus in species*, *totum in partes*, *vox in significationes*; *diuisio secundum accidentem* may be *subjectum in accidenta*, *accidentes in subjecta*, *accidentes in accidentia* (6,17–10,27 Magee).

\(^{72}\) Such is the list of *per accidentem* differentiae at Boethius *De Div*. 18,4–8 Magee, combining a list of regularly departing (*statim relinquentes*) and consequent (*consequentes*) accidental differences.
at definitions (see for example Ar. An. Post. 2.5 and 2.13, with commentary in Barnes 1993; Ar. Parts of Animals 1.2–3; Ar. Topics 1.5, 101b38, Boethius De Div. 880D–1D, 16,16–20,19 Magee). Instead, when I undertake to define a reality or substance (οὐσία), I should be careful to predicate only in the first of the ten categories, τί ἐστι (‘what it is’; note that Andronicus may not have distinguished carefully between the Categories’ and Topics’ accounts of the first category, as briefly noted below). Consider Aristotle’s exploration of how we might exhibit the essence of a subject demonstratively using division (An. Post. 2.13, 96a20–97b2): to predicate only in the first category, as Aristotle puts it, requires that I ‘establish things through the genus’ (διὰ τοῦ γένους κατασκευάσαι, 97a27–8), discarding incidental features in the other nine, non-substantial categories like ‘musical’, ‘pale’ (73b5), and the colourful examples cited above by Boethius, and focusing just on what the thing is ‘in itself’ or per se (καθ’ αὑτό: cf. An. Post. 1.4, 73a34–b5). (When Andronicus speaks of per se predication, he seems to have in mind predication in the first category, which he also treats as a category of substance (οὐσία: see also Simplic. in Cat. 63,22–6, discussed below). Thus Andronicus mostly has in mind examples like ‘the human being is an animal’ when he speaks of ‘per se predication’, while he has in mind examples like ‘the human being is pale’ when he speaks of ‘accidental predication’. Andronicus, perhaps like Aristotle in his later development, might restrict the category of ‘what-it-is’ to substances.)

On this interpretation, when I focus just on essential predicates belonging in the first category, focusing my investigation on what belongs to the substantial subject per se, these predicates will prove to represent features that are basically explanatory of my subject and possessed by it in the special sense that, if the subject were to lose those features, the subject would cease to exist. If I investigate the question carefully as it relates to the example of ‘human’ above, I will find that rationality is such a fundamental or essential feature of humanity, a sine qua non for being a human being. That is to say, it holds of a human being ‘in itself’, and I would be able to narrow down a scientific definition of humanity from genus and difference: for example, ‘rational animal’.

73 See Frede 1987: 45, and more broadly, 29–48, on the development of the ‘doctrine of categories’.
There are various ways in which Aristotle thinks that we could go awry in executing this kind of project and so fail to lay the correct groundwork for a good scientific definition, but the first and foremost error is to fail to distinguish those terms that belong to the first category, \( \tau\iota\varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota \), and therefore can be predicated of my subject per se, from those terms that refer to accidents or incidental features. This seems to be the kind of failure with which Andronicus charges ‘earlier’ Peripatetics: possibly he criticized them much as later Aristotelian commentators would criticize the Stoic practice of division and definition, as taking ‘the definition to be no different from the representation of the peculiar characteristic’ or proprium (Alex. in Top. 42,27–43,2: see LS 32E), and thus allegedly losing track of essentialism altogether. A counter-offensive in favour of Aristotelian essentialism, at least in the practical task of developing definitions, might have begun with Andronicus, whose treatment of at least some Aristotelian categories—such as the relative, discussed further below—shows evidence of possible Stoic influence.\(^{74}\)

Be that as it may, we are primarily interested in the role of the Categories in Andronicus’ view. The core of the treatise that Andronicus came to call Categories (the so-called praedicamenta) offers a series of heuristic recipes for just this kind of practice, namely, determining which terms fall under which genera and so enabling the construction of essential definitions. (Indeed, the Categories may be the only place in the corpus where one can go for a sustained account of such a series of recipes for the categories.)\(^ {75}\) Andronicus would have found here a wealth of relatively non-technical outline accounts (\( \upsigma\omega\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\iota \))\(^ {76}\) of the genera for getting this right. For

\(^ {74}\) It might seem surprising for Andronicus to accuse Peripatetics of ignoring such a fundamental Aristotelian position as essentialism, and I would not want to push this point too far. But (a) it may well be that he regarded his predecessors as endorsing something like Stoic logic over Aristotle’s (and, as Alexander would also stress, the Stoics fail to distinguish between essential and accidental features), and (b) if Andronicus himself had anything to do with promoting the story that his predecessors had disregarded or underemphasized the ‘esoteric’ treatises that he was now publishing, it would stand to reason that Andronicus might also accuse them of ignoring important doctrines in those treatises.

\(^ {75}\) For this function of the Categories, once again, see Bodéüs 2001: xxxix and Menn 1995: 319–20.

\(^ {76}\) As Jonathan Barnes has suggested to me in correspondence, a \( \upsigma\omega\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\iota \) of Fs is a proposition of the form ‘Fx iff Gx’ which is informative and true, but not a definition. I argue below that Andronicus took such \( \upsigma\omega\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\iota \) as more accessible to the beginner than a definition, easily explained in terms of everyday experience.
instance, I can test whether the item referred to by a given term is a secondary substance or a non-substantial feature by checking whether it is in the subject, in the technical sense that it is in it ‘not as a part, and unable to exist apart from what it is in’ (*Cat*. 1a24–25): if the answer is affirmative, we have here a non-substantial attribute, such as a quality (say, the *paleness* of Socrates’ body, or the universal quality *colour* to which that paleness belongs), which will not help us to construct a scientific definition. If we were not equipped to make these clear distinctions—that is, if we were unable consistently to locate the category to which a term belonged—the central demonstrative project of definition would become impossible; and in this way, having lost our capacity to construct definitions, we would be prone to slip up in many ways.

The *Categories* has often appeared to be useful for making it possible to speak about the essential features of ordinary, perceptible things (see Mann 2000: 184–204). In general, someone like Andronicus who wished to emphasize the distinction between essential and accidental predication would find particular value in promoting *Categories* 2 (1a20–1b9)’s celebrated fourfold division of items SAID-OF a subject and IN a subject (the following table is adapted from Reinhardt 2007: 515, also discussed above in the Introduction):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cat. 2, 1a20–b9</th>
<th>Beings IN a subject</th>
<th>Beings not IN a subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beings SAID-OF a subject</strong></td>
<td>Genera and species of non-substantial items</td>
<td>Genera and species of primary substances (i.e. secondary substances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beings not SAID-OF a subject</strong></td>
<td>Individual non-substantial items, such as ἡ τις γραμματεύει (‘some particular knowledge of grammar’)</td>
<td>Primary substances, individuals, e.g. ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος (‘some particular human being’)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the project of generating divisions that construct good definitions, in turn facilitating demonstration, the *Categories* would appear useful on several fronts. The reader may learn to narrow down what counts

I stress the word ὑπογραφαί here because I will argue below that this ‘non-technical’ nature of the descriptions of the genera in the *Categories* made it especially useful for Andronicus’ introductory purposes.
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in the first category, building from the Categories’ clear, pre-technical outline accounts or ὑπογραφαὶ for recognizing the genus under which a given term falls, especially the fundamental fourfold division here in Cat. 2 and the account of ὀφεία in ch. 5. Moreover, the cautionary division of homonymy from synonymy and paronymy in ch. 1 would help the reader to resist sophistical puzzles based on ambiguity and equivocation—the kinds of puzzles which, as we noticed above, may have troubled Antiochean advocates of dialectic and demonstration.

(b) Andronicus on the reduction of ten categories to absolute and relative

Moreover, Simplicius tells us that on Andronicus’ view, the ten categories described in the central section of the Categories were embraced by two broader headings, absolute (καθ’ αὑτό) and relative (πρὸς τι) (perhaps adopting a view previously adopted by Xenocrates77 based on the fundamental division of absolute from relative in Plato Sophist 255D). Simplicius explains that:

Xenocrates and Andronicus and their followers seem to include all [the ten categories] in [the opposition] ‘by itself’ (καθ’ αὑτό) and ‘relative’ (πρὸς τι) . . .78 [they say] that accidents are ‘relative’ as [being] always of other things, and that substance is by itself.79 (Simplic. in Cat. 63,22–6)

77 On the relation between Andronicus and Xenocrates, see also Tarán 1981: 741–2 (commenting on Moraux’s view). For a reconstruction of Xenocrates’ own position, see Dillon 2003: 150–1.

78 Simplicius suggests that Andronicus and Xenocrates thought the division into ten was excessive or ‘superfluous’, but Moraux and others have shown, I think persuasively, that Andronicus did not seek to replace the ten categories with two, as he also maintained the validity of the tenfold division. Rather, he seems to have sought to understand the tenfold division in terms of a twofold division. After all, Aristotle himself at Metaph. Δ 5 (1017a23–30, below) makes a first division of being into the kata sumbebēkos and kath’ hauto, before classifying the skhēmata tês kategórias under the kath’ hauto; once the kata sumbebēkos is identified with the pros ti, it seems simple to find the subordination of the ten to the two in Aristotle himself. If Andronicus maintained that the Categories and the Metaphysics express one and the same doctrine, he presumably would not have regarded such a subordination as a betrayal of the project of the Categories.

79 οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτη καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ’ αὑτό καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὡστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ’ αὑτὸν τὸ τοιούτων τῶν γενόν πλῆθος. ἀλλοι δὲ εἰς ὁδὸν καὶ συμβεβηκός διατέμνονον καὶ οὕτω δὲ πατῶν ποιοῦσι γεγονός τοῖς προτέροις λέγειν τὰ συμβεβηκότα πρὸς τι λέγουσιν, ὡς ἄλλων ἀεὶ διότι, καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν καθ’ αὑτό (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).
Andronicus, then, subsumes the ten κατηγορίαι under these two broad classes as the 'highest division' in the Categories, a move that his successors would endorse and follow. Moreover, Simplicius goes on to charge Andronicus and Xenocrates with reducing all of the genera of accidents to the relative (in Cat. 63,28–30), suggesting that in some way Andronicus lumped quantities, qualities, and the rest together as relatives. The passages from Boethius discussed in part (a) above might help us to make sense of this view: Andronicus wishes to distinguish carefully between items predicated of a subject essentially, in the first category (τί ἐστι) (which Andronicus may restrict to substances), and items predicated of a subject accidentally, in the nine non-substance categories. Naturally (given that he believes that Categories mirrors An. Post. and that τί ἐστι is the first category of both), he finds the Categories to be a useful place to look for elaborating this distinction.

But we have conflicting evidence about the exact position adopted by Andronicus concerning the status of the category of the relative (πρῶς τι), and there has been considerable debate over where he stands.81 On the one hand, as we have seen, Andronicus sought to reduce the number of categories to two, absolute and relative. On this view, if ‘relative’ is taken as amounting to ‘accidental’ (see above, 63,22–6), there would be just two ways in which one might predicate a feature of Socrates: either in the first category (for instance, ‘Socrates is human’) or accidentally (‘Socrates is wise’ or ‘pale’). Then again, Andronicus also aimed to preserve the number of ten categories (Simplic. 342,21–5), so that he did not want to jettison quantity,

80 While this has the historically important effect of integrating the ‘Platonic’ [Sophist 255D] and ‘Aristotelian’ categories, it also has some Aristotelian support: see Metaph. β.7, 1017a23–30, and Bodeüs 2001: lxxxi–li. Andronicus’ move was very influential: we have later evidence that the ‘Andronican’ division prevailed in the subsequent tradition as the ‘highest cut’ in the Categories, perhaps with substance functioning as absolute and the accidents as relative. Pseudo-Archytas, who may have written in the first century BCE as a near contemporary of Andronicus and follower of Eudorus (cf. Szlezák 1972), divides being into subjects and sumbebékota just before rostering the ten categories. Alexander also called this the ‘highest division’ in the Categories (τῇ πρώτῃ διάμερσι τῶν ἐν Κατηγορίαις, in Met. 242,15–16 and 243,3), as does Porphyry (in Cat. 71,28). Indeed, Alexander, Porphyry, and the subsequent Neoplatonic ‘consensus’ seem to follow Andronicus’ basic view about the Categories here, as Boethius suggests, and Andronicus may well be one of the ‘older masters’ followed in Porphyry’s Isagoge (1,3–17).

81 See Mansfeld 1992: 59–61 for a helpful summary, and Reinhardt 2007 for an especially clear and succinct presentation of the issues.
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quality, relation, and the rest as valid kinds of predicates. And yet again, he regarded the relative as a kind of ‘offshoot’ that belonged after the other categories (157,18–22; cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1.6, 1096a21), so that it seems on the face of it unlikely that he simply meant (say) to subordinate the remaining eight non-substance categories under the relative, so that he could have his cake (maintaining quantity, quality, relation, and so forth) and eat it too (subsume these categories meant (say) to subordinate the remaining eight non-substance categories under a single umbrella, relation).

Also relevant here is Andronicus’ proposal (shared with his contemporary Ariston) to amend Aristotle’s second definition of the category of the relative (πρός τι) at Cat. 8a31, in order to require that the item described exists only insofar as it relates to something different from itself.\(^\text{82}\) The ostensible purpose for this revision is to avoid vicious circularity, which could be a reasonable motive in its own right; but the correction also brings Aristotle’s (second) definition of the relative into concinnity with the fourth ‘category’ developed by the Stoics, the relatively disposed (πρός τι πως ἐξον). This has led some scholars (such as Tarán 1981: 741–2) to suggest that Andronicus is directly influenced by the Stoics.\(^\text{83}\)

There are several ways in which we might make sense of the differing evidence for Andronicus’ view.\(^\text{84}\) I propose the following

\(^{82}\) From items ‘for which being is the same as being somehow related to something’ (πρός τι) to items ‘for which being is the same as being somehow related to something else (πρός ἔτερον)’ (see Simplic. in Cat. 201,34, Porph. in Cat. 125,14–23).

\(^{83}\) On this ‘category’ and for what follows, see Menn 1999. This kind of property is weaker and, in a sense, further removed from real being than the other Stoic ‘categories’, such as the ποιόν, in the following sense: some attribute \(F\) (say, the attribute of being someone’s sibling) is a πρός τι πως ἐξον just in case any item that is \(F\) has no intrinsic difference from an item that is not \(F\). Such attributes are such that ‘they can belong to something and then not belong to it without any change or alteration in the thing’ (Simplic. in Cat. 166,17–19, discussed by Menn 1999: 232), like a case of what we might now call Cambridge change. But, Richard Sorabji points out to me in conversation, David Sedley has shown (2000) that the Academy had already introduced the concept of the πρός τι πως ἐξον deployed by Aristotle at Cat. 8a31–2; Andronicus may be reflecting earlier Academic views here—like those of Xenocrates—rather than Stoic doctrine. (Not too much weight should be placed on the phrase πρός τι πως ἐξον itself; as Jonathan Barnes reminds me in correspondence, it is just a natural expansion of the abbreviated phrase πρός τι.)

\(^{84}\) I am indebted for this discussion to conversations with Tobias Reinhardt and Richard Sorabji; see Sorabji, Sourcebook III, 3(c) and Reinhardt 2007 for a helpful summary of the issues. To fill out the inconsistency: (1) on the one hand, Simplicius at least interprets Andronicus and Xenocrates as if they complained about the multitude of ten categories (περίπτων εἶλαί κατ’ αὐτῶι τὸ τοσοῦτον τῶν γενῶν πλήθος, 63,22), and encompassed the ten in two (πάντα τῷ καθ’ αὐτό καὶ τῷ πρός τι περιλαμβάνει).
tente reconstruction. (i) Andronicus accepted that there were substantial beings, which could properly be predicated per se in the first category; (ii) he also accepted a broad sense of ‘relative’, which could accommodate quantities, qualities, and perhaps most of the other non-substance categories, and (iii) a narrow sense of ‘relative’, which accommodated Aristotle’s strictly defined relatives and perhaps also accommodated Andronicus’ rechristened categories of time and place. These would break down in the following way.

(i) **Beings in the first category.** Andronicus accepted and interpreted a version of Aristotle’s story in *Cat.* ch. 2 about what made an item a real, substantial being (οὐσία). Such a substantial item could not be discovered residing IN any other item, in the way that, say, paleness is IN Socrates’ body. Clearly Socrates here (the primary oὐσία) is not IN anything (in the technical sense of *Categories* 1a24–5), and humanity (the secondary oὐσία) is also not IN anything. As a basic test, humanity (the substance SAID-OF Socrates) cannot be removed from Socrates.

Nonetheless, (2) Andronicus appears to preserve the number of ten categories (Simplic. *in Cat.* 342,21–5). And (3) he declares that the relative is a kind of ‘offshoot’ or ‘sucker’ which belongs in order after all the other categories (in *Cat.* 157,18–22). How will this evidence hang together? Moraux (1973: 103) suggests that Andronicus did not intend to reduce the number of categories in this way, so that Simplicius is representing him inaccurately or polemically, or else (107) that the evidence misrepresents Andronicus altogether, and he never posited such a bipartition. Huby (1981: 406) suggests that Andronicus allowed for two ‘supercategories’ of substance and relation (and that he placed time under the supercategory of relation, as the measure of movement, which would make him the natural target of Simplicius’ rebuttal to that position at 134,25). Reinhardt (2007: 522) offers a nuanced alternative: Andronicus may have (i) allowed for ten categories—one category of substance and nine distinct non-substance categories—from a logical point of view, since kinds of properties are logically or linguistically distinct from one another, and at the same time, (ii) Andronicus may have collapsed all of the non-substance categories into one from an ontological point of view, because for all of them ‘being amounts to existing in relation to something else, namely the subject they are “in”’. (Thus Andronicus would have anticipated Boethus, further discussed in ch. 6, in distinguishing between an ontological, epistemological, and linguistic interpretation of the *Categories*). Then when Simplicius tells us of Andronicus’ reduction of the categories and shunting of relation to the end of the list, he refers to his ontological view; when he tells us that he maintained the list of ten, he refers to his linguistic view. (One challenge for this interpretation, perhaps, is the lack of clear evidence for an ‘ontological’ reading of the *Categories* offered by Andronicus as distinct from Boethus’ contribution; but it is certainly possible that Andronicus’ view was adopted more or less wholesale by Boethus in a revised form, and not preserved as distinct in the later tradition).
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without Socrates ceasing to exist, but paleness (the quality in Socrates) can be so removed, causing qualitative change in Socrates, but not his disappearance.

(ii) Broad ‘relatives’: quantity, quality, and perhaps being-in-a-position, having, doing, being-affected. But other, non-substantial items are in a broad sense parasitic on ὄνομα: this includes items in most of the remaining categories (possibly excluding time and place, Andronicus’ relabeled categories of when and where: see below). These are relative in a broad sense (perhaps similar to the secundum dici account at Cat. 6a36–7), spoken about primarily in their relation to other things, viz. the subjects, the ὄνομα in which they inhere, in a per accidens way. For example, it might seem impossible to describe Socrates’ paleness without speaking of Socrates, or colour in general without speaking of body in general.

(iii) Strict ‘relatives’: Relation, under which might also fall place and time (and perhaps other categories). Finally, Andronicus understood another kind of Relative (in a strict sense, following his revised definition of the relative at Cat. 8a31) to be an item whose entire being consisted in its disposition toward something else (cf. Porph. in Cat. 125.14–23)—a very ‘weak’ kind of being, comparable to to the Stoic ‘category’ of the relatively disposed (πρός τι πως ἔχον). Items that were relative in this last, strict sense, such as (say) the property of being Xanthippe’s husband, could alter without anything intrinsically changing about the subject—unlike, above under (ii), a proper quality such as paleness, whose alteration would at least imply a significant change in the subject. On this model, Andronicus did indeed reduce the number of ten categories to two, insofar as he made all the nine non-substance categories broadly ‘relative’ (perhaps following...

85 Without complicating this picture too much, we may also wonder about the place of the other, lesser categories, such as being-in-a-position and having: they may fall under the ‘broad’ relative, as basically similar to ποιά, which is how I have described them here, or possibly—since Andronicus’ scheme already answers to the Stoic picture in parts—we might wonder whether he allowed some of these to answer to the third Stoic ‘category’, the πως ἔχοντα or items disposed in certain ways, as Simplicius himself describes ‘on the right’ and ‘to be shod’ (the latter an example of ‘having’ in Ar. Cat. 4, 1b24–2a4) as cases of πως ἔχοντα. See Menn 1999 on the Stoic categories.
Xenocrates). Yet he also maintained the number of ten (since the nine non-substance categories are still distinct from one another, although they are all in a loose way relative to substance). Finally, he made the relative in the strict sense properly posterior to substance and the other eight non-substance categories, since it was a kind of ‘off-shoot’ or ‘appendage’.

It might be added that Andronicus may have regarded time as relative in either a broad or strict sense, insofar as it is the measure of movement (so Huby 1981: 406 suggests). If he treated time as a subcategory of the relative in the strict sense, and moved time to the end of the list of categories along with the strict relative, that might have provided an impetus for the posterior position of time and place at the end of the list of categories in other writers such as Philo of Alexandria and ps.-Archytas (see ch. 3). There may also be some trace of Stoic influence on Andronicus’ thinking here, since the Stoics treated time as an incorporeal and thus less ‘real’ than corporeal things; but that is pure speculation, and most arguments relating to the order of the categories cannot be pressed too far: Aristotle himself sometimes orders time at the end of the list (Metaph. Δ7, 1017a23–30).

If this interpretation is accurate, Andronicus’ exegesis of Aristotle was basically different from that of the later Neoplatonist commentators such as Simplicius, who take Aristotle to believe that one can predicate in all the non-substance categories per se, except the relative (cf. Simplic in Cat. 174,14–175,11; compare also Aristotle’s distinction of accidental and absolute predication at Metaph. Δ7, 1017a8–30). But as we will see (ch. 3), the first-century Academic Eudorus will criticize Aristotle as if he treated all the non-substance categories as relative. Eudorus may be responding to an interpretation like Andronicus’, or Andronicus may be influenced by Eudorus, or each may be independent of the other (see ch. 3).

We should also bear in mind the possibility that Andronicus was encouraged by the text of Cat. ch. 7 to admit two rather different accounts of the relative. One possibility, as Reinhardt tantalizingly suggests (2007: 522), is that Andronicus was prepared to regard the nine non-substance categories as ontologically identical (in that for them, existence just is having a certain relationship to something else)
yet *logically or linguistically* differentiable.\(^86\) This would be especially intriguing if it implied that Andronicus anticipated the distinction between a linguistic and ontological reading of the *Categories* that would so preoccupy the later tradition.\(^87\) For our purposes here, however, I have suggested only that Andronicus analyzed the *Categories*’ two accounts of the relative (6a36–7 and 8a31–2) as somehow ‘looser’ and ‘stricter’ senses,\(^88\) respectively applicable to the non-substance categories in general and the category of relation itself, in which he may have recognized (something like) the Stoic πρὸς τὴν πρὸς ἔχεν, or a set of Academic categories used by Xenocrates or Hermodorus.\(^89\)

\(^{86}\) After all, Andronicus would hardly have denied that the nine non-substance categories were logically distinct, but he could have denied that those distinctions picked out any real difference between real beings.

\(^{87}\) But against that approach to the distinction in Aristotle himself, see Sedley 2002: 332–4. We might furnish some additional support to this interpretation from the two definitions or descriptions of the relative offered by Aristotle in the *Categories*, respectively ‘those which, whatever things they are themselves, are said to be of other things, or in some other relation to another thing’ (6a36–7), and ‘those for which being is the same as to be relatively disposed to something’ (8a31–2)—if we were to understand these as respectively suggesting (to Andronicus’ ear) a *de dicto* and *de re* account of relation.

\(^{88}\) Similar to David Sedley’s language (2002) of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ relativity applied to the passage in Aristotle, although I suggest that Andronicus’ interpretation is somewhat different.

\(^{89}\) On which see Sedley 2002: 348–51, Fine 1993: 176–82.
the initial statement distinguishing homonyms from synonyms and defending its importance for the entire treatise (cf. Simplicius in Cat. 21,21–4). Without the recipes that the Categories offers, we might also fail to distinguish between homonymous and synonymous predication in general, as Boethius, perhaps channelling Andronicus by way of Porphyry, stresses at De Div. 880C–D, 17,24–18,1 Magee. That could make our definitions and demonstrations vulnerable to various sophisms or lead us into mistaken metaphysics—errors like assuming that every term that referred to many things picked out a universal essence. Moreover, then, a work that began by setting out the distinction between homonymous and synonymous predication would appear especially useful. This is the interpretation that I will attempt to develop below.

The Categories might have been seen as useful for solving the kind of puzzles that Cicero, speaking for Philo, levelled against Antiochus’ loyalty to dialectic. Of more direct relevance for us here, it might have been seen as useful for the kinds of puzzles that Simplicius raised as problematic for ‘the dialecticians’ who simply recommended ‘quiescence’—that is, for the Stoics—but soluble for the dialectician who made use of the significata described in the Categories:

Some people . . . rightly say that it is from the realities (πράγματα) that homonyms become clear to us: viz., when the same name is spoken, I project one concept in conjunction with the name, while you project a different one. For example, if someone says the name ‘dog’, I might conceive of the land-animal, while you might conceive of a sea-dog. This is why the dialecticians recommend that we become quiescent when faced with syllogisms based on homonymy, until the questioner transfers the name to one of the significata . . . Moreover, Aristotle himself presents his teaching on homonyms, because the discussion (λόγος) of homonymy is also . . . immediately consequent upon the goal (σκοπέως) of the Categories. For his part, Plato states that it becomes clear from realities whether the same name is borne by different things homonymously or synonymously, for he says in the Sophist, ‘for now, you and I have the name in common with regard to this matter, but perhaps we each privately keep the fact (εἰργόν) that we are naming to ourselves; [however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument (διὰ λόγων) rather than about the mere name without argument.]’ (Soph. 218C). Thus, it is

90 For the pervasive uses of homonymy in Aristotle’s philosophy, see Shields 1999.
This explanation seems to suggest the value that the dialectician should place on recognizing equivocation. It also implies that a list of the significata, the summa genera, could be a helpful tool for defeating some sophistical challenges, including some that troubled the Stoics (cf. Aristotle, Soph. El. 22, 178a4–5, involving sophisms that involve the confusion of one category for another, like ποίον for πόσον or ποίον for πάσχον). It might also contextualize the interest in distinguishing accidental from essential predication attributed to Andronicus in Boethius’ De Divisione, which also illustrates how this distinction—including the distinction of differentiae per se and per accidens—can be deployed to help determine what is univocal and what is equivocal, a crucial aid in the construction of good definitions

91 Απορούσε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ, καίτοι περὶ λέξεων προβήμενος εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς περὶ ὁμοιώματις μὲν οὐδὲν λέγει, περὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμοιώματις διδάσκει, καίτοι προφητεύοντας τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιώματις ἐννοίας, εἰπερ ἀπ’ ἑκείνης τὰ ὁμόνομα. καὶ λέγοντος καλῶς, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεται δῆλα τὰ ὁμόνομα, ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνόματος (10) ῥήθητος εὐγέ μὲν ἄλλῃ ἐννοίᾳ, οὐ δὲ ἄλλῃ περὶ τοῦ ἀνόματος προβαλλόμεθα, ὅπερ τοῦ κώμου ἀνόματος ῥήθητος εὐγέ μὲν τὸν χερσαίον, οὐ δὲ τὸν χαλαστὸν ἐννοίας, διὸ καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ’ ὁμοιώματις συλλογομείοις ἴσχυσιέντων οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ παρακλείονται, ἐσὼ ᾧν ἐν π’ ἄλλο σημαίνοντον ὁ ῥητῶν μεταγάγῃ τὸ ὅνομα—οὖν, εἰ τις ἐρωτᾷ εἰ ὁ χιτῶν ἄνδρεις, (15) εἰ τίς καὶ ἄνδρεις ὠν, συγχωρησάμεθα—καὶ ἐρωτήσῃ εἰ ὁ ἄνδρεις εὐφυχός, καὶ τοῦτο συγχωρησάμεθα, ἀλλὰς γὰρ εἰ δὲ συναγάγῃ ὅτι ὁ χιτῶν ἄρα εὐφυχός, ἐνυπάρχῃ τὴν ὁμοιώματι καὶ ἄνδρεις διαστελλόμεθα καὶ δείξῃ τὴν ἄνδρεις ἔριους τὴν εὐφυχός ὅτι ἄλλος μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ χιτῶνος, ἄλλος δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ τῆς ἄνδρεις ἔριους λέγεται, ὡστε τὰ πράγματα κυρίως, οὐχὶ τὰ (20) ὅνομα συμβαίνει τὴν ὁμοιώματι, καὶ γὰρ αὐτός τῶν ὁμοιώματι ποιεῖται τὴν διδασκαλίαν συνακολούθουσιν πάντως τῷ σκοπῷ εὐθὺς καὶ τοῦ περὶ τῆς ὁμοιώματι λόγου, καὶ ὁ Πλάτων δὲ ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων δηλοῦσθαι ψήφοι, εἰτε ὁμοιώματι κατὰ πλείονον φέρεται το αὐτὸ ὅνομα εἰτε συνωφύμως: [p. 25] λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῇ Σοφιστή: “νῦν γὰρ δὴ ἢ κάγια τούτου περὶ τούτου ἐχομεν κοινῆ, τὸ δὲ ἐργον, ἐφ’ ὧν καλοῦν, ἑκάτερος τάχα ἢ ἴδια παρ’ ἵναι αὐτοῦ ἐχομεν,” ὡστε ἢ γνωσθῇ ὅτι τοῦ κοινῆ λεγομένου ἀνόματος ὁμοίᾳ ἄστιν ἐννοίᾳ παρ’ ἑκάτερον, ὥστε γίνεται δῆλον, ὅτι ὁμοιώματι τὸ ὕνομο, οὐ γὰρ ἄστιν αὐτὰ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ ὁμοιώματα καὶ τὰ συνώματα (5) τοιαύτα, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τῶν διαλεγομένων καὶ ὁμοιώματι παρελαμβαγμένη ἐννοίᾳ ἢ συμφωνοῦσι ἢ τῶν ὁμοιώματι καὶ συνώματι ἐστὶν φύσις, καλὸς δὲ τὸ λέγεται εἰπέν, ἐπείδη μή περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἐστε, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν σημαντικῶν λέξεων (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

92 See also Menn 1995: 320.
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(De Div. 16,24–18,3 Magee). This is certainly an application of the main division that Andronicus wanted to expound.

We might again deduce from this evidence that Andronicus valued division as a tool serving demonstration, as we have seen above. Certainly many of his contemporaries and successors did. Indeed, Andronicus may have turned to Aristotelian resources after recognizing a lack in Stoic logic, which Atherton points out:

a feature . . . conspicuous by its absence from the Stoic context, in comparison with the Platonic–Aristotelian: any systematic use of homonymy, ambiguity, or related concepts as general instruments for identifying and solving philosophical problems, or for analysing, constructing, and disarming philosophical arguments. (Atherton 1993: 102)

(d) The Categories begins from pre-technical outlines (ὁπογραφαί) of the genera that actuate our innate preconceptions of them, making it a suitable work for beginners

The association may be pressed further. Simplicius tells us that Andronicus maintained that we require a πρόληψις or 'preconception'


The following point may also be relevant: Simplicius credits to Andronicus (in Cat. 54,8) the observation that we predicate attributes of subjects transitively, in the sense described by Aristotle in Cat. 1b10–15, not only in the first category or essentially (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν), but also in the other categories, as when we call a subject 'cultured' or 'Athenian': thus for example 'Socrates is philosophical', 'philosophers are knowledgeable', so 'Socrates is knowledgeable' (Simplicius, in Cat. 54,8–21; cf. Moraux 1973, 104, and see the anonymous commentary in the Archimedes Palimpsest, 6,9–7,7 Chiara Donna, Rashed, and Sedley 2013, with commentary and references). As Simplicius goes on to show, this kind of argument can lead to fallacies of equivocation that turn on category errors: for instance, this body is white, and white is a colour; therefore, this body is a colour. Andronicus might have thought that such inferences turned on a failure to distinguish between accidental and essential predication (this body is white per accidens, but white is a colour per se).
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about homonyms (more on this below) in order to grasp the core function of the book Categories, and this is why the 'onymies'—the opening chapter’s account of homonyms (items that share only a name in common, but not a definition), synonyms (items that share both a name and a definition in common), and paronym (items that get their name from something with a difference of ending)—should come first in the treatise (in Cat. 21,21–4). In a passage that derives from Porphyry, Simplicius gives an example of how

...‘man’ and ‘horse’ participate in the same substance, that of ‘animal’, which is predicated of them synonymously, and they are therefore placed under the same category. Socrates and the painted Socrates, however, do not both participate in the substance of ‘animal’: but one participates in substance, while the other participates in ‘colour’ or ‘surface figure’. Thus, they are not placed under the same category, but Socrates comes under the category of Substance, while the painted Socrates comes under the category of the Qualified.

It was thus necessary to give preliminary teaching about homonyms and synonyms. The necessity of having a preliminary notion (πράληψις) of homonyms was also shown by Andronicus, who made the initial phrase of the Categories read as follows: ‘Of things said, some are said without combination, others with combination. Of those without combination, those which have the name alone in common are called homonyms.’ Thus, a preliminary notion (πράληψις) of homonyms is clearly necessary, both for the above-mentioned reasons, and because, since there is a great deal of controversy about whether or not Being is a genus, [the answer] can be known by means of homonyms and synonyms.94 (21,15–22,1, tr. Chase 2003, lightly modified)

After Porphyry and Simplicius’ endorsement of Andronicus’ view (and paraphrase), Simplicius adds that ‘there is nothing as effective as a precise definition of names to counteract sophistical quibbling’

94 τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἀνθρωπός καὶ ὁ ἴππος τῆς αὐτῆς οὐδαμος τοῦ ζώου μετέχοντες συνωνύμως αὕτων κατηγορομένης ὑπὸ μίαν ἀνάγωσιν κατηγορίαν, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἄτρ μὴ τῆς οὐδαμος ἀμφοτερὸς τοῦ ζώου μετέχοντες, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν τῆς οὐδαμος, ὁ δὲ χρυσός ἅ σχῆματος ἐπιπολάζων, ἀὐχ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀνάγωσιν κατηγορίαν, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης ὑπὸ τὴν οὐδαμος, ὁ δὲ γεγραμμένος ὑπὸ τὸ ποιον. ἔδει τοίνυν προδιάδεξαι περὶ τοῦ ὁμωνύμου καὶ συνωνύμου. ὅτι δὲ χρείος ἔστιν ἢ τῶν ὁμωνύμων πρόληψις, ἐδήλωσεν Ανδρόνικος προτάξας "τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν άνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται, τὰ δὲ μετὰ συμπλοκῆς καὶ τῶν άνευ συμπλοκῆς ὁμωνύμων μὲν λέγεται, ὅν ὅνωμα μόνον κοινῶν", ὧστε χρείος ἢ τῶν ὁμωνύμων φαίνεται πρόληψις διὰ τὰ εἰρήμενα καὶ ὅτι τολης οὐδαμος ἀμβατολίας, εἶτε γένος τὸ ὃν εἴτε μὴ, ἐκ τῶν ὁμωνύμων καὶ συνωνύμων γιανώσκεται (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).
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(22,10-11), followed by a Speusippan division of homonymy, polyonymy, synonymy, heteronymy, and paronymy, and the ‘manly cloak’ example cited above—already familiar from Stoic dialectic and the challenges levelled against it. Similar challenges were later cited by Nicostratus against the Categories (specifically, against the ‘transitivity principle’ of 1b10–11; see Chiaradonna, Rashed, Sedley, and Tchernetska 2013: 1,26–3,1).

Simplicius here preserves Porphyry, who perhaps preserves in his turn Andronicus’ own argument for the usefulness of a sketch at the outset of the Categories—introducing the notions of equivocal and univocal predication by excavating a ‘preconception’ or πρόληψις of them. (I take it that Porphyry did not merely read Andronicus’ paraphrase of the opening of Categories and redeploy it as a proof text for his own reasoning about the value of the ‘onymies’, but that he built on an argument by Andronicus. Thus in 379,8–11 below I think that we can see traces of Porphyry’s response to an earlier Andronican argument for the value of the ‘onymies’, and Herminus [ap. Porph. in Cat. 59,17–33], who is there ‘compressing’ Andronicus’ pupil Boethus of Sidon, demonstrates that the argument for the Categories as useful for teasing out and correcting προλήψις is pre-Porphyrian and dates to the first century.)

What notion of πρόληψις could Andronicus build upon (if indeed he uses the word in a technical sense here)? In a broad Epicurean and Stoic usage, a πρόληψις is a rough preconception that arises naturally in the course of the use of our sense in Epicurean usage, for instance, repeated sense-impressions of a dog will generate the preconception ‘dog’, which is a kind of rough, natural sketch of what we have grasped about dogs (εἰληφέται) prior to (πρό) a scientific or precise inquiry.95 Based on this—as the Neoplatonists, too, agreed96—we are able to bootstrap a process of conversation or dialectic. For the Stoics, on one interpretation (Brittain 2005: 179), some of these preconceptions are common conceptions or κοιναί ἐννοιαι—or they become common conceptions once they are properly excavated or articulated (Dyson 2009: 53–71)—and it takes a process of working from a rough sketch or ὑπογραφή toward a precise definition to ‘excavate’ their

95 See Asmis 1984: 22 for this suggested etymology, and Brittain 2005 and Dyson 2009 for the Stoic and Epicurean usage more broadly.
96 For the Neoplatonic reception of προλήψις following Plotinus, see Van Den Berg 2009 and Helmig 2012: 141–342.
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content. This process of excavation is called διάρρηψις or ‘articulation’ (for which see for example Helmig 2012: 280, Brittain 2005: 186): a commonplace of Stoic, Platonist, and other traditions (compare for example Anon. in Theaet. col. 46, 43–9), it involves shifting from ordinary linguistic usage, our day-to-day language, toward a more precise, clearly defined usage that has been hardened by philosophical articulation (cf. Brittain 2005: 157).

Did Andronicus have some such Stoic infrastructure in mind? That he did is implicit, I think, in a response later offered by Porphyry against Andronicus’ disconnection of chs. 10–15, the so-called ‘post-praedicamenta’, from the rest of the Categories (mentioned by Simplicius at 379,8–11). Andronicus should not have rejected that part of the treatise, Porphyry explains, because he ought to have recognized that these later sketches of opposition, priority and posteriority, and so on were necessary for the same reason as the onymies at the beginning of the treatise:

Others, including Porphyry, opine that these investigations [i.e. the post-praedicamenta] contribute to [the] clarity [of the work], because, among the names which receive mention in the Categories, those which were not anticipated (προειλημμένα) by the common conceptions (κοινάς ἔννοιας) Aristotle took right at the beginning and articulated (διάρρησει) them, as for example in the account concerning homonymous and synonymous things, while those which were indeed anticipated in the common conceptions, but which required further articulation (διαρρήσεως)—of these Aristotle analysed [in each case] the confused [name] belonging to the precondition (προλήψεως) after the completion [of the Categories proper], in order not to chop up the continuity of the account by inserting the articulation (διαρρήσεως) of these [names] into the midst [of the main account].

(Simplicius in Cat. 379,12–20, tr. Chase 2003).
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I would interpret Porphyry as here endorsing an Andronican argument that the Categories begins—in the first third, or prepraedicamenta—by capturing and teasing out a πρόληψις of equivocation, of which we lack a common notion. 99 Andronicus’ error is in failing to recognize that the Categories does just the same thing in the last third, or post-praedicamenta, this time focusing on teasing out and excavating our προλήψις of things of which we have a common notion, on the basis of which we were able to read the text. That would suggest that Andronicus had some notion of ‘articulation’ (διάρθρωσις) along the lines of the Stoic excavation of preconceptions, and Porphyry, while accepting his basic premises, thinks that he has failed to apply it to the post-praedicamenta as he applied it to the pre-praedicamenta or onymies (above, 21,15—22,1).

There is another link between Porphyry and Andronicus on the methodology of the ‘articulation’ of concepts through dialectic that suggests this. In his discussion of quantity, Simplicius comments that:

Porphyry tries, on this question, to follow Andronicus in articulating the concept (διάρθρων...τὴν ἔννοιαν) of the one, the unit and the point, not when spoken of in terms of Ideal Forms but when evident in terms of perception or reasoning (which the present undertaking is concerned with), let us too try to follow what he says. 100 (154,3—6, tr. Fleet in De Haas and Fleet 2001)

The ‘articulation’ follows. Porphyry begins from a perceptible, everyday example, the unity of a body (154,7—12):

When we say that a length or a breadth or a depth is one, we must consider in what way we mean ‘one’. Now it is clear that when someone looks at a body which is a continuous whole in itself containing all its parts, but is circumscribed individually and separated from all other bodies, we call such a continuous body ‘one’ and the continuity of its parts with each other ‘a unity’. In this way we conceive of what is numerically one. 101

99 For Porphyry’s reception of earlier, Hellenistic concepts of prolēpsis and ennoia, see Chase 2010 and 2000: ch. 1.
100 Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθα διαρθρῶν ὁ Πορφύριος ἐπιχειρεῖ τῷ Ἀνδρόνικῳ κατακολουθῶν τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ τε ἐνὸς καὶ τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς στιγμῆς, οὐ τῶν κατ’ ἱδέας λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν κατ’ αἰσθήσει ἢ διάνοιαν ἐναργῶν, περὶ ὧν καὶ ἡ παροῦσα πρόθεσις πραγματεύεται, φέρε καὶ ἢμεῖς τοῖς λεγομένοις παρακολουθήσωμεν (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).
101 οὕτως γὰρ, φησιν, ἐν λέγωμεν ἢ μήκος ἢ πλάτος ἢ βάθος, οσκεπότεν πῶς τὸ ἐν φαμεν. ἢ δῆλον ὡς ὅποταν τις σώμα θεάησαι συνεχῆς μὲν ὅλον ἑαυτῷ περὶ πάντα τά
Pumping our intuition of unity in this fairly ordinary way, which requires no technical expertise, he proceeds to offer a more technical example (154,12—13):

[W]e recognize what is one in species and of the same species <as other things> by separating off what is accidental to the individuals according to the differentiae in them.\textsuperscript{102}

Porphyry’s ‘articulation’ of the \textit{éννοια} of unity here is no doubt a commonplace, and nothing special; but Simplicius says that he has it from Andronicus, which presumably implies that Porphyry himself credited this particular ‘articulation’ to Andronicus. It might illustrate just the kind of ‘excavation’ of an \textit{éννοια} that Andronicus deployed the \textit{Categories} to facilitate. That is, Andronicus might have suggested that the \textit{Categories}, with its relatively non-technical delineations of the highest genera, does for our innate concepts of ‘relation’ or ‘quantity’ something like what he does here for our concept of ‘unity’.\textsuperscript{103} (If this is right, we should also note that Andronicus sometimes tries to improve on the treatise, as when he amends the wording of the \textit{Categories}' account of the \textit{πρὸς τί} [Simplic. in Cat. 202,5].)

I think that we can strengthen this interpretation from other sources, tracing this approach to the \textit{Categories} to Herminus in the second century CE, who in turn follows Boethus of Sidon in the first century. To develop this case, we now return to the argument in favour of the title \textit{Categories} preserved in Porphyry’s shorter commentary. For a long stretch in the opening pages of the commentary, Porphyry contends that the treatise should not be called \textit{Before the Topics} but instead \textit{Κατηγορίαι}, because it is about \textit{κατηγορίαι}, simple significant expressions. This argument about the title, as I proposed above, should likely be attributed to Andronicus, on the strength of coordinate passages like Simplicius \textit{in Cat.} 379,8–11. In Porphyry’s commentary, it is backed by a variety of stronger points about the nature of language acquisition grounded, not in Aristotle, but in Stoic

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and Epicurean philosophy of language,\textsuperscript{104} which I think may be a hallmark of Andronicus’ approach. (Boethus, on the other hand, shows signs of adopting the semantics of \textit{De Interpretatione} as a new framework for interpreting the \textit{Categories}; see ch. 6)

Porphyry states that everyday language lacks precise names for certain real things dealt with by philosophy, but the \textit{Categories} can aid us in acquiring a new vocabulary (cf. Porph. \textit{in Cat.} 55,3, Simplicius \textit{in Cat.} 74,4), thereby bringing our language closer to reality. The \textit{Categories} requires just a few coined or ‘technical’ terms to introduce philosophy properly (λέξεις καυαί, for which cf. Porphyry \textit{in Cat.} 55,12 and the ‘five words’ of \textit{Isag.} 1,4–5). Porphyry credits the general thrust of his argumentation to Boethus of Sidon, and then adds that Herminus (the second-century \textit{ce} Peripatetic who lectured to Alexander) takes the same view as Boethus and himself, namely that:

[T]he subject of the [\textit{Categories}] is not the primary and highest genera in nature, for instruction in these is not suitable for young persons, nor the issue of what the primary and fundamental differentiae of things said are, since in that case the discussion would seem to be about the parts of speech. Rather it is about the sort of predicate that will properly belong to what is said in each of the genera of being. Hence it also became necessary to touch in some way upon the genera to which the predications in question correspond, for it is impossible to recognize the kind of signification that is proper to each genus without some preconception (πρόληψεις) of it. This also accounts for the title \textit{Predication} (κατηγορία), which means ‘the proper mode of signification connected with each genus’.\textsuperscript{105} (Herminus ap. Porphyry \textit{in Cat.} 59,17–33, tr. Strange 1992, lightly modified)

\textsuperscript{104} See Frede and Inwood 2005: 14–54; I have also tried to explore this question further in Griffin 2012b.

\textsuperscript{105} Λέγει τούτων ὁ Ἐρμέιος προκείμενος, ὅτι προτέρω τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει πρῶτων καὶ γενικοτάτων γενῶν (ὡς γὰρ νέους προσήκουσα ἡ τῶν τοιούτων διάδοσις) ὅτε τίνες αἱ προτέρω καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν λεγομένων διαφοραί, ὡς τόν λόγον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τῶν τῶν λόγου μερών, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐκάστοτε γένους τῶν ἰδίων οἰκείων ἀν ἔσομεν τῶν λεγομένων κατηγορίας· διό καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἐγένετο ἁμαρτήματος ἀφαίρεσιν τῶν γενῶν, ἐφ’ ἀπέρα ἡ τῶν κατηγορομένων ἀναφορά· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὴν ἐκάστου οἰκείαν σημασίαν γνωρίσων εἶναι μηδεμίας αὐτῷ προλήψεως προσποιημένης. διὰ τούτο δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιγραφή Κατηγορία, δηλαδὴ ὁμοτικὴ ὀνομα τῆς ἐκάστου γένεις συνημμένης οἰκείας σημασίας, ὅτι δὲ αὐτά τὰ γένη τῶν ἀρίθμων δέκα, προὶ τῶν ὁ λόγος δηλώσας ταύτῃ δέ καὶ ὁ ἀρίθμος τῶν κατηγοριῶν δέκα, δὲ ἐπιγράφοις. Περὶ δέκα γενῶν οὐδὲ αὐτῶν ἀπεικότως, εἰ μονὸν πρὸς τὴν ἐπί τὰ γένη ἀναφορὰν ποιοῦτο τὴν ἐπιγραφήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ προσθηκομένος περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν νομίζοι (ed. Busse 1887).
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This is evidently a compressed version of Boethus’ interpretation (Βόθθος ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίες εἴρηκεν ταῦτα καὶ Ἑρμίνος βραχέως, 59,17–18). It seems to represent a similar reading of the Categories as a text to be used for teasing out or articulating προλήψεις. Perhaps most importantly, it is extremely suggestive of a justification for beginning the philosophical curriculum with the Categories, because this treatise is uniquely well adapted to help to articulate precisely these προλήψεις. A similar view is attributed to Boethus in Simplicius’ commentary:

It was not feasible to give definitions (ὁροὶ) of the primary genera . . . But it was possible, by means of a general sketch account (ὑπογραφή), to actuate (ἀνακινεῖν) our conception (ἐννοιαῖ) that fits (αναρμῷοςεύς) with the relative. [Aristotle] does this by following Plato according to the first rendering (ἀπόδοσις) [of the definition of the relative], as Boethus [of Sidon] tells us. For Plato is said by him to have given the following rendering about relatives: ‘whatever are said to be just what they are [as being] of other things’.106 (Simplicius 159,10–15, translation Fleet 2002, lightly modified)

I take this passage to suggest that Boethus, for his part, located the Categories’ value in the core chapters’ ‘sketches’ or υπογραφαί of the genera, stirring up our concepts about them without requiring the capacity to construct a technical definition (which would also be impossible, in the absence of any higher genera). (The verb ἀνακινεῖν has a storied philosophical history in the Platonic tradition,107 but that does not prevent Boethus from having used it in commenting on Aristotle; at any rate, the following passage shows that the central point about υπογραφαί is Boethus’ own.) Another useful passage in this connection, I think, is Simplicius in Cat. 163,28–9. Boethus remarks that the first account of the relative (Cat. 6a36–7) looks circular, which is no good in a definition; Simplicius rebukes him

106 Ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἐννεῖς λέγομεν ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν ἀποδιδόναι τῶν πρὸς τι ἀδύνατον ἢ τῶν γὰρ πρῶτων γενῶν ἄρους ἀποδιδόναι ἀμήχανον ἢ διὰ τὰς εἰρήμενας πρότερον αἰτίας· δι’ ὑπογραφῆς δὲ τοιοῦ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐννοιαν ἀνακινεῖ τὴν συναρμολογοῦσαν τοῖς πρὸς τι ὑδατόν ἢ τούτοις περὶ τὸν Ἐννοιαν κατὰ τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τὴν πρώτην ἀκολουθοῦν, ὡς φησὶν Βόθθος· λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων οὕτως ὡς αὐτοῦ ἀποδοικεῖ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τή· ὡς αὕτη ἀπερ ςτίν ἐτέρων λέγεται (ed. Kalfleisch 1907).

107 See Plato, Meno 85C, and for the Platonic context, Chiaradonna 2007c. It is certainly possible that Boethus did not use this exact verb, but it is paraphrase by Simplicius or his source.
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for failing to recognize that Aristotle is not offering a proper definition, but a sketch account or ὑπογραφή. The rebuke stings because:

[Boethus] himself goes on to claim in his defence that it is necessary to present sketch accounts (ὑπογραφάς) of the primary genera by means of the things which are posterior to them as well as [by means of] themselves.108 (in Cat. 163,28–9, tr. Fleet 2002, lightly modified)

Boethus stressed that the primary genera should be described by ὑπογραφαί. (It would, after all, appear to be impossible to furnish a formal Aristotelian definition of the highest genera, since a formal definition would comprise a genus and differences.)109 All of these passages suggest that this broad approach to the Categories belongs to the first century and to the first generations of interest in the treatise. Even if this view originated with Boethus, I think it is a good candidate for elucidating the interest in the Categories among the earliest generations of commentators. And as I began to argue above, I think there is also some circumstantial evidence that Boethus was here following Andronicus.110

On the Stoic view, the difficulty about using such ‘sketches’ to actuate preconceptions from ordinary language was that they capture only accidental, not essential, features of the world (Brittain 2005: 196–200—like the merely ‘ennoematic’ definitions described by Galen, Diff. puls. 4, 708,16–709,5). To arrive at an essential account that was not merely expressed in terms of accidental attributes—that was not a mere sketch but a proper definition—would require, for the Stoic, a systematic dialectical process of articulation (διάρρημα), as noted above. The Categories, I think, is construed as bridging this gap. Consider, for example, Simplicius’ preface to Aristotle’s description of the first category, οὐσία:

Earlier <Aristotle> enumerated all genera in order, and he provided an outline elucidation (ὑποτυπωτικήν . . . διδασκαλίαν) of them by means of examples; now he takes in hand each of the genera and gives a more detailed account as best as one can, by pointing out their conceptual

109 I am indebted to Marwan Rashed for this point: see Alexander, Quaestio De differentia II [12!](a), translated in Rashed 2007: 64–5.
110 It might also be worth noting that the rendering preferred as a ὑπογραφή here by Boethus is close to Andronicus’ and Ariston’s preferred account of the relative as disposed to another (Simplic. in Cat. 202,5).
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content by means of a sketch account (ἐννοοῖν δὲ ὑπογραφῆς ἐπιδεικνύων), and by clarifying their attributes (παρακολουθοῦντα) and distinguishing characteristics (ἴδια). Archytas proceeded in this way as well.111 (Simplic. in Cat. 75,28–31, tr. de Haas and Fleet 2001, lightly modified)

Here, again, is the fundamental pedagogical value attributed to the Categories: Aristotle begins from relatively informal, everyday, perceptible ‘examples’ of the genera and then clarifies their παρακολουθοῦντα and ἴδια, not requiring prior experience in the technicalities of constructing definitions. Thus Aristotle’s Categories simply offers an articulation of familiar terms, approaching a more exact understanding:

Aristotle’s aim here is to teach us about the words mentioned in the doctrine of categories that require some articulation (διάρθρωσις) and explanation.112 (Ammonius in Cat. 93,9–12, tr. Cohen and Matthews 1991)

The Neoplatonists will later adapt this basic Aristotelian notion—that the Categories is beginning from the familiar and proceeding to the unfamiliar, from what is known to us to what is known by nature—to accommodate a doctrinally valuable restriction of the Categories’ scope, establishing that it concerns itself only with sensible being. Thus Simplicius contends that:

[Aristotle in the Categories] is talking about perceptible things (αἰσθητά), which are also what is investigated by the ordinary person (ὁ πολίς ἄνθρωπος)... he seeks the difference in accordance with those meaningful words which were first and most properly assigned to sensible things, and which are familiar to the ordinary person.113 (Simplicius, in Cat. 74,3–17)

111 Πρώτον μὲν ἐν τάξει πάντα τὰ γένε κατημηριθμᾶτο, ὑποστυπώτικὴν αὐτῶν τὴν διδασκαλίαν διὰ παραδειγμάτων ποιησάμενος· νῦν δὲ ἐκατόν προχειρίσμενος τὴν ἀκριβεστέραν ὡς αὐτὸν τα παράδοσα αὐτοῦ ποιεῖται, τὴν τε ἐννοιαν δὲ ὑπογραφῆς ἐπιδεικνύων καὶ τὰ παρακολουθοῦντα καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἀνακαθαρισόμενος. οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀρχάτας ἐποίησεν... (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).
112 Σκοπὸς ἦστιν ἐνταῦθα τὸ Ἀριστοτέλει διδάξαι ὡς περὶ τῶν φαινόντων, ὅτι ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν κατηγορίων ἐννομόσευσε, οὐ παντάσαι μὲν ὧν ἄγνωστον οὐσίαν ἐκ τῆς συνθείας, δομέμενον δὲ ὧμιλος διαρθρώσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας (ed. Busse 1895).
113 ἐπεί ὃτι περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διαλέγεται, περὶ ὧν καὶ ὁ πολίς άνθρωπος τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ποιεῖται, δήλον ἦστι πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τῆς παρά πάσης λεγομένης οὐσίαν προχειρίσασθαι, ἐπείτε ἐξ ὧν δεικνύει μνημονεύσας, αἰσθητής τε καὶ διανοητής, εἰς δὲ τὴν ὑπὲρ ταύτας μηδὲ ἀνελθόν ὅλως τὴν αἰσθητήν κυριωτέραν εἶναι τῆς διανοητῆς φύσιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σκέμματι προχειρίσμενον ἔχουσιν.
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[ Aristotle in this treatise] is not concerned with discussing the intelligible substances . . . this he made clear by the <word> ‘called’ (λεγομένη, Cat. 2a12). For in ordinary language (συνήθεια) intelligible substance is not spoken of, nor is it known to the multitude (οἱ πολλοὶ), but sensible substance is.\(^{114}\) (Simplicius, in Cat. 82,2–20)

In fact, Boethus of Sidon had already developed the basic argument that the Categories is concerned with the sensible world addressed by speech, in response to criticisms raised by a predecessor of Nicostatus and Plotinus (ap. Simplic. in Cat. 78,4–20: perhaps Eudorus, as Chiaradonna 2009: 104 suggests, or Lucius).\(^{115}\) (For Plotinus, on the other hand, language primarily addresses the intelligible;\(^{116}\) I argue in ch. 3 that Eudorus of Alexandria may also have maintained that language addresses both intelligible and sensible realms.)

I think this is a suggestive bundle of evidence supporting an early reading of the Categories as ‘articulating’ προλήψεις in something like the Stoic sense, also illustrating and grounding its forward position in the curriculum as the ‘first book’ of philosophy and logic. The Categories alone offers the ‘honing’ of our natural preconceptions of the highest genera that the later Aristotelian curriculum—and dialectic in general—depend upon: as a dialectical handbook, it offers and describes a short list of summa genera, including simple linguistic ‘tests’ that we can use to help determine to which category a given term really belongs. (As I suggested above, this might also have been emphasized as an important practical step in tackling sophistical

\(^{114}\) ή ότι ού πρόκειται αὐτά περὶ τῶν νοητῶν οὐσίων νῦν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν φιλών καὶ τάξις παραδοσεῖ, ὅπερ καὶ διὰ τῆς λεγομένη ἐνεδείξατο: οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἐν τῇ συνήθεια οὐδὲ ἐγνωσταί τοῖς πολλοῖς ἑκεῖνη, ἀλλὰ αὐτῇ μᾶλλον ἡ αἰσθητή (ed. Kalbfleisch 1907).

\(^{115}\) See ch. 6.

challenges that turn on equivocation).\textsuperscript{117} I think the attribution of some such interpretation of the \textit{Categories} to the first generation of commentators, especially Boethus, is fairly strong, on the basis of the evidence treated here.

I think that there is further reason to trace it to Andronicus, given his apparent innovation in foregrounding the \textit{Categories} in the corpus of Aristotle, his interest in distinguishing accidental from essential predication (as preserved in Boethius), and his associations with the terminology of προλήψεις and διάρθρωσις in Simplicius. The \textit{Categories} will activate our preconceptions of the highest genera and also correct them, and—crucially—will begin us on the road to using our honed concepts in scientific demonstration or ἀπόδειξις, not merely in the rhetorical applications of ‘dialectic’ in the \textit{Topics}’ sense. The use of the \textit{Categories}’ simple tests helps us to avoid the mistake of confusing accidental with essential predication, and so trains the budding dialectician to resist sophistical puzzles turning on equivocation (and such puzzles, to judge from Cicero’s criticisms, may still have troubled Antiochus’ school before Andronicus). But it will not be enough for this process simply to apply in rhetorical contexts: philosophers would merely be ‘declaiming θέσεις’ or rhetorical theses maintained in dialectical practice (which, interestingly, is just what Strabo says they were limited to doing before the recovery of the esoteric treatises: \textit{Geog.} 13.1.54). This is what Peripatetics and Academicians had done before (cf. Brittain 2001: 329–42 and Reinhardt 2003: 347).

Andronicus perhaps argued that Aristotle provided the resources that the ‘dogmatist’ required to articulate our innate ἐννοίαι—a long road that began with the \textit{Categories}’ (pre-technical) training in the predication of simple terms, and ran through propositions and syllogisms to the \textit{Analytics} and ἀπόδειξις. Our everyday speech, based on our words’ conventional relation to everyday things, still encodes something of the truth about things, a truth that Aristotle’s articulations help to decode.\textsuperscript{118} The proof that predication is possible—that words could successfully refer to things, once we are able to bring

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Topics} 1.9 and \textit{Soph. El.} 22 presuppose such tests, as Menn 1995: 320 points out, but do not provide the tools to practise them; the \textit{Categories} does provide just such tests.

\textsuperscript{118} The later Neoplatonist commentators would develop such a reading of its value: see Simplicius in \textit{Cat.} 12.10–13,12 with Hoffmann 1987. I have also explored some issues relating to the Neoplatonists’ pedagogical use of the \textit{Categories} in Griffin 2013a.
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every term under the correct genus—would lie in our subsequent agreement in employing the predicates that the Categories articulated.119

Be that as it may, Andronicus certainly insisted that the Categories contributes to demonstrative knowledge (ἀπόδειξις) and not merely to rhetorical competence, and in this he was not alone. There are many traces of early interest in the value of formal division and definition for finding the truth, focusing on the indefiniteness or ‘uncountability’ of particulars.120 Antiochus already crafts an ‘Old Academic’ consensus that definition and division can be used to overcome the vagueness of sensible reality (Cic. Ac. 1.5, above). The Categories is represented as a solution to that same ‘vagueness’ of the perceptible world in Porphyry’s shorter commentary on the Categories, building on the earlier discussion of the appropriateness of the title Κατηγορία:

For things and expressions are both practically infinite in number. But his intention is not to list expressions one by one—for each one signifies one particular being—but since things that are many in number are one in species or in genus, the infinity of beings and of the expressions that signify them is found to be included under a list of ten genera. Since beings are comprehended by ten generic sorts, the words that indicate them have also come to be ten in genus, and are themselves also so classified. Thus predications (κατηγορίαι) are said to be ten in genus, just as beings themselves are ten in genus.121 (Porph. in Cat. 58.5—13, tr. Strange 1992, lightly modified)

The most general items, then, are ten; the most special are of a certain number, but a definite one; the individuals—that is to say, the items after the most special items—are infinite. That is why Plato advised those who descend from the most general items to the most special to

119 For that kind of argument, an argument from our consensus about (properly articulated) κοινά ἐννοιαί, see for example Obbink 1992, Brittain 2005 (with passages cited above).
120 I have also argued this point in Griffin 2012a and 2013b. For the Neoplatonist reception of this idea, see Chase 2011.
121 ἀπειρα μὲν σχέδων καὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ αἱ λέξεις κατὰ ἀριθμον. ἀλλ’ ό πάς κατὰ ἀριθμον πρόκειται διελθεῖν λέξεις ἐκάστη γὰρ κατὰ ἀριθμον σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων. ἀλλ’ ἔπει τῷ ἀριθμῷ πολλά ἐστιν ἐν ὑπάρχει ηλικίας, καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν σημανσον αὐτά λέξεων εἰς δέκα γένη εἰρηγήτω περιλαμβανομένη εἰς τό γράφθηκα, εἰς δέκα τοῖν τε καινος διάφορας περιληπθέντων τῶν ὄντων δέκα καὶ αἱ διηλούσαι ταῦτα φωναγεγονων κατά γένη καὶ αὐτὰ περιληπθέσαι δέκα οὖν λέγονται κατηγορίαι τῷ γένει δηλονοντὶ, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτά τὰ ὄντα δέκα τῷ γένει (ed. Busse 1887). Bodéus 2008
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and perhaps earlier to Andronicus. Pseudo-Archytas—writing perhaps in the first century BCE—argues that:

Beings are spoken of in two ways: for some are subjects, others inherent in subjects or accidental to them […] And it is clear that ὁδὸς and ποιῶν and ποιῶν, and the other thoughts and signifiers [mentioned previously in the list of ten κατηγορίαι at 22,14] will have been spoken of in just the same number of ways […] All knowledge, then, takes its starting-points (ἀρχομενη) from the limited (πεπερασμένων) and gets to know the unlimited (ἀπειρων); and this is even more true of the knowledge of beings […] Every craft and every form of knowledge has a certain rank and definition, and anything like this is in a numerical sequence (ἀρθιμος): and the entirety of number is ten […] Now other men have language (λόγος) by accident (for they use it without knowledge), but the wise have it in an absolute manner. That is because, once

122 δέκα μὲν οὖν τὰ γενικῶτατα, τὰ δὲ εἰδικῶτατα ἐν ἀρθιμῳ μὲν τινι, οὐ μὲν ἀπειρων τὰ δὲ ἀτομα, ἄπερ ἐστι τὰ μετὰ τὰ εἰδικῶτατα, ἄπειρα, διὸ ἄχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατίστατα παρεκκλείστο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι, κατείναι δὲ διὰ τῶν διὰ μέσον διαφορών ταῖς εἰς διάφοροις διαφοραῖς: τὰ δὲ ἀπειρὰ φησιν ἑαυτον, μὴ γὰρ ἄν γενεσθαι τοιῶν ἐπιστήμην. κατίστατο μὲν οὖν εἰς τὰ εἰδικῶτατα ἀνάγκη διαιροῦντος διὰ πλήθους ἑνάς, ἀνίσοντων δὲ εἰς τὰ γενικῶτατα ἀνάγκη συναρεῖν τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἑν (ed. Busse 1887).

123 So Szlezák 1972. Certainly the associations of the text, including Andronicus and Eudorus, belong to the first century, and there is no trace of the dominant later discussions that we encounter in (say) Sosigenes in the second century (cf. Dexippus, 7,1 and following). Hippolytus (170–236 CE) seems to allude to the text in his Refutations (6,24), and Iamblichus uses it extensively in commenting on the Categories.
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they grasp reality and witness real beings, they apply the fitting mean-
ings absolutely.124 (31.6–32.23 Thesleff)

This passage seems to express a similar common position, including
the emphasis on transcending vagueness and ignorance, and on
distinguishing accidental from essential predication, with additional
Pythagorean undertones.125 I suggest that Andronicus developed this
position in the first place, stressing the value of the Categories as
a crucial initial tool for undertaking the kind of division necessary for
generating formal definitions—shifting from mere προλήψεις based
on vague sensible particulars to properly articulated ἔννοιαι—and
defended its value on this basis.

(e) Other testimonies on the Categories

I have focused here on testimonies to Andronicus’ interest in the
general function and purpose of the Categories, and its goal or target

124 The text runs as follows (excerpted from Szlezák 1972): ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ὄντα διχῶς λέγεται τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὑποκείμεναι, τὰ δὲ συνυπάρχοντα ἤ συμβεβηκότα τούτων καὶ τῶν συνυπαρχόντων ἢ συμβεβηκότων τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐστίν ποιότης, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχουν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τούτων ἔξος καὶ ὶμοιοις [... ] (30) Τὸ μὲν οὖν σύστημα τοῦ παντὸς λόγου, τὰ συνυπάρχοντα αὐτῷ τίνα τε καὶ ὑπόσα καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλεκόμενα τε καὶ διαρροέμενα διάδηλωται, ἐκ δὲ τούτων φανερῶ ἔστιν, ὅτι ἄρθρωσις κανόνων [p. 32] ἐστί καὶ σταθμή τῆς ὄντως ἐπιστήμης καὶ γέγονε πρὸς τὸ καταθεῖν τὴν τῶν ὄντων ὄπασαν ἄλθειαν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ σύμφωνον τε καὶ συγγενή τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παντὸς ἐξ’ τῆς καταρρηθμάσας, δι’ ἂσπρον καὶ τὰ θεία τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἄρθρωμα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἐρμηνευόμενα καὶ διασημαίνεται πάντα γὰρ ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἢ διὰ τούτῳ ὢν ἄνευ τούτων ἔχει τὴν θεωρίαν—ἤ γὰρ περί οὐδαίον ὁ λόγος ἢ περί τῶν συνυπαρχόντων αὐτὴ καὶ ἦτοι περί συμμάτων ἢ ἀδιάματων καὶ τῶν ἀδιαμάτων ἦτοι τοῦ ἐν ποιότητί ἢ τοῦ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τοῖς ἔξος.

125 Ἀρχύτας, like Eudorus, privileges the absolute over the relative (see ch. 3).
in the later Neoplatonist vocabulary (πρὸθεσις, σκοπιός).\footnote{On which see for example Mansfeld 1994: 1–9, 20, Hoffmann 1987, Hadot 1991.} Andronicus' other reflections on the text illustrate his attitude to Aristotle—in general, he engages him more or less as an equal, without the sort of reverence that characterizes even Boethus' treatment (Moraux, Aristotelismus I: 99). For example, he famously replaced Aristotle's categories of Where and When by Place and Time (Simplic. in Cat. 134,5, 342,23, 357,28). He added a fifth kind of quality to Aristotle's own list (263,19–22). He seems to have suggested—if this is not a textual criticism but a philosophical point—that Aristotle could have expressed himself more clearly at Cat. 6a37, as his extant definition of the relative is circular (202,5).\footnote{I attempt to set out some of Andronicus' other contributions more generally in Griffin 2009: ch. 3.} All of these innovations sparked defences of Aristotle by Andronicus' successors, especially Boethus.

**IV. CONCLUSIONS: ANDRONICUS' RELATIONSHIP TO THE 'ANCIENT EXEGETES' OF CATEGORIES**

Based on the limited material at our disposal, there is no strong evidence of Andronicus responding critically to alternative interpretations of the Categories, such as those offered by Lucius (discussed in ch. 4). The only alternative reading of the treatise that Andronicus is clearly concerned to rebut is that which pegs it as an introduction to the Topics, and so to plausible dialectic rather than scientific demonstration. Still, we might attempt to develop a tentative narrative of the course of influence of Andronicus' promotion of the Categories, focusing on the 'ancient', or first-generation, readers of the text (Simplicius in Cat. 159,33: τῶν παλαιῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἔξηγηγητὰς).\footnote{Namely, Boethus of Sidon and Ariston (Peripatetics), Eudorus of Alexandria (who may be called an 'Academic', or Pythagorean; cf. Bonazzi 2013, 160–2), and Athenodorus (a Stoic), to whom we might add the shadowy critic Lucius, who is mentioned only by Simplicius and is not listed among 'the ancients', but seems to belong there chronologically, since Boethus responds in some detail to his critique.} In this section, in anticipation of chs. 3–6, I sketch this narrative. (Again, I would like to stress at the outset that I do not take
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Andronicus’ ideas about the text to be especially influential on his contemporaries, with the exception of Boethus of Sidon; rather, I argue that his simple promotion of the text—from relative obscurity as a preface to the Topics to the fore of his catalogue—may have been the primary motivator of wider interest in the treatise Categories.)

Peripatetics

Let us turn first to Andronicus’ Peripatetic near-contemporaries, Boethus and Ariston. Since there is good evidence of Boethus of Sidon either correcting or defending and expanding Andronicus’ interpretations of Aristotelian philosophy (Aspasius in Eth. 44,24), and plentiful evidence of his response to Andronicus’ reading of the Categories in particular, we can support the ancient tradition (e.g. Philoponus in Cat. 5,19) that Boethus was influenced by Andronicus, and perhaps in some formal sense his pupil. We can locate Boethus after Andronicus—not necessarily chronologically, but simply in terms of influence, suggesting that Andronicus’ publication, paraphrase, and foregrounding of the Categories helped to attract the kind of detailed interest that Boethus displays in the treatise. In particular, as I argue below in the chapter on Boethus, Boethus adopts Andronicus’ vision of the Categories as a useful introduction to philosophy for beginners.

There is very little evidence to tell us much about Ariston (likely of Alexandria), a newly-minted Aristotelian with whom Andronicus

129 On Ariston, see for example I. Mariotti (1966) and Moraux I, 181–93, with Caujolle-Zaslavsky and Richard Goulet, ‘Ariston d’Alexandrie’, in Goulet (1989) and Gottschalk (1987), 1110 and 1120–1. For his ‘conversion’ to Aristotelianism, see now Blank 2007: 92 and Chiara Donna 2013: 39–40, with Moraux 1973: 225–6 and Donini 1977: 247–8. Strabo (Geog. 17, 1, 5) is a chief witness for the life and chronology of Ariston. He must have lived during or before Strabo’s own life. Fraser (489) argues that Strabo was unlikely to have known Ariston during his own sojourn to Alexandria in and after 24, as the latter was a pupil of Antiochus (and his brother), and there is a lapse of forty years between the probable death of Antiochus in 69 and Strabo’s residence in Egypt. The information about Ariston’s relationship to Antiochus depends on Philodemus, Index Acad. Herc. col. 35. The Philodeman Index has Ariston move from the Academy to the Peripatos with Cratippus. It is not demonstrable that the Academic–Peripatetic Ariston mentioned in the papyrus alongside Cratippus is the same Ariston of Alexandria mentioned by Strabo. It was assumed, e.g. by Moraux (1973: 57), although Moraux also recognizes the uncertainty of the identification (182; cf. Tarán 499). If they are the same, certainly this is some help; Cratippus’ activity was contemporary with Cicero, who mentions him as the leading Peripatetic in Athens (cf.
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shared a bid to revise the definition of the Relative at *Cat.* 8a31 to avoid circularity; Andronicus, Ariston, and Boethus are all credited with this argument, although perhaps the fact that Porphyry mentions only Andronicus (*in Cat.* 125,20) is mildly suggestive in his favour as its originator. This evidence, I think, only points to the possibility that Andronicus was one of several contemporary Peripatetics, like Ariston and Cratippus, who grew increasingly interested in the Aristotelian esoteric texts and in working out and correcting the ideas contained in the *Categories* in particular—though they were not yet driven by the commentarial, line-by-line approach that Boethus would subsequently adopt.

Platonists

Before turning to Eudorus, let us consider Lucius, a very influential critic of the *Categories* (discussed in more detail in ch. 4). Lucius, who has Platonist sympathies, forcefully objects to the *Categories* on the grounds that it professes (but fails) to offer a compelling account of being, since it omits any discussion of intelligible being at all: in other words, it’s a failed shot at a system of first philosophy, or ontology. While ‘Lucius and Nicostratus’ refer to Andronicus in the course of their objections to the *Categories* (ap. Simplic. *in Cat.* 134,4, in the set of *aporiai* at 127,11–140,30) and they rely on some of Andronicus’ interpretations, we have no evidence that Andronicus was in turn aware of the interpretations and challenges to the text offered by Lucius. Boethus of Sidon, however, certainly was; he responds to their objections systematically (see ch. 4). We might, then, suggest this

*De Off.* 3.2, *De Div.* 1.3, etc.—although as Gottschalk and others stress, this need not imply that he was ‘scholarch’; thus the close attachment of Cratippus with Ariston could also weight Ariston’s activity before the later fortieth BCE.

130 Simplicius (*in Cat.* 201,34) states that Ariston and Boethus changed *tι* to *heteron* in the definition of the Relative at *Cat.* 8a31 to avoid circularity; Andronicus appears to have done the same. Simplicius subsequently states *οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος*, although it is not clear who follows whom: there is perhaps a superficial reason to favour Andronicus, who is mentioned alone at Porphyry, *in Cat.* 125,20 ff. I think there is no immediate reason to doubt that Andronicus here originated the interest in the discussion of the relative from an Aristotelian standpoint, and shared this interest with Ariston. Tarán 1981: 742, suggests Stoic influence on Ariston; Gottschalk 1987: 1106 n. 138, points to Aristotelian sources instead.

131 This, however, does not prove very much chronologically, since Simplicius often reports Lucius, Nicostratus, and Plotinus as if they presented a united front.
rough sequence of events: Andronicus’ new emphasis drew serious attention to the Categories outside the circle of scholars like himself, Ariston, and perhaps bibliophiles like Tyrannio; Lucius represents a critical response from a Platonist standpoint (which would imply a relatively early date for Lucius; on this, see ch. 4); Boethus, belonging to the next generation, replied to Lucius’ objections while also developing a more subtle reading of the text’s metaphysical implications and amending Andronicus’ views accordingly.

But why did Lucius respond so vigorously against an interpretation of the Categories that simply—with Andronicus—made it into a useful, introductory handbook for teasing out our ‘preconceptions’ and developing demonstrative technique, a foundation for logic? What threat was there in that? For an answer, we must turn to Eudorus, a near contemporary of Andronicus who shares his analysis of the Categories under the broader subdivision of the absolute and the relative, and the conviction that its study can lead to demonstrative knowledge (these affinities are discussed further in the following chapter). Eudorus, followed in several important respects by Pseudo-Archytas, adopted these insights in a Pythagorean and Platonist framework, arguing that the Categories offers an accurate map of the structure of reality, both intelligible and sensible, once it is lightly amended (for example, to position quality before quantity, representing the Monad before the Dyad). It appears to be this kind of interpretation, not Andronicus’, that sparked objections from the school represented by Lucius. It is difficult to judge the direction of influence here, although Andronicus’ motivations for treating the Categories as he did display no evidence of Eudorus’ specifically Pythagorean innovations or concerns. We might then suppose that they evolved independently and that the attention that Andronicus drew to the treatise helped to attract interest in Alexandria, although others introduced a very different, metaphysical and ontological set of concerns, which then in turn attracted critical engagement from other Platonists. Eudorus may well have developed his interests in the Categories entirely independently from Andronicus, and for different reasons (see ch. 3).

So perhaps we might update our suggested narrative as follows: Andronicus’ methodological and pedagogical concerns motivated his foregrounding of the Categories in his catalogue, which in turn helped to draw attention to the text; Eudorus represents a growing Alexandrian school of interest in the Categories as a metaphysical or
ontological treatise offering a map of reality, which in turn attracted other Platonist interest and critics such as Lucius; Boethus responded to them in turn, arguing in his turn that the *Categories* was only intended to offer a map of sensible reality, and metaphysicians would be better off exploring its relationship to the central books of the *Metaphysics*. Boethus’ view, of course, would prevail through Porphyry, with Plotinus adopting the Lucian and Nicostratan critique in the meanwhile.  

**Stoics**

This narrative omits just one of the ‘ancient’ readers of *in Cat*. 159,22, namely the Stoic Athenodorus. There is no clear evidence, I think, that Athenodorus’ interest in the *Categories* was stimulated by Andronicus; in fact, there is some prima facie reason to doubt that, since Athenodorus’ worry about the treatise is that it does a poor job of analysing natural language into its component parts. That is to say, it is a bad textbook of grammar, in the sense that the tenfold division seems to be the wrong number (cf. Simplicius *in Cat*. 62,24–6) to capture everything from conjunctions to prepositions, nouns to verbs (for this argument, see ch. 5). This would be a very odd and blinkered response to the Andronican interpretation that this treatise is about meaningful predication (*katēgoria*), especially the clear and precise distinction of absolute from relative predication, functioning as an aid to definition and demonstration, and that the book provides an on-ramp to philosophical demonstration through the articulation of our innate προλήψεις.

Perhaps, instead, we might locate Athenodorus as an earlier, Stoic respondent to Aristotle’s theory of ten kinds of predication, understood as useful for rhetoric or grammar, compatible with its earlier reading under the rubric of the *Before-the-Topics* or the rhetorical interpretation found, for instance, in Quintilian *Inst.* 3.23–34. (This might make it chronologically less likely, though not impossible, that the ‘Athenodorus’ mentioned by Simplicius is Athenodorus Calvus, the tutor of Augustus, but there are other, earlier alternatives for that identification.)  

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133 I argue this in more detail below and especially in Griffin 2013b.
responding to Athenodorus’ concerns, but not very much: Boethus responds, here elaborating and adding precision to Andronicus’ view, that the treatise is not trying to analyse verbal expressions as such (λέξεις καθ’ λέξεις) but instead simple verbal expressions qua significant of being—that is, it is a work of semantics. This influential Boethan interpretation would prevail through Porphyry. (There is also some evidence, as I suggest in ch. 4, that later Stoics like Cornutus agreed that the Categories belonged to the primary part of dialectic in the Stoic sense, dealing with λέκτα and not with grammar as such, although there are also passages, such as 359,1, that speak against this.)

The following chapters aim to develop and elaborate this narrative.