Important Placement Program Dates: 2019-2020

Placement Procedures, Instructions, Forms
- Applications: An Overview
- Interfolio
- Instructions for Letters of Recommendation, using Interfolio
- Major sources of Job Listings
- Placement Procedures
- Evaluations Request (Form)
- Student Authorization Releasing Placement File (Form)
- Advice on preparing a Job Placement Dossier
- APA Convention Logistics
- Mock Interviews & Practice Job Talks
- Membership Information and Joining the APA
- The Ph.D. Process
- Important Graduate Program Dates: 2019-2020

Samples of Placement Materials
- Sample CVs
- Sample Dissertation Summaries
- Sample WDAPs (Works Done at Princeton)

Sample Job Application Letters

Sample Teaching Dossiers

Sample Research Statements

Sample Diversity Statements
### Important Placement Program Dates: 2019-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 8, 2019; 4:15pm</td>
<td><strong>May Placement Meeting</strong> (201 Marx Hall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 3, 2019</td>
<td>Evaluation Request Form (list of recommenders) due (required)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring/Summer, 2019</td>
<td>Review of writing samples with students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12, 2019</td>
<td>Draft of DS &amp; writing sample to letter writers for feedback (this will also help them to describe your project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 3, 2019</td>
<td><strong>Letters of Recommendation due</strong> (required)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 9, 2019</td>
<td>Drafts of CV, Dissertation Summary/Research Statement, WDAP (Work Done at Princeton) due to Committee (required for 1st-timers &amp; for repeaters seeking review) Drafts of Teaching Dossiers (due only if you are seeking advice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 9, 2019; 4:00pm</td>
<td><strong>September Placement Meeting</strong> (201 Marx Hall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16, 2019</td>
<td>Completion and approval of dossiers Website check by Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23 - 25, 2019</td>
<td>Sign up for time slots for Mock Interviews with Students (all via Skype or BlueJeans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 30-October 4, 2019</td>
<td>Mock Interviews with students (all via Skype or BlueJeans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 14, 2019</td>
<td>Send draft of job talk to advisor for feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4-8, 2019 (est. dates)</td>
<td>Mock Interviews with faculty (all via Skype or BlueJeans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early November thru mid-December, 2019</td>
<td>Practice Job Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 8 – 11, 2020</td>
<td>APA Eastern Division Meeting (Philadelphia, PA) Sheraton Philadelphia Downtown Hotel 201 North 17th St., Philadelphia, PA 19103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 26 – 29, 2020</td>
<td>APA Central Division Meeting (Chicago, IL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 2020 (Date/Time TBD)</td>
<td>March Placement Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8 – 12, 2020</td>
<td>APA Pacific Division Meeting (San Francisco, CA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*page updated 6/7/2019*
Placement Procedures, Instructions, Forms
Applications: An Overview

Applications

In most cases, there are three rounds involved in securing a job. The first round involves mailing/emailing/uploading an application to that job. That application will normally include:

- CV
- WDAP (with official note from the chair)
- Dissertation Summary
- Letters of Recommendation
- Cover Letter
- Writing Sample
- Teaching Dossier
- Any additional information that may be requested in the advertisement

If this portion of the application is successful, you will most likely be offered the chance to interview with the school via video conference (or, in rare cases, at the APA); this is the second round. An interview is normally 45 mins long, though sometimes they are only 30 mins. Interview often (though again, not always) covers the following information:

- An opening spiel by the candidate (to be prepared in advance)
- Questions asked about the candidate’s work
- Questions asked about teaching (for this syllabi should be prepared in advance and memorized)
- A chance for the candidate to ask a question about the school (to be prepared in advance)

If the interview is successful, candidates will normally be offered fly-outs to campus; this is the third round. On a fly-out, one meets with faculty, and possibly students and/or administrators. The candidate will then give a job talk of approximately 50 minutes, followed by approximately an hour of Q&A. Occasionally schools will ask candidates to give a sample undergraduate lecture, either in addition to or in lieu of a job talk.

More detailed information about each component of the application, and guidelines on timing are given below.
Writing Sample

This is the single most important component of your application. Please note that you will not have time to work on this in the fall, so it is essential that you have your writing sample polished and ready to go in September. If you are planning to go on the market in the fall, you should have a draft ready to circulate by May. Getting feedback on your writing sample is of great importance, so please take the summer to circulate it. Your advisor should have already read a draft by this point; if not you should show it to your advisor asap, and ditto for your other letter writers, and other members of the faculty who are willing to read it. You should also take advantage of Liz’s program and get feedback from other graduate students. While it is important to get feedback from people who are experts, it is equally important to get feedback from non-experts, since many schools will not have experts in your area. Feedback from educated non-philosophers can also be valuable, since a good writing sample should be interesting and accessible to a broad audience.

Please note that the Placement Committee does not review writing samples; you need to seek feedback on them yourself.

There are differing views on how long a writing sample should be. In general, you should aim for between about 25-30 pages, double spaced. However, this is only a rule of thumb, and the best way to determine whether your sample is too long (or too short) is to get specific feedback on your piece from a range of people.

You should be aware that many writing samples will not be read all the way through. Your writing sample should be written so that it will grab the reader right away and keep her reading.

Interviews

You will have the opportunity to give four practice interviews – one face-to-face with other students, two over skype with other students, and one face-to-face with members of the faculty. In response to a recent shift toward skype interviews – which can happen as early as November – mock interviews with faculty will be held in November. Mock interviews with students will correspondingly be held in late September/early October. It is thus essential that you prepare for your interviews over the summer.

There are three main things to do to prepare for an interview. The first is that you should prepare a 5-10 minute spiel, which summarizes the main argument of your writing sample/dissertation. You should consult with your advisor about your spiel, since it is an important part of the interview. You should also be prepared to answer questions about your spiel, your writing sample, your dissertation, your future research plans, and so on. Practice interviews will be helpful in preparing to answer these sorts of questions, but it is also helpful just to engage people in conversation about your work. The sorts of questions that come up in conversation are often similar to ones that come up in interviews.
You should also be prepared to answer teaching questions, and in preparation for this you should prepare syllabi for the following classes: an upper-level undergraduate and an introductory class for each AOC; a graduate class, an upper-level undergraduate and an introductory class for each AOS. (So, two classes per AOC, three per AOS.) Once you have prepared these syllabi, you should construct a paragraph summary of each syllabus. Ideally, the paragraph should begin by stating your ‘vision’ for the class, then more specifically how you would go about achieving this vision. The paragraph should mention readings, but should not simply be a list of all the readings you would assign – it should have a more interesting and captivating narrative structure.

When in actual interviews, you should be sensitive to the kind of school you are interviewing with, and potentially adjust your course descriptions accordingly. For example, if you are interviewing at a large, non-selective state school, you do not want to describe a course that would simply be inappropriate for the undergraduates there. This is something that your advisor can give you specific guidance on.

**Job Talk**

Your job talk should be another paper of comparable quality to your writing sample, but that you are prepared to deliver as a talk. Even though most applicants will not actually read the paper, it is still important to write up the job talk as a paper so that you can really see the arguments in it, and so you can get feedback on it. Additionally, a number of schools request that you circulate a copy of your job talk paper in advance, and you do not want to be in a position to having to refuse, or turn in something hastily written.

You will not have much time at all to devote to serious philosophy once September rolls around, and all too often students scramble to throw something together the week after the convention. Your job talk is as important as your writing sample when it comes to securing a job, so this is clearly not a reasonable strategy. By the end of the summer, you need to have your writing sample in its final, polished form, and also have your job talk in its penultimate shape, ready to be circulated for feedback.

Practice job talks will be held in the second half of the fall semester, and it is highly recommended that you deliver your job talk at least once before presenting it to the department. Philsoc is an excellent forum for this, as is dissertation seminar. There are always flaws in a talk that emerge the first time you present it; delivering it at least once before your official practice job talk will let you get more effective feedback from the faculty. (Compare the difference between getting feedback on a first draft vs. a later draft.) Following the practice job talk, the Placement Committee and other faculty members will give you feedback and constructive advice concerning your talk.

Please note that, until recently, practice job talks have been delivered as late as January, however this is very problematic if there are serious difficulties with the talk, as the student has no time to fix them, let alone practice delivering the improved version. As a result, practice job talks will now be held starting in early November. If you are on schedule with your writing sample, then you will be able to work on your job talk this summer, so that should not be a problem.
Students are encouraged to discuss their plans for their job talks with their advisors. There is no one-size-fits-all piece of advice for job talks; however, students should be aware that many people in the audience will not have read their writing samples, so if the job talk builds on the writing sample, it is important to devote some of the talk to explaining the main ideas in the writing sample. Many successful job talks are quite separate from the writing sample, though they should be on the same basic topic, reflecting that they are part of the same dissertation.

**Letters of Recommendation**

You should have at least three non-teaching letters, preferably four. These should be from faculty who know your dissertation work well, and are prepared to write in detail about it. You should know who these 3-4 faculty members are well before May, and so should they.

You will also need a teaching letter, so you should make sure that that is in place also. (Your teaching letter can be written by someone who is also writing a research letter; their letter should simply be divided into two sections, one on research and one on teaching.)

If you will need more than one letter from a letter-writer, it is best to request this early in the process.

For each year that you are on the job market, we recommend that you ask each letter writer for an updated letter, even if they have written for you in the past. In particular, you should update letter writers who have written for you in a prior year with a brief summary of what has changed during the intervening time.

**CV, WDAP (Work Done at Princeton), DS (Dissertation Summary)**

Your CV, WDAP, and dissertation summary should be prepared according to the guidelines in the Placement Handbook. There are also a range of examples in there to use as models. The Placement Committee will review all three documents and give you feedback on them; however you should consult with your advisors about your dissertation summaries before submitting to the Placement Committee.

Drafts of these documents are due to the Placement Committee in early September; please consult the schedule of important dates.

**Teaching Dossier**

Normally, a teaching dossier would contain a teaching statement, your numerical teaching scores, written comments from one or more of your courses, and sample syllabi. It may be advisable to tailor your teaching dossiers depending on the school you are considering – for example, an appropriate undergraduate syllabus for an Ivy League school may not be appropriate for a large, non-selective state school, and vice versa. You might consider making two or three teaching dossiers and selecting one for each school.

Note that some schools specifically request teaching information; be sure to read the job announcements carefully and make whatever adjustments are needed.
The Placement Committee will offer optional feedback on teaching dossiers to candidates who are not yet placed, provided they are given to us by the specified deadline in early September. We will not read teaching dossiers given to us after this date, so please plan accordingly if you wish to get our feedback.

Cover Letters

A cover letter is a good opportunity to express enthusiasm for, and knowledge of, the job in question. Some schools may be concerned that an applicant from Princeton would not accept a job offer from them, and a cover letter is a good place to show genuine excitement about that school. The cover letter also allows you to highlight some of the best features of your application – e.g., the main payoff of your dissertation, your teaching accomplishments, any publications you may have, etc.
Interfolio

In 2012, the APA announced a partnership with Interfolio, which is a web-based service that allows applicants to manage and send their applications, and we will use this service to manage Princeton’s applications. We want our applicants to be as competitive as possible in the job market and using Interfolio will help achieve this end.

You can familiarize yourself with Interfolio by visiting www.interfolio.com. Please review this section and the Interfolio website. As for the cost, please see the following:

- An Interfolio Dossier Account is free. In this account, you can upload and store your materials.
- To have Interfolio send out your materials via one of their delivery methods, you need to upgrade to Dossier Deliver; the annual subscription cost is $48 for 50 deliveries. (There is no longer a per-transaction fee to have Interfolio send out your materials.) If you go beyond the 50 deliveries, you have the option to purchase smaller packs; i.e., 5 deliveries for $5, 15 deliveries for $12, etc.
- Please see the Costs and Reimbursement paragraph of this section for reimbursement details.

If you would like to join the APA, you should do so now.

Once you have set up your account with Interfolio, you can begin the process of a) uploading your application materials, b) requesting letters of recommendation, and c) applying to schools either by mail, email, or through a school’s website. For mail and email applications, you will select the previously uploaded documents that you wish to include in that application, and Interfolio will deliver that application in its entirety. For online applications, you should upload your materials directly to the relevant website, but Interfolio will send the confidential letters of recommendation. This is accomplished by following the instructions on the Interfolio website.

Interfolio is user-friendly, and once you create an account, you are able to access extensive help documentation on their website, and you also have access to 24-hour technical support. We will therefore not attempt to reproduce those instructions in the placement handbook, but rather encourage applicants to familiarize themselves with the website and its instructions.

With Interfolio, applicants will have much more control over their own applications, since they will be able to choose which documents they wish to include in each application. The placement committee strongly encourages applicants to include their CVs, WDAPs, Dissertation Summaries, and all letters of recommendation in each application; however, this is now a strong recommendation rather than a requirement.

Applicants will be able to track the status of their applications with Interfolio, so everyone will be able to tell which applications have and have not been sent.
Specific Instructions Concerning Letters of Recommendation

**It is very important that you let your recommenders know to send their letters to Jo Kelly, to be reviewed by the Placement Committee before they can be uploaded to Interfolio. Jo will take care of the Interfolio upload; when a letter is uploaded, you will be notified by Interfolio.**

Once your Interfolio account has been set up, you will be able to request confidential letters of recommendation to be uploaded. You will be able to tell when those letters have been uploaded or updated (you will receive an email from the Interfolio system), but you will not be able to view the letters.

Instructions for the upload of Letters of Recommendation are in the section Instructions for Letters of Recommendation, using Interfolio, in this Handbook.

Costs and Reimbursement

The department will continue the policy of reimbursing delivery charges, up to $500 per academic year. Restriction: if you currently hold or have been offered a TT position, or if you hold a full-time position with a contract (or renewable contract) of 3 years or longer, you are no longer eligible for reimbursement. If you have any questions concerning your eligibility status, please contact the Placement Committee immediately.

Receipts are necessary for reimbursement! You need to take an electronic copy of the receipt screen; be sure the dollar amount is included.

The procedure for reimbursement follows:

- Current graduate students – use SAFE;
- Postgraduate/Postdoctoral Research Associates – use Concur;
- Employee of Princeton University – use Concur;
- No longer a student or are not an employee of Princeton University – PRIME. Let Jo know; you must be set up.

Instructions for SAFE: Jo will provide the link to the appropriate SAFE opportunity, which changes every year.

Instructions for Concur:

- Contact Joann Zuczek, our Business Manager for questions.
- Use your University credit card, if you have one.
- Once in the Concur system, please include the following information:
  - On the “Create a New Expense Report” screen:
- Report Name: enter the word INTERFOLIO, plus your last name and first initial (for example: INTERFOLIO KellyJ)
- Business Purpose: INTERFOLIO EXPENSE
- Department/Fund/Program: (contact Jo Kelly for this information)
  - On the “New Expense” screen:
    - Expense Type: MISCELLANEOUS
    - Business Purpose: INTERFOLIO EXPENSE
    - Vendor Name: INTERFOLIO
    - City: Princeton, NJ
    - Payment Type: Cash out of pocket
      - If you are using your University credit card, this field will populate automatically.
    - Amount: enter the total amount of all attached receipts
    - Comment: INTERFOLIO EXPENSES (plus date).
  - Remember to click on ATTACH RECEIPTS.
  - Be sure to SAVE frequently.

If you not a student nor an employee:

- Let Jo Kelly know if you plan to be reimbursed for Interfolio expenses.
- Be sure to keep your Interfolio receipts, as they must be submitted with the reimbursement request.
- Be sure there is a dollar amount listed on the receipt.

For all reimbursement types: the maximum amount of reimbursement is $500 per academic year, so do not submit expenses beyond that amount. You will need to reimburse the University if the amount reimbursed goes over $500.

Please be aware – all expenses must be submitted into SAFE or substantiated in Concur within 30 days of purchase. For PRIME, receipts must be submitted to Jo within 2 weeks, to allow for processing time.

Loading letters of recommendation to AcademicJobsOnline.org

Some institutions are set up to obtain letters of recommendation from AcademicJobsOnline. In these cases, you will need to have Interfolio upload your letters to AcademicJobsOnline.

Here is a website with instructions on how to do this: [https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/faqs/0/63](https://academicjobsonline.org/ajo/faqs/0/63).

Section updated 7/15/2019
Instructions for Letters of Recommendation, using Interfolio

Have your letter writers forward all letters of recommendation to Jo Kelly (jkelly@princeton.edu). Once all letters for a job candidate are received, Jo will forward the letters to the correct Placement Committee member. When letters are approved, Jo will upload the letters to Interfolio.

Instructions follow. **It is important to follow them exactly.**

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If you are a new job candidate, go into Interfolio www.interfolio.com and sign up.

To have Jo upload Letters of Recommendation, follow the steps outlined here.

Click on “Request a Letter.”
Fill in the “New Recommendation Request” form as shown above. Arrows denote what to put into each field.

**Recommender:** Placement Coordinator

**Title:** Placement (first name); Coordinator (last name)

**UPDATE:** Title is now one field, so enter **Placement Coordinator** in the Title field.

**Email address:** phiplace@princeton.edu

Click “Add”.

*If this is the first time you are adding this, you will need to click on “Add New,” which will appear on the screen.*
You will see a screen similar to this.

**UPDATE (see the blue arrow):** To identify who the uploaded letter is from, add the letter writer’s name AFTER

“Recommendation from %RecommenderName&” in Document Title.

**Example:** Recommendation from %RecommenderName& Gideon Rosen

Also - Be sure that *Confidentiality is checked.*
Add the Due Date. *(This date will generate reminder messages sent to Jo, so please make this date as late as possible. Your letter will be uploaded once I receive it from your letter writer and have it approved by the Placement Committee.)*

**Under “Message to Recommender”**

Delete the verbiage and add the Recommender’s name – for example: Professor Gideon Rosen.

This is *VERY IMPORTANT* – this is how Jo will know which letter of recommendation to upload.

**UPDATE:** Under “Message to Recommender,” if you have more than one letter coming from one recommender, indicate *on each request* what type of letter you are expecting, or what job this is for, etc.

For example: Professor Gideon Rosen – Classical Philosophy letter

--OR--

Professor Gideon Rosen – letter for Podunk University
Once the Recommender’s name is filled in (see prior page), click on “Send Request.” Jo will receive the request to upload the letter.

*Do not add materials;* your recommender will not receive this form. Send any materials to your recommender directly.

You will receive a *Thank You* screen after you press Send Request.
Once Jo has uploaded the letter to Interfolio, you will be notified. You can then access this screen:

Click on “View Details” to see details about the letter.

Above is what you see if you do not add the letter writer’s name (see page 3).

—OR—

Click on “View Details” to see details about the letter.

This is what you see if you do add the letter writer’s name (see page 3).

So, please do so!

Section updated 8/5/2019
Major sources of Job Listings:

- APA - http://www.apaonline.org
- Philjob - www.philjobs.org
- Phylo - http://phylo.info/jobs
- JobsACUK - jobs.ac.uk
- Academic Keys - http://www.academickeyes.com/
- World-wide Job Postings - http://www.jobsinphilosophy.org/
- Jobs in Europe - http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html
- Emails – many emails are forwarded to job candidates from institutions and from our faculty.

Many of the non-APA sites and emails refer to JFP job numbers in their listings.
Placement Procedures

Preliminaries

Each May, graduate students who are contemplating becoming candidates for placement the coming fall will meet with the placement committee to review application procedures.

The Placement Committee will strongly urge job candidates to make progress on their dissertations throughout the summer. In general, the more in command you are of your dissertation, and the further along on it you are when you make applications and have interviews, the stronger your candidacy will be. At the end of the Summer, applicants should have two polished papers – a writing sample and a job talk.

At about this time, you will need to become a member of the American Philosophical Association. This is important for two reasons: (1) you will then be able to access Philjobs: Jobs for Philosophers on-line and (2) membership enables you to use the placement services of the APA at convention time.

The procedure of assembling dossiers begins at this time. At the May meeting, you will be given forms to complete on which you indicate whether you will waive access to your placement file, and suggest a list of letter writers. It is imperative that at least one letter writer be someone you taught for: this can be a separate "teaching letter," or from a distinctive part of a more general letter of recommendation. Candidates should ask the faculty members they plan to list if they would be willing to write on their behalf before listing them, and are urged to discuss the list with their advisers or anyone else who might prove helpful (for example, the Placement Committee). Normally, your dossier should contain letters of recommendation from your principal dissertation adviser and at least three others with whom you have worked, chosen so as to indicate the range as well as the strength of your competence.

You will need to return your list of letter writers to Jo no later than early June (see the IMPORTANT PLACEMENT PROGRAM DATES document in this handbook for the exact due date). Students who will be seeking jobs in the coming academic year should so indicate at this time.

September

Placement dossiers consist of the following items: (1) a Curriculum Vitae, which includes a brief (one paragraph) description (abstract) of the dissertation, (2) a separate, longer, Dissertation Summary (up to about three single-spaced pages), (3) a record of Work Done at Princeton, (4) Letters of Recommendation (at least four). Following guidelines provided by the Committee, you will prepare items (1) and (2) (with the advice and assistance as to (2) of your advisers). You also prepare item (3), with the assistance of the Placement Coordinator, in accordance with strict guidelines.

Placement dossiers can also contain the following: Cover Letter, Writing Sample, Teaching Dossier, plus any additional information that may be requested in the job advertisement.
As letters of recommendation are received and once the dossiers are completed, the Placement Committee reviews the letters to see if any can be improved or might be omitted from the dossier. A letter of recommendation will be dropped from a dossier if, and only if,

1. the writer of the letter so requests, or
2. the candidate so requests, or
3. the Placement Committee deems the letter to be detrimental to the job candidate.

In the course of this review, the Committee should see to it that the dossier contains some information about the candidate’s teaching abilities.

The target date for the completion of the dossier is mid-September. This means that students must submit first drafts of items (1), (2), and (3) well before this time. The dissertation summary must be written under the adviser’s supervision and a first draft approved by the adviser before it is submitted to the Placement Coordinator for the Committee to see. The process of revision in the light of Committee suggestions can be lengthy. In order to have complete dossiers ready to be sent out in a timely manner, dossiers must be complete and approved by September.

Optional, but recommended, Teaching Dossiers are prepared by candidates with the advice of the Committee. These include teaching evaluations, general statements of teaching competence and interest, and (perhaps) comments on preferred teaching styles, methods, etc.

October

Though jobs may be advertised at any time, we expect many to be advertised around late September / early October. If you are not doing so already, you should start regularly checking the section MAJOR SOURCES OF JOB LISTINGS in this handbook. Jobs are also sometimes advertised via email, which the Placement Coordinator will forward to you.

Each candidate who applies for a position must write a letter officially applying for that position. This should include a statement of your academic interests and your particular reasons for wanting that job, and stating your availability for an interview via phone, Skype, or otherwise.

Applications are to be submitted using Interfolio (see the section “Interfolio”).
November

For first-time job candidates, the department provides a mock interview with the faculty. These will be scheduled to take place in early-to-mid November. You should also plan on giving a practice job talk, which will take place from early November through mid-December. The Placement Coordinator will contact you to schedule these events.

Interviews via video conference and phone can begin as early as late November. Following an interview, candidates should send out an email thanking the search committee for the interview and to express their interest in the position. Please note that our Placement Coordinator can assist with setting up video conference interviews.

Candidates should immediately inform the Placement Coordinator (by email) when they hear from places where they have applied, whether the response is positive or negative, or a request for an interview or paper. This is important: the Placement Coordinator acts as the central repository of up-to-date information on all aspects of the progress of students' candidacy for jobs. Inform the Coordinator immediately of all changes in your status at any place where you have applied. This includes information about post-convention invitations for campus visits (“flyouts”), offers of jobs, and notification of when your application has formally been rejected.

Members of the faculty receive periodic summaries listing current prospects, areas of competence and thesis topics for each candidate. This is to allow faculty members to make better use of personal contacts and to respond more adequately to inquiries.

December

The department will fund the expenses of any person whose candidacy is under the oversight of the Placement Committee, to the following extent:

(a) The department will make available a lifetime allowance of up to $1,200 for travel to APA conventions. The amount granted for a given trip shall be based on University standards (i.e., airline fare plus whatever extras the University allows) but may not exceed $400 per year: this amount is applicable not only to travel costs but also to all legitimate expenses. This benefit will expire when the candidate secures a tenure-track job, or a job with a renewable contract of three years or longer.

(b) Interfolio expenses will be reimbursed up to $500 per year until a candidate secures a tenure-track job, or a job with a renewable contract of three years or longer.
January and later

The Eastern APA meeting is typically held in early January**. Although some interviews may be conducted there, this is occurring less often. By this time, many interviews will already have been conducted by phone or video conference.

You will often hear from places that have interviewed you shortly after the interview. Flyouts are arranged normally during January through March, but could be earlier, or as late as May. The Committee offers information and advice at candidates’ request about what to expect and how to prepare for the campus visit, which almost always includes the presenting of a paper to department faculty and students.

When you receive a job offer, you should report this immediately to the Placement Coordinator; you are also advised to discuss it with the Committee. The Committee can help you by giving you information and advice useful for negotiating any and all aspects of the employment contract.

Job placement activities may also occur at the Central Division (typically held in February**) and Pacific Division (typically held in early April**).

Remember: new jobs are continuously announced on the APA website, both continuing and tenure-track positions, and one-year replacements. You may very well find a job (perhaps even a tenure-track one) from adverts posted in January and thereafter. It is essential to keep checking the websites in January-May, until you are finally placed. Persistence pays off.

**See IMPORTANT PLACEMENT PROGRAM DATES document in this handbook for exact dates and locations.

Section updated 6/10/2019
Evaluations Request (Form)

I request the following evaluations with the understanding that they will be made available to persons and institutions to which I make application for employment. A copy of these evaluations may also be used in support of my candidacy for prizes or awards for which I may be nominated, or for fellowships or grants for which I may apply. The evaluations will not otherwise be used without my written consent. (The next sentence is optional; if you do not agree, please strike it out.) These are confidential evaluations and will not be made available to me without the prior consent of the author of the evaluation.

This statement is provided in connection with The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.

It is your responsibility to seek these evaluations. Be sure to include someone you have taught for. We will follow up with a request also.

Please indicate advisor and teaching evaluation request.

**Include the following:

• Institution and email address, if recommender is not from Princeton
• Date the letter of recommendation was requested.

List of persons from whom evaluations are requested.

1. _______________________________  Date requested: ______________
2. _______________________________  Date requested: ______________
3. _______________________________  Date requested: ______________
4. _______________________________  Date requested: ______________
5. _______________________________  Date requested: ______________
6. _______________________________  Date requested: ______________

Revised date: 5/13/2013
Princeton University, The Graduate School

Student Authorization Releasing Placement File (Form)

By my signature below I hereby authorize Princeton University to release my placement file to persons or institutions where I may apply or be nominated for employment. I understand that the contents of the files may include by biographical resume, record of experience, statements of recommendation, and any additional material supplied by me or public in nature.

This authorization is provided in connection with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.

Date ________________  Signed _____________________________

STUDENT WAIVER OF RIGHT TO REVIEW CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL IN PLACEMENT FILE

By my signature below I hereby waive my right to review confidential statements of recommendation in my placement file.

This authorization is provided in connection with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.

Date ________________

Signed______________________________

Note: if you do not wish to waive your right of access to confidential material in your placement file, check the line below, initial and date.

I DO NOT waive my right to review statements of recommendation in my placement file:

_____  Date _____________  Initial ________________

Note: Your file will carry a notation indicating either that you have waived your right of access or that you have not.

Student Name (please print) __________________________________________

Address __________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________

Telephone ____________________________
Advice on preparing a Job Placement Dossier

Notes on writing your CV (*curriculum vitae*):

The formatting and style of the CV are basically up to each individual to decide for themselves. The samples provided show you some options to consider. However, keep in mind the following general guidelines:

- Make sure that included in the contact information at the top includes the Princeton Philosophy Department phone number (Placement Coordinator: 609-258-6161), plus your own cell number and email address.
- Follow the order shown in the samples for the various categories (i.e. contact information, Education, Employment [if applicable], AOS, AOC, Publications, etc.).
- Under Teaching Experience make sure you include full information displayed exactly as on the Sample CVs. For precepting in 300-level courses, indicate that this is work in an “advanced undergraduate course.”
- At the end of your CV, include a brief dissertation abstract (maximum of 1/3 page, single-spaced) under the title of the dissertation, followed by the name(s) of your adviser(s). This is in addition to the separate, and longer, Dissertation Summary.
- DATE the CV in some prominent place (e.g. at the end of the CV).
- Your name, “CV,” and page number should be on the top of each page.

Notes on writing your Dissertation Summary:

- The Dissertation Summary should be 1-3 pages, single-spaced. Do not exceed 3 pages.
- It should give a chapter-by-chapter summary of what you have done or intend to do in your dissertation.
- It should discuss the dissertation in the present tense, as an already-existing object. Don’t say “Then in chapter 3, I will …” even if you haven’t even begun to write chapter 3 yet.
- Work closely with your advisor(s) in preparing the Summary. Seek and take their advice both in planning and in executing it. (The placement committee will give you further feedback.)
- Your name, “Dissertation Summary,” and page number should be on the top of each page.
Notes on writing your Work Done at Princeton (WDAP):

The WDAP is an official departmental document, even though each candidate prepares it individually. You must adhere to the following guidelines:

- List courses by category, starting with the area(s) in which you now principally work. Your selection of “areas” need not, and probably should not, follow the department’s official areas for unit-accumulation purposes (Metaphysics and Epistemology, Value, etc.). Select the areas in a way which most favorably presents the evidence about the full range of areas you have worked in while a student here. The sample WDAPs provide examples of how several specific students thought of doing this in their own cases.

- Give both the official title of the course (e.g. “Metaphysics”) and the specific description or topic of the actual course given under that title, on a second line. Check with the Graduate Administrator for the records giving information about graduate courses offered in recent years: titles, topics, etc. Where the instructor has provided information about topic or content, use that yourself, without improvising.

- Follow the pattern of indentation, line spacing, etc., used in the models. This is important: follow the pattern exactly, in all details. Aim: to maintain easy scanability by a rapid reader.

- Be sure to add, at the end, a section which indicates current courses, seminars, etc., which you intend to take in the future.

- When listing units, indicate units acquired by writing a paper by listing the paper’s title in quotation marks, without additional comments. In other cases, say how the unit was achieved (e.g., written and oral examination in Topic).

- Your name, “Work Done at Princeton,” and page number should be on the top of each page.

- A cover sheet, signed by the Department Chair, needs to be included with the WDAP. The cover sheet explains the purpose of this document.

General Advice

- Remember that the dossier is, at least in part, a marketing device. Pay careful attention, therefore, to the format, readability and style of your documents. Write, in the first place, for a general philosophical audience. (One possible exception is the Dissertation Summary, which may be directed at a more specialized audience.) Your main goal is to present yourself as accomplished, interesting, smart and reliable. We already know you’re all these things; a well-written dossier will also convince your reader or will at least not convince them otherwise.

Section updated 6/10/2019
APA Convention Logistics

Timing Your Travel:

If you plan to attend an APA Meeting, you should plan to arrive no later than mid-afternoon on the first day of the convention. If interviews are being held, they can be scheduled any time from late afternoon of the first day to the morning of the last day, so you should plan to remain at the APA until the afternoon of the last day.

Hotel Reservation:

If you plan to attend an APA meeting, reserve a room at the hotel as soon as you can prior to the meeting. See the APA Proceedings for details about the room reservation procedure. You can always cancel the reservation without penalty up to a short time in advance, if your plans change. If you phone the hotel, do not forget to mention you are coming for the APA Division Meeting so as to receive the discounted room rate.

Travel Reimbursement:

You are entitled to reimbursement of up to $400/year (lifetime maximum of $1,200) for APA travel funding. Restriction: if you currently hold or been offered a TT position, or if you hold a full-time position with a contract (or renewable contract) of 3 years or longer, you are not eligible for reimbursement.

- If you are a graduate student: you must use SAFE for reimbursement of your APA travel. The funding opportunity to use for this academic year is APA Conference Funding FY 20.
- If you are a Postgraduate or Postdoctoral Research Associate: you must use CONCUR to process your reimbursement. Your Placement Coordinator will provide the chart string.
- For others: please contact your Placement Coordinator. You will need to be set up in the PRIME system, and there are various steps involved

All receipts must contain a dollar amount. Remember the 60-day rule: Reimbursement requests for expenses submitted more than 60 days after being incurred may (or may not) be approved, and, if approved, the reimbursement will be reported to the IRS as taxable income paid to the individual.
**Dress Code:**

Business attire should be worn to the APA interviews or to any interview. This normally means jackets for both men and women, and ties for men. Everyone should wear dress shoes and generally look polished and professional. But it is important to dress comfortably – to be at ease in what you wear.

**Interview Scheduling:**

There are a couple of general principles: try not to schedule important and difficult interviews without some breathing time between them; try not to schedule interviews back-to-back if they are in different hotels. Most places are also interviewing on the last day of the convention, at least in the morning: try to schedule some interviews then, rather than loading up on the prior days, if you are getting lots of interviews. Some schools may interview on the afternoon of the first day.

**Interview Follow-up:**

It is good practice and common sense to contact all those with whom you have interviewed to thank them for meeting with you, to say how much you enjoyed meeting and talking with them, and to express your own continued interest in your candidacy with them. Tell them that if, as they decide on the next stages of their hiring process, they would like further information, such as additional work or other input, you would be very glad to provide it. And/or they can contact the members of the Placement Committee.
Mock Interviews & Practice Job Talks

Mock Interviews:

Each interview will be conducted by the Placement Committee, plus a small group of other faculty members, for a total of perhaps 6. One or two of these should be your advisor(s), but the composition of the group should also include several people from different philosophical areas, not only people who know your specific topics well. We want to simulate the sort of group that you are likely to meet during your interviews, which would be members of the department, not all of which would be especially informed about your areas of work.

Mock Interviews are normally held during the Fall semester – usually in November – prior to the APA Eastern Division Meeting.

The Mock Interview should last for 50 minutes to provide a 10-minute break between interviews. The typical breakdown of Mock Interview time is:

- 1-5 minutes: Student mini-brief on dissertation/research
- 20 minutes: Discussion of research
- 5 minutes: Discussion of teaching
- 10 minutes: Faculty-only preparation of advice
- 10 minutes: Faculty gives feedback to student and answers questions on what might be profitably changed.

1) Interviews could include some in which you are interviewed by only one or two persons – especially when this represents a small college department – but the typical interviewing group will consist of 5 or 6. Some departments will interview in larger groups, possibly up to 10 or 12, but that is exceptional. Interviewing groups may include one or two graduate students.

2) We will probably pose as a department having a graduate program (rather than a liberal arts college department), so we will want to test you on all aspects of your work. You must be prepared to be questioned on:
   (a) Your research interests, especially your dissertation: how well you can speak about it, deal with questions and challenges about it, etc., but also, more generally, about how wide and deep your knowledge and abilities go in the areas you announce as your AOS.
   (b) Your teaching abilities, at
      (i) introductory levels in all the areas you have said you are prepared to teach in (i.e., each area listed as either an AOS or an AOC). ‘Introductory level’ means where the students are not assumed to have done any previous philosophy and may include some or many first-year students.
      (ii) Upper-level undergraduate courses (i.e., courses primarily for departmental majors in their junior and senior years, as central parts of the program for a degree in philosophy) in all of your listed areas.
(iii) Graduate seminars in your AOS areas at both beginning or survey level, and advanced or research level.

3) To enable yourself to answer our questions about your teaching, you must prepare a course syllabus (topics, readings, method of approach and general guiding ideas and purposes) for courses at each of the three levels just identified. This means actually write one out and memorize it. You can bring the written syllabus to the interview if you prefer, but you need to have a detailed plan in mind to refer to as you speak. This is absolutely essential. Your interviewers will want to know whether you are ready to teach the courses referred to in your AOS and AOC listings; the appropriate test would be to find out whether you have definite ideas about what needs to be covered and how (what texts or problems, and with what textbooks). You must be able to say, e.g., for a standard introduction to philosophy course, oriented towards problems of metaphysics and epistemology, with readings drawn from a mix of historical and contemporary sources, what exactly you would try to do, and how you would go about it. You need to do likewise (as appropriate) for introduction to ethics, or logic, or philosophy of science, or political philosophy, and introduction to history of modern, or ancient, etc. (One place to start in preparing such a syllabus would be to get copies of course syllabi currently or recently taught at Princeton – speak to our Undergraduate Administrator, who maintains a file of such things. But be sensitive in preparing the syllabus, and in presenting it to the interviewing group, to the needs of students at different types of institutions. Many graduate departments are located in state universities having a wide range of student abilities and preparations, and the introductory courses would have to be presented in such a way as to meet the needs of a student body much more varied in abilities and interests than the typical Princeton class.) Seek advice from advisors in preparing your sample course syllabi. Similarly, think about advanced undergraduate courses in your area (ones where the students will have already done some work in philosophy), and about graduate seminars. Remember: you are presenting yourself as a qualified professional, ready to join in as an independent agent in the program of instruction in the department you join. You have to know what sort of teaching is required, and how you would deal with the usual and expected obstacles that teachers face in getting across to students of all levels of ability and preparation the subjects you will be teaching. Once you are hired, it is OK – indeed desirable – to express tentativeness and flexibility when it comes to learning about the needs of the specific students at the interviewing place, but this must be presented against a firm background of professional competence in and about teaching.
4) We will probably begin the interview by asking you to tell us about your dissertation in six to ten minutes; i.e. to give us your dissertation ‘spiel.’ This is how many interviews begin. Interviewers will not always let you speak non-stop, but might interrupt before you finish. This is intended to let the group question you about any major claims you are making, and to explore, for solidity and interest, whatever may be original in your ideas. You should avoid drawing special attention to any aspects of your ideas that are not fully formed or about which you would find it embarrassing to be pressed. On the contrary, it is a good idea to ‘seed’ your initial presentation with tantalizing, interesting remarks – even side-remarks – about matters on which you have particularly dazzling first, second, and third responses that members of the interviewing group can pick up on. It is very important to spend a lot of time thinking about and preparing this dissertation ‘spiel’: think about your audience, and the likely effect this will have on them. They will have read, or had available to read, a general description of your dissertation project, and possibly a chapter from it: but not everyone will have that fully in mind. You need to grab them in a way that invites their questions on points that you have well-prepared follow-up ideas to present, succinctly and with appearances of depth and intelligence. Don’t dither; get straight to the point. Remember: in presenting and discussing your ideas, you will be showing how you can be expected to come across to your students, as well as in future interchanges with prospective colleagues. Be brief and clear, and don’t beat about the bush or seem defensive. If you are asked things that you do not have the answer to, don’t hesitate to say that that is something you don’t know or haven’t yet looked into. The interview lasts only a short time, and you will be judged much more on what you say positively that is good than on what you were unable to talk about.

In sum:

(a) Prepare syllabi for undergraduate courses at introductory and advanced levels in your AOC and AOS, and for graduate seminars in your AOS.
(b) Prepare a dissertation spiel.

After the mock interview, the interviewers will discuss with you how you did and may have suggestions for additional preparation that will be needed before going on an actual interview. For the mock interview to have its best effects in advancing your chances of getting a job, you must be as fully prepared as you can manage, in all the respects detailed in this memo.
Practice Job Talks:

Practice Job Talks are normally held during the Fall semester – usually in the November-December time frame – prior to the APA Eastern Division Meeting.

Your actual talk will be limited to a maximum of 45 minutes, so please practice your talk in advance, using a timer. Without doing this, it will be unlikely that your talk will fit into the allotted amount of time. You need to practice the skill of fitting a talk into prearranged period of time – and this requires practice!

The typical breakdown of Practice Job Talk time is:
- Up to 45 minutes for your talk
- 5-minute break
- 20-minute Q&A
- 10-minute faculty discussion
- 10-minute faculty and job candidate discussion

PREPARE YOURSELF THOROUGHLY FOR YOUR MOCK INTERVIEW AND PRACTICE JOB TALK.

YOUR PREPARATION SHOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO THE PREPARATION YOU WILL DO FOR AN ACTUAL INTERVIEW AND JOB TALK.

Section updated 6/10/2019
Membership Information and Joining the APA

For membership information, go to www.apaonline.org, and check out the Quick Links.
The Ph.D. Process

Timeline:
• Let your Graduate Program Administrator (GPA) know, as far in advance as possible, that you are planning to submit your dissertation;
• Email your dissertation to DGS (copy to GPA);
• (DGS needs time to find readers);
• 4 weeks for FPO reading (sometimes readers run late);
• 1 week for faculty review of readers’ reports;
• 2 weeks for e-copy of your dissertation to be in the department, available for reading.
  o During this time, forms must be filled out and approved, and your bound copy must be received.
  o The GPA will work with you and faculty to get this done in a timely manner.
  o The Graduate School must OK the FPO date/time during this 2-week period.)

Minimum timing with no problems – allow 8 weeks. Time could be shorter if readers take less than 4 weeks.

FPO Date and Funding:

The following does not apply to those who are DCE or ET/DCC, as they do not receive University funding; (6th / 7th year funding & PGRA rules can be different):
• Graduate student support ends on the first of the month following the FPO date;
• Except for May – if FPO date occurs in May, the student is on the payroll until 7/1;
• Unless the grad student has a job – then support ends on the first working day of the job (not to extend beyond the above dates; if job begins mid-month, support ends mid-month).

Here is the site for Degree Deadline dates:
http://gradschool.princeton.edu/academics/degree-deadlines

Page updated 6/10/2019
Important Graduate Program Dates: 2019-2020

Please refer to the following document for IMPORTANT GRADUATE PROGRAM dates:


This document includes some, but not all, of the important dates for the Placement Program, so please also refer to IMPORTANT PLACEMENT PROGRAM DATES, which is located directly after the Table of Contents in this Handbook.
Samples of Placement Materials
Sample CVs

These samples of approved CVs provide a range of options open to you in preparing your own CV. Remember, the CV you prepare now will probably remain the basis for your professional CV for the rest of your career, as you add and subtract items to reflect your professional progress. It’s important to make good decisions now at the beginning as to how to collect and display the information.

The CV is not an official document, so you have lots of freedom in preparing your own. However, the Committee makes a small number of important recommendations as to what to include and the order in which to arrange and display your information. Please follow these carefully. You should also consult your primary adviser closely as you draft the document.

1. Always put the current date on the document; this is best placed at the end. Later, as changes are needed (sometimes in the course of the first placement year) as your information changes (e.g. by the acceptance of a paper for publication), you will want to update the document; each time you do so you should enter the new date.

2. Always have a header on all pages after the first, with your name, the word “CV” and the page number (best formatted in a smaller size font than that of the main text).

3. At the top of the document, as the first heading, have a section “Contact Information”: in it be sure to include the department contact phone number (Jo’s), and your cell number and email address.

4. Include a section “Teaching Experience,” and follow the wording exactly as given on the samples in formulating your information: this includes noting when a course you assisted in is an upper level course rather than an Introductory course, and providing the exact number of precepts you were responsible for. If it was a course for which you were the instructor in charge, make note of that fact.

5. Include at the end a “Dissertation Abstract,” with the names of your official advisers (primary, as well as any secondary ones). This should take only one paragraph of maybe 15 lines (anything as long as half a page, single spaced, is definitely too long). Remember, you also have a Dissertation Summary where you will give a full description. Here, try to highlight in an attention-grabbing way the most interesting or important claims you establish in the dissertation, and sketch the scope of the whole without going into details.
WHITNEY SCHWAB  
CURRICULUM VITAE

CONTACT  
Department of Philosophy  
Princeton University  
212 1879 Hall  
Princeton, NJ 08544  
Phone (departmental): (609) 258-6161  
Fax (departmental): (609) 258-1502  
Phone (personal): (607) 342-8989  
Email: wschwab@princeton.edu

EDUCATION  
Dissertation: Plato on Opinion and Understanding  
Advisors: Benjamin Morison (primary), Hendrik Lorenz (secondary)  
Oxford University: B.Phil. (2007)  
Thesis: The Beliefs of a Skeptic: Dogma in Sextus Empiricus  
Advisor: Benjamin Morison  
Cornell University: B.A. (2005), Summa Cum Laude in Philosophy  
Thesis: Psuche and Noûs in Aristotle  
Advisors: Amber Carpenter, Christopher Taylor

INTERESTS  
AOS: Ancient Philosophy  
AOC: Epistemology, Metaphysics

HONORS  
Mrs. Giles Whiting Honorific Fellowship  
2011-2012  
Competitive dissertation research award in the humanities  
Stanley J. Seeger Award (Support for Workshop in Crete)  
2010, 2011  
Program in Hellenic Studies, Princeton University  
Perkins Prize  
2007  
Philosophy Department, Princeton University  
Graduate Fellowship  
2007-2012  
Princeton University  
Graduate School Summer Stipend  
2008-2012  
Princeton University  
Travel Grant  
2011  
Princeton University  
Overseas Research Student Award Scheme  
2005-2007  
Summa Cum Laude in Philosophy  
2005  
Cornell University  
Member: Phi Beta Kappa  
2005

TALKS  
Authority in the Two Worlds  
Princeton Philosophical Society, Princeton University  
09.2011  
Aristotle on Virtue and Virtuous Acts  
Dissertation Seminar, Princeton University  
05.2011  
Explanation in the Epistemology of the Meno  
34th Annual Ancient Philosophy Workshop  
Washington University, St. Louis  
03.2011  
Princeton Workshop in Normative Philosophy  
Princeton University  
02.2011  
Justification in Plato's Meno?  
Dissertation Seminar, Princeton University  
11.2010
TEACHING

**Assistant in Instruction**

- **PHI 300: Plato and his Predecessors**  
  Spring 2009  
  Led three weekly discussion sections and graded papers for John Cooper

- **PHI 201: Intro to Logic**  
  Fall 2008  
  Led two weekly discussion sections and graded problem-sets and exams for Delia Graff Fara

LANGUAGES

Ancient Greek (reading), Latin (reading), French (reading), Spanish (reading, conversational)

SERVICE

- **Research Assistant** for Alexander Nehamas  
  2011

- **Job Talk Coordinator**, Princeton University  
  2011

- **Co-Organizer**, Princeton Ancient Philosophy Grad Conference  
  2010

- **Reviewer**, Princeton Ancient Philosophy Grad Conference  
  2008, 2010

- **Reviewer**, Princeton-Rutgers Grad Conference  
  2008, 2009

DISSERTATION

**ABSTRACT**

*Plato on Opinion and Understanding*

My dissertation examines Plato’s epistemology in *Meno* and *Republic*. I argue that the concept of *epistēmē* presented there is not our modern concept of knowledge. Rather, I agree with some recent scholars that it is closer to our concept of understanding. In grappling with Socrates’ preoccupation with wisdom, which Socrates thought was the *epistēmē* of living well, Plato comes to be interested in *epistēmē* quite generally, and concludes that one who has *epistēmē* has both a synoptic grasp of the explanatory structure of some domain (e.g. geometry) and a grasp of the content of its principles and theorems. *Epistēmē*, for Plato, does not consist in a belief plus some further feature, such as justification. On the picture I present, Plato’s notorious claim that there is no *epistēmē* of perceptible objects is vindicated because, he reasonably thinks, facts about perceptible objects do not constitute a domain structured in terms of principles and theorems. Plato, however, does allow that perceptible objects can be grasped in a privileged way, which he is willing to call “*gnōsis*” (which philosophically and etymologically is closer to our concept of knowledge). Thus, Plato has a disjunctive conception of knowledge: there is understanding of domains that exhibit the appropriate explanatory structure; then there is knowledge of the perceptible world, which comes, for Plato, in the form of the authoritative opinions of philosophers, based on Forms, about how things stand in that world, including how things stand ethically. My controlling aim in the dissertation is to show that Plato’s position is philosophically rich and deserving of serious consideration.

Advisors: Benjamin Morison (primary), Hendrik Lorenz (secondary)

*Last Updated:* September 29, 2011
Errol Lord  
Curriculum Vitæ

CONTACT

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Phone    (609) 651-3220
Dept. Phone (609) 258-6161
Mail     errol.lord@fandm.edu
Website  www.errol-lord.com

INTERESTS

AOS      Ethical Theory (esp. Metaethics & Practical Reason), Epistemology, Philosophy of Action
AOC      Applied Ethics (esp. Bioethics), Political Philosophy, Metaphysics, History of Modern Philosophy

APPOINTMENTS

Post-Doctoral Researcher  
Love and Human Agency Project, Franklin & Marshall College
2013-Present

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Philosophy  
Princeton University
Advised by Michael Smith & Thomas Kelly
2009-2013

MA Philosophy  
Princeton University
Advised by Gideon Rosen
2009-2011

MA Philosophy  
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Advised by Mark van Roojen
2007-2009

BA Philosophy and Political Science  
Arizona State University
magna cum laude
2003-2007

PUBLICATIONS

Books

(9) Weighing Reasons (co-edited with Barry Maguire)  
under contract with Oxford University Press

Papers

(8) Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation  

Winner of the Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics

(7) The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality  
forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
(6) Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters

(5) From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary
    forthcoming in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*

(4) An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons (with Barry Maguire)
    forthcoming in *Weighing Reasons*, Oxford University Press (pending final review)

(3) Violating Requirements, Exitng from Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality
    *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 2011, v. 61, no. 243

(2) Having Reasons and The Factoring Account
    *Philosophical Studies*, 2010, vo. 149, no. 3

(1) Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason
    *Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy*, 2008

SELECTED WORK IN PROGRESS

*For drafts and/or abstracts, see www.errol-lord.com/work.*

What You’re Rationally Required To Do and What You Ought To Do (Are the Same Thing!?)
    Invited to revise and resubmit at *The Philosophical Review*

Prime Time (for the Basing Relation) (with Kurt Sylvan) (under review)

The Coherent and the Rational (under review)

Defeating the Externalist’s Demons

The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism about Practical Reason

Reasons First Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

What Do the Right Kind of Reasons Have to Do with the Normative Reasons?

*Friday Night Lights and the American Dream* (with Andrew Huddleston)

TALKS

*Friday Night Lights and the American Dream* (with Andrew Huddleston)

(29) *Panel on Aesthetics and Friday Night Lights*, *American Society of Aesthetics Annual Conference*, ³
    San Diego, California
    11/2013

Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation

(28) Madison Metaethics Workshop, *University of Wisconsin-Madison*, Madison, WI
    09/2013

(27) Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress (poster session), *University of Colorado-Boulder*, Boulder, CO
    08/2013

(26) Department of Philosophy, *University of Edinburgh*, ³ Edinburgh, Scotland
    05/2013

    04/2013

    03/2013

Defeating the Externalist’s Demons

(23) Seminar on Knowledge Based Views of Rationality, *University of Geneva*, ³ Geneva, Switzerland
    05/2013

Virtue, Luck, and Believing for Normative Reasons

(22) Department of Philosophy, *University of Edinburgh*, ³ Edinburgh, Scotland
    05/2013

For the Right Reason

(21) Department of Philosophy, *Vassar College*, ³ Poughkeepsie, NY
    02/2013

From Deviance to Demons

(20) Northern Institute of Philosophy/University of Aberdeen, ³ Aberdeen, Scotland
    07/2012

Deviance in Action (and Belief)

(19) *CRNAP Summer Workshop, L’Institut Jean Nicod*, ³ Paris, France
    07/2012

Wedgwood on Acting and Believing for Reasons

(18) *Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, University of Cologne*, ³ Cologne, Germany
    07/2012
From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary
(17) Northwestern/Notre Dame Epistemology Conference, with comments by Kathryn Pogin, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 04/2012
(16) Rutgers Epistemology Mini-Workshop, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 12/2011

How to be a Narrow-Scope about Absolutely Everything
(15) St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, with comments by Jonathan Way, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 05/2011

Non-Violation ≠ Compliance
(13) Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, with comments by Justin Snedegar, University of Colorado-Boulder, Boulder, CO 08/2010
(12) Institute of Philosophy/Northern Institute of Philosophy Graduate Conference, with comments by Jonathan Way, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland 07/2010

Explaining Wide-Scope Requirements
(10) Boston University Ethics Reading Group, Boston University,† Boston, MA 11/2009

Being Committed
(9) Brown Metaethics Reading Group, Brown University,† Providence, RI 03/2009

Two Puzzles about Ought
(8) 12th Annual Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference, with comments from John Broome, Oxford, UK 11/2008

The Propositional Account of Reasons and Compatibilism about
Motivating and Normative Reasons
(7) Central States Philosophical Society, with comments from Tristram McPherson St. Paul, MN 09/2008

On Maximal Rationality
(6) 10th Annual Pitt/CMU Graduate Conference, with comments from Justin Sytsma, Pittsburgh, PA 03/2008
(5) 4th Annual USC/UCLA Graduate Conference, with comments from Eileen Nutting, Los Angeles, CA 02/2008

A Defense of The Factoring Account of the Having Reasons Relation
(4) University of Texas at Austin Graduate Conference, with comments from Neil Sinhababu, Austin, TX 04/2008

Comments Given

Comments on Dorsey's 'Rational Discretion'
(3) Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado-Boulder, Boulder, CO 08/2013

Comments on Demitriou's 'Fundamental Moral Disagreement, Anti-Realism, and Honor'
(2) Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Atlanta, GA 12/2012

What's Weighing Got To Do With It? Comments on Kearns and Stars
(1) St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 05/2010

‘†’=df invited

HONORS

Winner, Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics, for 'Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation' 2013
Description from the Marc Sanders Foundation: "The competition for the $8,000 prize awarded annually will be open to younger scholars who are, at the time of application, no more than fifteen years beyond the date of receipt of their doctorates. Winning essays appear in Oxford Studies in Metaethics."
Charlotte Elizabeth Procter Fellow
Princeton University (Competitive Dissertation Completion Fellowship) 2012-2013
Invited Participant
Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality 2012
Mildred W. and Alfred T. Carton, Class of 1905 Fellow
Princeton University 2009-2012
Travel Grant (∗6)
Princeton University Department of Philosophy 2009-2013
Merit Grant
Princeton University Center for Human Values 2009-2010
Chancellor’s Fellowship
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 2007-2009
Centennial Fellowship
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 2007-2008
Travel Grant (∗4)
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 2007-2009
Member: Phi Beta Kappa
Arizona State University 2007-Present
Provost Scholar
Arizona State University 2003-2007

TEACHING

At Franklin & Marshall
Instructor, Seminar in Moral Psychology: Understanding People (PHI 375/SPM 375) Fall 2013
Instructor, Seminar in Moral Psychology: Fractured Psychologies (PHI 375/SPM 375) Spring 2014

At Princeton
Leader, Senior Thesis Writing Seminar 2011-2012
Assistant in Instruction for Thomas Kelly, Philosophical Analysis from 1900-1950 (PHI 338) Spring 2012
Led two weekly precepts for upper-level undergraduate course; responsible for discussion sessions and grading.
Assistant in Instruction for Michael Smith & Sarah McGrath, Systematic Ethics (PHI 307/CHV 311) Fall 2011
Led one weekly precept for upper-level undergraduate course; responsible for discussion session and grading.
Guest Lecturer on Gibbard’s Expressivism, Systematic Ethics (PHI 307/CHV 311) Fall 2011
Assistant in Instruction for Desmond Hogan, Philosophy and the Modern Mind (PHI 200) Spring 2011
Led three weekly precepts for lower-level undergraduate course; responsible for discussion sessions and grading.

At University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Instructor, Philosophy and Contemporary Issues (PHIL 106) Summer 2009
Teaching Assistant for Jennifer McKitrick, Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 101) Spring 2009
Teaching Assistant for Mark van Roojen, Philosophy and Contemporary Issues (PHIL 106) Fall 2008
Teaching Assistant for William Bauer, Introduction to Philosophy (PHIL 101) Summer 2008
Teaching Assistant for David Sobel, Philosophy and Contemporary Issues (PHIL 106) Spring 2008
Teaching Assistant for David Sobel, Philosophy and Contemporary Issues (PHIL 106) Fall 2007

SERVICE

Founder and Co-Organizer, Princeton Workshop in Normative Philosophy 2010-2013
Secured funding from Princeton University Graduate School, the University
Center for Human Values, and the Department of Philosophy

Co-Organizer, Conference on Weighing Reasons  
Secured funding from Princeton University Council of the Humanities,  
the University Center for Human Values, and the Department of Philosophy  

Co-Organizer, Princeton Philosophical Society  

Referee, Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Conference  

Organizer, Practice Job Talk Series, Princeton University Department of Philosophy  

Professional Development Committee, Princeton University Department of Philosophy  

Career Development Committee, Princeton University Department of Philosophy  

Referee, Ethics, The Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, Ergo, Canadian Journal of Philosophy,  
dialectica, Dialogue  

Referee, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Dialogue, The Philosophical Quarterly  

Referee, dialectica  

Receptions Committee, Princeton University Department of Philosophy  

Middle Category Editor: Reasons, PhilPapers (www.philpapers.org)  

REFERENCES

Available upon request.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

The Importance of Being Rational

Despite the fact that rationality plays a central role in both ethics and epistemology, ethicists and epistemologists have come to significantly diverging views about rationality. In ethics and metaethics, it has become popular to think that rationality is a matter of being coherent in certain respects—e.g., not being akratic or means-end incoherent. Epistemologists disagree. Very few epistemologists think that being coherent is sufficient for being rational. My dissertation defends a unified account of rationality that sides with the epistemologists. I argue that coherence is not sufficient for being rational. In so doing, I develop novel views that allow us to make progress on important problems in both metaethics and epistemology.

According to my view, rationality is a matter of correctly responding to the reasons you possess. Normative reasons are facts that count in favor of reacting in certain ways. The normative reasons you possess are the normative reasons that are within your ken in a privileged way. My dissertation defends novel accounts of what it is to possess a reason, what it is to correctly respond to reasons, and what it is to be obligated to do something. I argue that these views allow us to explain the data about rationality and allow us to solve major problems in both ethics and epistemology.

On the epistemological side, my view allows us to explain at least two important claims. First, it allows us to explain how all rational beliefs—including rational perceptual beliefs—are held for sufficiently strong possessed reasons. Second, it allows us to explain how it is that internal duplicates are equally rational despite the fact that those in favorable epistemic environments have an advantage over their internally alike deceived counterparts. On the ethical side it allows us to explain how it is that what we are rationally required to do affects what we ought to do. Indeed, I argue that what one ought to do just is what one is rationally required to do. Thus, on my picture, rationality is very important indeed.

Last Updated: October 23, 2013
Carla Merino-Rajme
Curriculum Vitae

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EDUCATION

Princeton University
Ph.D., Philosophy 2007 – Expected May 2013
Dissertation: “A Quantum Theory of the Experience of Duration”
Advisors: Mark Johnston, Sarah-Jane Leslie

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)
M.A., Philosophy of Science 2004 - 2007
First in class
Thesis: “Names and Theoretical Terms, a Descriptivist Account”
Advisor: Maite Ezcurdia

Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM)
B.S., Industrial and Systems Engineering 1998 - 2002
Third in class

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Philosophy of Mind
Metaphysics

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Epistemology
Ethics
Logic (Introductory to Intermediate)
AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Graduate School Fellowship
Princeton University, 2007-2012

Ph.D. Scholarship
CONACYT, 2007 (Declined)

Graduate School Scholarship
UNAM, 2005-2007

M.A. Scholarship
CONACYT, 2004-2007

Norman Sverdlin Prize (awarded to the best Philosophy thesis)
UNAM, 2008

Antonio Caso Medal (awarded to first in class)
UNAM, 2008

Academic Excellence Award
ITESM, 2002

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
ASSISTANT IN INSTRUCTION

Metaphysics and Epistemology
Prof. Boris Kment
Spring 2011
Advanced undergraduate course, covered topics like the nature of time, change, causation, and free will. Led two precept sections, met regularly with students, graded papers and exams. Gave a guest lecture on the problem of personal identity.

Introduction to Ethics
Prof. Michael Smith
Spring 2009
Covered various topics on metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Led one precept section, met regularly with students, graded papers and exams.

Introduction to Metaphysics and Epistemology
Prof. Michael Fara
Fall 2008
Covered topics like the existence of God, causation, the mind-body problem, mental content, and the problem of induction. Led three precept sections, met regularly with students, graded papers and exams.
**Facilitator**

**Philosophy Senior Thesis Writing Group Leader**
Led a year-long series of workshops and intensive writing sessions for seniors.

**Classics Senior Thesis Writing Group Leader**
Led a year-long series of workshops and intensive writing sessions for seniors.

**Publication**

“How similar is ‘Julius’ to ‘Phlogiston’?” in M. Carrera and V. Morato (eds.)

**Under Review**

“How Lewis’s Natural Properties Fail to do All the ‘New Work’ they were Called for”
Under Revise and Resubmit, *Philosophical Studies*.

“De se Thoughts and Names” with Maite Ezcurdia,
Oxford University Press volume with selected papers from the Centered Content and Communication Workshop, edited by M. Garcia Carpintero and S. Torre.

**Selected Talks**

“A Theory of the Experience of Duration”
*Princeton Philosophical Society*

“*De Se Thoughts and Names*” (with Maite Ezcurdia)
*Centered Content and Communication Workshop*
University of Barcelona
*Research Seminar, UNAM*
*Princeton Luce Seminar in Philosophy and Psychology*

“Comments on Jorge Morales’s *Change Blindness and Consciousness*”
*Fifth Meeting of the American Association for Mexican Philosophers*
Princeton University
“Against Consciousness of Instantaneous Slices”
Northwest Workshop on Time and Rationality Apr 2012
Princeton Philosophical Society Apr 2012
Princeton Luce Seminar in Philosophy and Psychology Feb 2012

“On My Persistence”
Princeton-Humboldt Graduate Philosophy Workshop, Berlin July 2011
Fourth Meeting of the American Association for Mexican Philosophers, UNAM May 2011
Princeton Philosophical Society Nov 2010

“Some Remarks on McDowell’s Account of Aristotelian Character-Virtue”
‘Philosophy as A Way of Life’ Graduate Conference, Emory University Apr 2011
Third Meeting of the American Association for Mexican Philosophers, Pacific APA, San Francisco Apr 2010
Princeton Philosophical Society Nov 2009

“On How Lewis’s Natural Properties Fail to do All the ‘New Work’ they were Called for”
Metaphysics Graduate Seminar, Profs. Hawthorne and Leslie, Princeton Apr 2010
First Meeting of the American Association for Mexican Philosophers, MIT Apr 2008

“Comments to Michael Tye’s What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?”
University of Texas at Austin/UNAM Encounter Oct 2010

“Self-constitution and Agency”
Research Seminar, UNAM Sept 2010
Princeton Philosophical Society Apr 2010

“How similar is ‘Julius’ to ‘Phlogiston’?”
Language, Knowledge, and Metaphysics, Sifa Graduate Conference Aug 2007
University of Padua
(Paper chosen for publication in the proceedings of the conference)

SERVICE

Referee
Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Philosophy Conference 2007-2010, 2012
Crítica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 2012
Princeton-Penn-Columbia Graduate Conference in the History of Philosophy 2010
**Dissertation Summary**

How do we experience time? What is it to experience today’s walk as *taking twice* as long as the one you took yesterday? In my dissertation, I offer a defense of the idea that we experience the durations of events, that there is something that it is like to experience an event as lasting for a particular amount of time. This subjective sense of duration is captured in everyday expressions like “Time flies when you’re having fun” or “A watched pot never boils”. In using them, we give voice to the idea that a certain event is *experienced* as taking either a much shorter or longer amount of time than it in fact takes. I offer a theory with which I aim to explain what *felt duration* is, what is distinctive about it, and just how we experience events as having durations of different and yet comparable amounts. Crucial to this theory is that there is a specific amount of duration such that experiencing an event as having that duration usually has a particular phenomenal quality, a particular feeling. This duration is the duration characteristic of what I call an *experienced quantum*: the longest-lived temporal slice of a situation that is normally experienced as a ‘tightly unified’ whole. According to this theory, while an experienced quantum provides the basis for a common subjective measuring system of duration it also marks a natural division between two distinct ways of experiencing duration. After characterizing the analogues of qualia for the experience of duration, I consider duration illusions. The theory proves to be fruitful, offering different explanations of various ordinary cases that ought to be distinguished.

**Advisors**

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November 28, 2012
Sample Dissertation Summaries

The Dissertation Summary should be a maximum of three single-spaced pages in length. (Try hard, if necessary, not to exceed that limit.)

Work closely with your primary adviser in writing, editing, and vetting its content before submitting it to the Committee for approval.

Include a header on all pages after the first, with your name and the page number (best formatted in a type-size smaller than the size of the main text’s type).

Normally, the best plan is to begin with a one-paragraph overview of the dissertation, followed by chapter by chapter accounts of the main claims in each, with if possible some brief and summary indication of the main arguments.

Write as if reporting on a completed dissertation (don’t use the future tense, as if saying what you are going to do by the end of the academic year just beginning). (It doesn’t matter if what you finally produce departs even in major ways from this preliminary sketch.)
Symmetry as a Guide to Reality

The concept of symmetry plays a central role in modern physics, and my dissertation argues that it is also a powerful philosophical tool. In the first part I argue that symmetries in physics can be used as guides to the fundamental structure of reality. In the second part I argue that this result has surprising implications for three live issues: the metaphysics of individuals, the metaphysics of space-time, and the metaphysics of quantities.

What is symmetry? Consider a physical system that evolves in accordance with Newton’s laws, and then consider the result of shifting the entire system, from beginning to end, three feet to the right. It turns out that the resulting system also obeys Newton’s laws. Because of this, the operation of moving everything over in space by some uniform amount is called a symmetry of the Newtonian laws. Similarly, take a Newtonian system and consider the result of uniformly putting the entire system, from beginning to end, into motion five mph towards the north. It turns out that the resulting system will again be one that obeys Newton’s laws, so the operation of uniformly boosting everything’s velocity—called a “Galilean boost”—is also a symmetry of the Newtonian laws. Roughly put, spatial shifts and Galilean boosts are symmetries of Newton’s laws because if applied to a system that obeys the laws they invariably yield a system that also obeys the laws. That is the basic idea, but how is the concept to be defined in generality? I argue in Chapter 1 that definitions found in the philosophical literature are inadequate, and I propose a new definition instead.

The next two chapters argue that the symmetries of the physical laws of motion are guides to the fundamental structure of reality. Why? Because facts about symmetry imply that certain putative features of the world, such as our velocity through absolute space, are physically redundant and unknowable; and we have reason to think that features like this are unreal. This reason is not based on any verificationist dictum but instead on quite general maxims of theory choice.

It is relatively uncontroversial that the symmetries of the physical laws have implications about what is physically redundant. Much less clear is whether they also imply that certain features are unknowable. The key to justifying this claim, I argue, is to build on the following basic idea. Suppose we want to measure our velocity through absolute space to establish whether we are moving or at rest. At a minimum, we would need to build a device with the following sort of property: that if it were moving it would register that fact by, say, displaying ‘Moving’ on a computer screen; and if it were at rest it would register that fact differently, say by displaying ‘At
rest’ on the screen instead. It is relatively straightforward to argue that if Galilean boosts are symmetries of our laws of motion, it is impossible to build a device like this no matter how much funding is made available. The challenge is then to show that this line of reasoning can be extended to the general case. To show that the challenge can be met, I identify a previously overlooked necessary condition on knowledge and I show that facts about symmetry imply that this condition is impossible to satisfy when inquiring about certain features of the world.

The second part of the dissertation brings these symmetry considerations to bear on three live topics in metaphysics. I start in Chapter 4 by discussing the metaphysics of *individuals*, things that bear properties and stand in relations to one another. I argue that permutations of individuals are symmetries of the laws of motion, and that this implies that individuals themselves are physically redundant and unknowable. I then develop an original metaphysics according to which, fundamentally speaking, there are no such things as individuals; and I argue that the virtues it enjoys by dispensing with redundant and unknowable structure outweigh any putative costs. The chapter concludes in favor of this individual-less metaphysics.

I then bring the results of the last chapter to bear on the substantivalist-relationalist debate about space and time. Roughly speaking, substantivalists claim that there is a realm of spatio-temporal locations in which matter is situated, while relationalists deny this. Relationalists have historically used symmetry considerations to argue against the substantivalists, but in Chapter 5 I argue that they misapply the symmetry considerations. When properly applied, what they really motivate is not relationalism but a third alternative, namely the individual-less metaphysics outlined in Chapter 4. I motivate and defend the picture of space and time that emerges on this individual-less view.

Finally, I turn to a central issue in the metaphysics of quantities such as mass, distance, energy, and so forth. The issue is well illustrated by the case of mass. According to absolutists, mass is an intrinsic property, a property that things have independently of their relations to other things. But according to comparativists, mass is essentially comparative: all the mass properties of an object $x$ consist in it being less massive than $y$, twice as massive as $z$, etc. In Chapter 6 I use symmetry considerations to argue in favor of comparativism. Roughly speaking, I argue that doublings of mass are symmetries of our best physical laws of motion, and that this implies that intrinsic mass is physically redundant and unknowable. Since comparativism dispenses with this redundant and unknowable structure, I argue that it is preferable over absolutism.
Dissertation Summary
The Importance of Being Rational
Errol Lord

It is common to praise and condemn people's actions and beliefs by calling them rational or irrational—e.g., it's rational to buy a hybrid car and irrational to disbelieve evolution, it's irrational to drink and drive and rational to believe you are reading right now. In large part because of these phenomena, rationality plays a central role in both epistemology and ethics. Despite this common interest in rationality, in the last two decades epistemologists and ethicists have sharply diverged on the nature of rationality. No unified story of rationality has emerged from the two literatures. In my dissertation, I argue for a unified account of rationality.

The now dominant view in ethics holds that rationality is just a matter of avoiding certain types of incoherent states. Paradigm examples of the type of incoherence in question are means-end incoherence—e.g., failing to intend to write my dissertation summary even though I intend to apply for the job and know that in order to apply I have to write my dissertation summary—and akrasia—e.g., failing to intend to apply for the job even though I believe I ought to apply. This dominant view in ethics holds that being coherent is sufficient for being rational. Epistemologists couldn't disagree with this more. Coherentism is nearly dead in epistemology. A popular anti-coherentist view in epistemology holds that beliefs need to be supported by one's reasons for belief in order to be rational. Since it's possible to be fully coherent and yet have beliefs that are systematically disconnected from one's reasons, coherence is not sufficient for rational belief.

My dissertation sides with the epistemologists—being coherent is not sufficient for being rational. I systematically defend the claim that what it is to be rational is to correctly respond to the reasons one possesses. Central to my account is the distinction between the reasons there are and the reasons one possesses. There are reasons for attitudes and actions. For example, the fact that Anne is smiling is a reason to think she is happy and the fact that the baby is crying is a reason to feed her. There are also reasons that are possessed. I see that Anne is smiling and thus possess a reason to believe she is happy and I hear the baby crying and thus possess a reason to feed her.

A necessary condition for possession is that one stand in some epistemic relation with the reason. According to my account of rationality, the reasons that you possess are the only reasons that affect what you are rationally required to do. This is intuitive because it is hard to see how facts completely outside your epistemic ken can get a rational grip on you. I argue that the epistemic relation is being in a position to know.

While the epistemic condition is a necessary condition, I argue that it is not sufficient for possessing the reason. There are cases where you stand in the epistemic relation but don't intuitively possess the reason because you don't see the support relation between the fact you are in a position to know and the attitude or act it supports. In light of these cases, I argue that there also has to be a treating condition. It has to be that you are disposed to treat the fact as a reason for the act or attitude it supports in order to possess the reason. Meeting these two conditions, I argue, is necessary and sufficient for possessing a reason.

Simply performing actions and having attitudes that are adequately favored by the reasons one possesses is insufficient for being rational. One has to correctly respond to the reasons one possesses in order for one's acts and attitudes to be rational. For example, a belief held because of wishful thinking isn't rational, even if it happens to be favored by sufficiently strong possessed reasons.

I defend a novel account of what it is to correctly respond to possessed reasons. My account is a causal account. It holds that when you correctly respond to the reasons you possess, the best possessed reasons cause your attitudes and actions. Causal accounts are plagued by the problem of deviant causal chains. This problem shows that being caused in any way whatsoever by a reason isn't sufficient for an act or attitude to be
performed or held for that reason. For example, the fact that I’m late might cause me to believe that there are birds in the trees, but only because the fact that I’m late causes me to quicken my pace, which causes me to slip and gaze skyward at the birds. In this case, the reason for which I believe there are birds in the trees is not the fact that I am late, even though that fact plays a role in the etiology of the belief. I argue that my view can solve the problem of deviant causal chains. On my view, what it is to correctly respond to a reason \( r \) to \( \phi \) is to \( \phi \) in virtue of the fact that \( r \) is a reason to \( \phi \). The property of being a reason must be the property that does the causing in order for that fact to be the reason for which you \( \phi \). This doesn’t occur in the problematic cases. I also show how my view can help solve problems in a number of other debates, ranging from the epistemology of perception to the causal efficacy of the normative.

In addition to defending my positive account of rationality, I also reply to several prominent objections. Since views like mine are popular in epistemology, the epistemology literature contains many worked out challenges to my view. I focus on the two I find most pressing. The first challenge aims to show that not all rational beliefs are rationalized by possessed reasons that are correctly responded to. The most popular counterexamples appeal to perceptual beliefs. This is because these beliefs are paradigm instances of foundational beliefs—beliefs whose rational status doesn’t depend on having any other rational beliefs. I show that it’s very plausible that foundational beliefs are held because they are supported by sufficient reasons one possesses. Arguments to the contrary founder because they are confused about the nature of reasons or the nature of correctly responding to reasons.

The second major objection I respond to is The New Evil Demon Problem. The New Evil Demon Problem plagues externalist views of rationality. Externalists deny that rationality supervenes on non-factive internal states—states you can be in even if the content of the state is false. A common objection to externalist views is that they seem to predict that the radically deceived are not rational. Consider someone just like me when it comes to non-factive internal states who happens to be deceived by an evil demon. The world seems the same to him as it does to me. Yet, the externalist holds that he is in a different position than I am when it comes to rationality. This is because despite being identical in non-factive internal respects, I am in a much better position in the relevant external respects. According to the most menacing version of the objection, the systematically deceived are also systematically irrational.

I argue that my view can explain why my unfortunate counterpart is rational (at least if I am). We don’t possess the same reasons, but this doesn’t entail that my counterpart is irrational. Moreover, I argue that there is even a respect in which we are equally rational. I parlay my solution to The New Evil Demon problem into solutions of two other problems, one having to do with knowledge from falsehood advocated by Ted Warfield and Branden Fitelson, and one advocated by Mark Schroeder about how non-veridical perceptual beliefs are rationalized.

The final aim of the dissertation is to defend the significance of rationality to what one ought to do. It is vital to much ethical and epistemological theorizing in the 20th century that rationality affects what one ought to do and believe, full stop. Despite this, it is hotly disputed in recent work on practical rationality whether rationality is significant in this way. A consensus seems to be forming around the idea that rationality doesn’t affect what one ought to do.

I argue that not only does rationality affect what one ought to do, what one ought to do just is what one is rationally required to do. Rationality is, on my view, centrally important to what one ought to do. I provide a novel argument for this, which shows that it follows from plausible claims about the connection between obligation and the ability to correctly respond to reasons that only possessed reasons can obligate. From this it is a few short steps to the conclusion that the requirements of rationality just are the requirements we are obligated to comply with. If this is right, then being rational is very important indeed.
A Quantum Theory of Felt Duration

Dissertation Summary

Carla Merino-Rajme

How do we experience time? When you experience today’s walk as taking twice as long as the walk you took yesterday and then judge that this is so, what is going on? What is it to experience a walk as taking twice as long as yesterday’s walk? Do I look at some mental analog of a watch, one available to me even when no watch is on? Of course not. Time does not present to me as a structure of quality like the dials and background of a watch, be it a mental or physical watch. Nor is there a pulsing ‘pacemaker’ in my visual field that measures how long events take. So do we really experience the duration of events, as opposed to just finding ourselves with judgments concerning their durations? Is there something that is what it’s like to experience an event as lasting for a particular amount of time?

In my dissertation, I offer a defense of the idea that we experience the durations of events, that there is something that it is like to experience an event as lasting for a particular amount of time. The subjective sense of duration is captured in everyday expressions like “Time flies when you’re having fun” or “A watched pot never boils”. In using them, we give voice to the idea that a certain event is experienced as taking either a much shorter or longer amount of time than it in fact takes. I call the experience of duration the felt duration of an event. According to the theory I develop, we usually form immediate judgments about the amounts of duration of ordinary events like going for walks, reading papers, or listening to concerts on the basis of their felt durations.

In the first chapter, I motivate the act-object theory of perceptual experience in which I frame the theory. According to this, to experience something is to perform an act directed towards the object of the experience. I then go on to consider the so-called ‘content views’ of perceptual experience. According to these, a perceptual experience is a mental representation: having a perceptual experience involves being in a representational state that predicates of the object of the experience those features that the object is presented as having. Under these views, to experience an event as lasting for a certain amount of time is to be in a state that represents that event as lasting for that amount of time. I consider whether these theories are in a better position when it comes to accounting for our experience of duration. After arguing that this is not so, I go on to offer some reasons to prefer a non-representationalist framework.

In the second chapter, I discuss models of felt duration proposed in the experimental psychological literature. After considering some of these models and explaining their common strategy, I go on to explain why even if they could overcome the empirical difficulties they face, none could serve as an account that vindicates the intuition that we usually experience the durations of the events we encounter. One moral of this discussion is that the account of felt duration we are looking for should be distinguished from accounts of the organism’s sub-personal mechanisms for keeping track of time. What we want instead is a theory that characterizes what felt duration is, one which can explain
just how we experience events as having durations of different and yet comparable amounts. Such theory should be capable of explaining cases in which the experienced duration of an event comes apart from the actual temporal length of the event. In the following two chapters, I offer a theory that aims to provide this.

Crucial to the theory I present is that there is a specific amount of duration such that, usually, experiencing an event as having that duration has a particular phenomenal quality, a particular feeling. This is the duration characteristic of what I call an 

experienced quantum: the longest-lived temporal slice of a situation that is experienced as a ‘tightly unified’ whole. According to this view, though the temporal length of particular quanta can vary, typically they have roughly the same duration. The aim of the third chapter is to make this idea clear. This is important because one of the main tenets of the theory is that we experience amounts of durations of other events in relation to the duration of an experienced quantum.

In chapter four, I propose a two-fold model for felt duration. According to this model, while an experienced quantum provides the basis for our subjective measuring system of duration it also marks a natural division between two distinct ways of experiencing the duration of an event. I take a short-lived event to be one whose duration can be taken in an experienced quantum: we can experience it within one looking, one smelling, one touching, one tasting, or one hearing. A long-lived event is one whose duration is too long to be taken in this way.

What is it like to experience the duration of an event? According to the model I offer, the short answer is this. The felt duration of a long-lived event is the impression formed of how many quanta are involved in experiencing the event from beginning to end. The felt duration of a short-lived event is how much of the duration of its surrounding quantum it strikes us as taking up. Because in both cases the duration of a quantum is the common unit in terms of which the experienced duration is subjectively measured, the felt duration of short- and long-lived events can be compared with each other, allowing for a unified measuring system of felt duration.

In chapter five, I put the theory to work by considering duration illusions. I first characterize various common duration illusions. I then go on to argue that the theory developed allows us to explain an otherwise mysterious incongruence in how we experience the durations of the short- and long-lived events involved. In this way, the theory has the advantage of offering different explanations of illusions that ought to be distinguished.

In chapter six, I draw some consequences of the theory and suggest how these could account for the widely held idea that as we age time seems to pass faster. I offer two distinct but compatible explanations for this. According to one of these, the phenomenon is the non-transient analogue of one of the duration illusions discussed in the previous chapter. According to the second account, the phenomenon is explained by what I call ‘experiential blackouts’: brief periods of time during which we have no experiences of the events before us.
In chapter seven, I consider the idea that all we ever experience is what happens at an instant. According to this, we perceive events in virtue of perceiving their instantaneous slices. Thus, if I see a soccer player shooting the ball into the goal, I see this partly in virtue of seeing instantaneous slices of this shooting. This claim is the denial of one of the main tenets of the theory developed in the previous chapters, namely, the idea that we experience events by taking in short but temporally extended slices of them. After considering arguments in support of this view I explain why none of them is successful. I go on to argue that, when properly understood, one of these arguments turns out to support the claim that the objects of our experiential consciousness are temporally extended. A consequence of the view that emerges is that short-lived objects and events can be perceived as persisting.

In chapter eight, I examine in more detail the memory hypothesis. According to this, it is features about how an event is remembered and not of how it is experienced that ground our duration judgments. While this idea could be held for both short- and long-lived events, the arguments in each case may differ. After considering arguments for each case I turn to argue against them. One upshot of this discussion is that while memory is not what determines our immediate duration judgments, it could have effects on our inferential judgments about the durations of events.

Advisors: Mark Johnston, Sarah-Jane Leslie

November 16, 2012
Sample WDAPs

The WDAP is an official document, certified and signed by the department Chair. You must prepare it in close and detailed conformance to required patterns for the presentation of your information. In this section we provide several samples, including at least one sample of a WDAP from a student in the Regular Program, one in Classical Philosophy, one following the Logic and Philosophy of Science Track, and one following the track for the Program in Neuroscience. Students in programs other than the regular one should pay especially close attention to the way that the sample for their program arranges and displays course and unit information.

In general, do not arrange your courses by following our designated “areas” for units. Instead start with a Category (for example, “Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind,” or “Classical Philosophy,” or “Ethics” or “Philosophy of Mathematics”: see the samples) that best presents your work in your main area—usually, the area of your dissertation. After that, list, in whatever order suits your own situation best, your other course work, broken down by such categories. (You can consult your adviser(s) or the Placement Committee for advice about which categories to name.)

As the samples all indicate clearly, under each Category you should arrange the information in columns (whether or not you use a word-processor’s column tool), with no line in any column extending into an adjacent column.

Under each Category, present, first, all the courses you have taken (by course number and catalogue title), with the specific topic of the course when you took it on the line just below (indent this line); then, the unit(s) awarded for work in those courses; then, presentations; then, reading groups or similar additional work in the area of that Category.

Whenever you can’t get the information required onto a single line, you can continue on to a second line, but it (and any subsequent lines) must be indented below the first, in order to show that it is indeed a continuation from the line above.

Include at the end (just before or just after the area for the General Examination) a Category of “Courses Projected for Spring 20xx.”

Don’t have any white lines except between Categories and (perhaps) between sections of Categories. (See samples.)

The ruling principle for formatting is this: the WDAP should be concise and easily surveyable, in the manner of an official University transcript, so that the reader can gather quickly and efficiently basic information about your graduate work, at a quick glance.
Work Done at Princeton

David John Baker

The philosophy department at Princeton University provides the following official document, entitled "Work Done at Princeton", which serves as a transcript of the student's coursework in their time at Princeton. Due to the structure of our graduate program (described below), this document is to be used in place of a centrally issued transcript, as the latter would not be an accurate reflection of our students' accomplishments.

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The most usual way of earning a "unit" is through work in conjunction with a graduate seminar, normally by writing a substantial paper on some topic related to the work of the seminar. But units may also be earned by special examination on a prearranged topic (and reading list), or by the submission of independent work, usually prepared in close consultation with a member of the faculty. Please note that we do not assign letter grades in our program. Units are not graded.

David John Baker followed a special Logic and Philosophy of Science "track," the distribution requirements for which differ somewhat from those of the regular program. They are as follows: as well as fulfilling the requirements of the regular Philosophy Department program, students in the Logic and Philosophy of Science Program are required to demonstrate proficiency at the graduate level in a field of science (mathematical or empirical), usually by taking two graduate level courses in the science; in addition, students in this program are required to earn two units in logic (beyond satisfying the standard logic requirement) or the philosophy of science.

Since 1997, the General Examination—previously an oral examination alone—combines a written with an oral examination, administered by four members of the faculty, on the field within which the candidate proposes to write a dissertation. Students are encouraged to attend and participate in the work of seminars both before and after the General Examination, whether or not in the course of satisfying distribution requirements.

The following is a summary of the work done at Princeton by David John Baker arranged by area of philosophy, and chronologically within each area.

Gideon Rosen
Chair and Professor of Philosophy
DAVID JOHN BAKER
WORK DONE AT PRINCETON

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

PHI 539  Theory of Knowledge  B. van Fraassen  Spring 2007
(Scientific Representation)

PHI 538  Philosophy of Physics  H. Halvorson  Fall 2005
(Quantum Information Theory)

PHI 539  Theory of Knowledge  B. van Fraassen  Fall 2004
(Structural Realism)

PHI 538  Philosophy of Physics  J. Butterfield  Fall 2004
(Metaphysics of Physics)

PHI 538  Philosophy of Physics  H. Halvorson  Spring 2004
(Algebraic Quantum Field Theory)

UNITS
“Observability and Causal Connectability”  B. van Fraassen  Fall 2004
Independent work.

“Spacetime Substantivalism and the Cosmological Constant”  H. Halvorson  Fall 2003
Independent work.

METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

PHI 534  Philosophy of Language  F. Jackson  Fall 2007
(Reference)

PHI 540  Metaphysics  K. Bennett  Fall 2005
(Methodology and Meta-Ontology)

PHI 523  Problems of Philosophy  A. Elga  Fall 2003
(Laws and Chance)

UNITS
“Against Everettian Rationalism”  A. Elga  Fall 2003
Seminar paper for PHI 523.

LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

PHI 323  Advanced Logic  J. Burgess  Spring 2004
(Set Theory)

PHI 705  First-Year Seminar  P. Benacerraf  Fall 2003
(Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic)
**UNITS**

**Advanced Logic (PHI 323)**
- Problem sets and final exam.

**PHILOSOPHY OF MIND**

**PHI 535** Philosophy of Mind
- K. Bennett
- Spring 2007
  (Physicalism)

**PHI 535** Philosophy of Mind
- S. Kelly and P. Pettit
- Fall 2003
  (Consciousness)

**UNITS**

**Consciousness (PHI 535)**
- S. Kelly
- Fall 2003
  Written examination.

**EPISTEMOLOGY**

**PHI 513** Recent and Contemporary Philosophy
- T. Kelly
- Spring 2006
  (Rationality and Objectivity)

**ETHICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY**

**PHI 524** Systematic Ethics
- M. Smith
- Fall 2007
  (Themes from Scanlon, Raz and Railton)

**PHI 514** Recent and Contemporary Philosophy
- G. Rosen
- Spring 2007
  (Moral Responsibility)

**PHI 524** Systematic Ethics
- M. Smith
- Fall 2006
  (Themes from Velleman, Herman and Langton)

**UNITS**

**“Subversive Convincing”**
- P. Pettit
- Spring 2004
  Independent work.

**Strawsonian approaches to free will**
- G. Rosen
- Fall 2004
  Written and oral exam.
  and M. Smith.

**HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY**

**PHI 516** Descartes
- D. Garber
- Spring 2005
  (*Meditations*)

**PHI 515** Topics in the History of Philosophy
- D. Garber and M. Mahoney
- Spring 2004
  (Descartes and Galileo)
UNITs

“Causal Simultaneity and the Independence of the Parts of Time in Descartes’ Meditations”
Seminar paper for PHI 516.

“Time as a Number in Aristotle’s Physics”
Independent work.

PHYSICS AND RELATED MATHEMATICS

AST 301 Gravitational Astronomy J. Goodman Fall 2005
(Special and general relativity)

PHY 506 Quantum Mechanics II E. Lieb Spring 2005
(Quantum theory of many-body systems)

MAT 323 Algebra and Applications R. Calderbank Fall 2004
(Groups, rings and fields)

UNITs

Quantum Mechanics II (PHY 506) E. Lieb Spring 2005
Problem sets and exams.

DISSERTATION RESEARCH SEMINARS

PHI 599 Dissertation Seminar H. Halvorson Fall 2007
PHI 599 Dissertation Seminar J. Burgess Spring 2007
PHI 599 Dissertation Seminar M. Smith Fall 2006
PHI 599 Dissertation Seminar M. Johnston Spring 2006

GENERAL EXAMINATION

Interpreting Quantum Theory With Interactions H. Halvorson (chair), Fall 2005
B. van Fraassen,
A. Elga, J. Burgess
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The following is a summary of the work done at Princeton by Richard Yetter Chappell arranged by area of philosophy, and chronologically within each area.

Richard Yetter Chappell

Gideon Rosen
Chair and Professor of Philosophy
### Richard Yetter Chappell
### Work Done at Princeton

**Ethics and Political Philosophy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor(s)</th>
<th>Semester</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI 524</td>
<td>Systematic Ethics</td>
<td>M. Smith</td>
<td>F07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Themes from Railton, Raz, and Scanlon</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL 519</td>
<td>Seminar in Political Philosophy</td>
<td>P. Pettit</td>
<td>F07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Democratic Riddle</em></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 524</td>
<td>Systematic Ethics</td>
<td>E. Harman</td>
<td>S08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Ethics of Desire</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 525</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>E. Harman</td>
<td>S09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Rutgers]</td>
<td>Advanced Topics in Ethics</td>
<td>D. Parfit</td>
<td>S09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Reasons, Values, and Acting for a Reason</em></td>
<td>&amp; R. Chang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 525</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>J. Thomson</td>
<td>F09</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Normativity</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>CHV 525</td>
<td>On What Matters</td>
<td>P. Singer</td>
<td>F10</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Reading Parfit</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 524</td>
<td>Systematic Ethics</td>
<td>E. Harman</td>
<td>S11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Ethics and... Metaphysics, Language &amp; Epistemology</em></td>
<td>&amp; S. McGrath</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 525</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>E. Harman</td>
<td>F11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>How Demanding is Morality?</em></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Units:**

- *Written Examination (PHI 524)*
  - M. Smith  F07
- “What is Democracy?” (POL 519)
  - P. Pettit  F07
- “Value Holism” (Independent Work)
  - P. Singer  F08
- “Global Rationality” (Independent Work)
  - D. Parfit  S09
- *Oral Examination (PHI 525)*
  - E. Harman  S09
  & G. Rosen

**Mind, Language, and Logic**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor(s)</th>
<th>Semester</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI 534</td>
<td>Philosophy of Language</td>
<td>F. Jackson</td>
<td>F07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Reference</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 535</td>
<td>Philosophy of Mind</td>
<td>G. Harman</td>
<td>F08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Empirical Moral Psychology</em></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 340</td>
<td>Philosophical Logic</td>
<td>J. Burgess</td>
<td>S09</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Non-classical Logics</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 535</td>
<td>Philosophy of Mind</td>
<td>A. Elga</td>
<td>F11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Representation and Fragmentation</em></td>
<td>&amp; A. Rayo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Richard Yetter Chappell – Work Done at Princeton

**Unit:**

Philosophical Logic (PHI 340)  *Problem Sets and Exams*  J. Burgess  S09

**Metaphysics and Epistemology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Semester</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI 555</td>
<td>First-Year Seminar</td>
<td>A. Elga</td>
<td>F07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 533</td>
<td>Decision Theory</td>
<td>A. Elga</td>
<td>S08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 523</td>
<td>Problems in Philosophy: Epistemology</td>
<td>T. Kelly</td>
<td>S09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 525</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>T. Kelly</td>
<td>F09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Bayesian Expressivism, Fragmentation &amp; Disagreement</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Themes from Boghossian, Christensen, and DeRose</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Moral Epistemology</em></td>
<td>S. McGrath</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Units:**

- “Rationality and Time” (PHI 555)  A. Elga  F07
- “Modal Rationalism” (Independent Work)  F. Jackson  F07

**History of Philosophy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Semester</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHV 524</td>
<td>Problems from Sidgwick</td>
<td>P. Singer</td>
<td>F08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Methods of Ethics</em></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Units:**

- “On Sidgwick's *Methods*” (CHV 524)  M. Smith  S09
- “Fatalism in Antiquity” (Independent Work)  A. Nehamas  S09

**General Examination**

- The Characterization and Evaluation of the Consequentialist Agent  M. Smith (chair)  F09
- P. Pettit
- T. Kelly
- S. McGrath

**Courses Projected for Spring 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI 523</td>
<td>Problems in Philosophy</td>
<td>M. Smith</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Normative &amp; Meta-Ethics, Moral Psychology, Methodology</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 524</td>
<td>Systematic Ethics</td>
<td>S. McGrath</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>TBA</em></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Work Done at Princeton

Philipp Koralus

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Philipp Koralus followed a special interdisciplinary Program in Neuroscience, jointly hosted by a number of participating departments, in addition to the regular program in philosophy. The Program in Neuroscience includes additional requirements. As well as fulfilling the requirements of the regular Philosophy Department program, students in the Program in Neuroscience are required to complete the seminar Current Issues in Neuroscience every semester after enrollment in the special program. In addition, students in the Program in Neuroscience must have a co-advisor in a participating department other than the Philosophy Department and complete whatever additional coursework is deemed necessary to write an interdisciplinary dissertation. Successful completion of the requirements of the Philosophy Department in addition to the requirements of the Program in Neuroscience leads to a joint degree in Philosophy and Neuroscience.

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Gideon Rosen
Chair and Professor of Philosophy
**PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND**

**PHI 512**  
*Topics in Recent & Contemp. Phil.*  
Computation and Mind  
A. Elga  
F05

**PHI 534**  
*Philosophy of Language*  
Temporalism and Eternalism  
D. Graff  
S06

**PHI 534**  
*Philosophy of Language*  
Reference  
F. Jackson  
F07

**PHI 535**  
*Philosophy of Mind*  
G. Harman  
F08

**PHI 513**  
*Recent & Contemp. Philosophy*  
Perception  
F. Jackson & M. Johnston  
F09

**LIN 435**  
*Advanced Semantics*  
E. Williams & G. Harman  
F09

** Units **

“Rule Following and Justification: Chomsky on Kripke on Wittgenstein.” *(PHI 512)*  
A. Elga  
F05

“The Systematicity of Thought: Constraints, Varieties and the Symmetry Challenge.” *(Indep. work)*  
K. Bennett  
F05

“Distinguishing Ambiguity and Nonspecificity in Vision.” *(Indep. work)*  
G. Harman  
S07

**Presentations**

“Stalnaker and Lewis on Pragmatics.” *(PHI 534)*  
D. Graff  
S06

“Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Paradox.” *(PHI 512)*  
A. Elga  
S06

**VALUE THEORY**

**PHI 724**  
*First Year Seminar*  
Parfit’s Climbing the Mountain  
G. Rosen  
F05

**CHV 701**  
*Moral Neuroscience*  
W. Sinnott-Armstrong  
S06

**PHI 523**  
*Problems of Philosophy*  
Pluralism and its Limits  
A. Appiah  
F06

**PHI 514**  
*Recent & Contemp. Philosophy*  
Responsibility  
G. Rosen  
S07

**PHI 519**  
*Seminar in Political Philosophy*  
P. Pettit  
F07

**POL 519**  
**PHI 523**  
Problems of Philosophy  
J. Gardner  
S08

**POL 563**  
Philosophy of Law
Units

“Political Freedom as non-Domination in Social Choice Theory.” (Indep. Work) P. Pettit F06

Presentations

“On Ch. 3 of Climbing the Mountain.” (PHI 724) G. Rosen F05
“Casebeer’s Criticisms.” (CHV 701) W. Sinnott-Armstrong S06
“Some Limits for Pluralism.” (PHI 523) A. Appiah F06

LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

PHI 312 Intermediate Logic J. Burgess F05
Mathematical Logic and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems

PHI 536 Philosophy of Mathematics P. Benacerraf S06
Kurt Gödel’s Collected Papers

PHI 314 Philosophy of Mathematics P. Benacerraf S06

Unit

Logic Problem Sets and Final Exam (PHI 312) J. Burgess F05

Presentation

“On a selection from Gödel’s Collected Papers.” (PHI 536) P. Benacerraf S06

EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

PHI 539 Theory of Knowledge B. van Fraassen S07
Scientific Representation

Unit

Written and Oral Examination on Structural Realism (PHI 539) B. van Fraassen & A. Elga S07

Presentation

“Ontic Structural Realism.” (PHI 539) B. van Fraassen S07
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

PHI 500  The Philosophy of Plato
Plato’s Republic  A. Nehamas  F06

Units
“Locke’s Theory of General Terms and Abstract Ideas.” (Indep. Work)  D. Garber  S07
“The Connection between Epistemic and Social Requirements in Plato’s Republic.” (PHI 500)  A. Nehamas  S07

NEUROSCIENCE

PSY 511  Current Issues in Neuroscience  C. Brody, A. Ghazanfar, E. Gould  S06
PSY 511  Current Issues in Neuroscience  C. Brody, A. Ghazanfar, E. Gould  F06
PSY 511  Current Issues in Neuroscience  C. Brody, A. Ghazanfar, E. Gould  S07
PSY 511  Current Issues in Neuroscience  C. Brody, A. Ghazanfar, E. Gould  F07
COS 598B  Adv. Topics in Comp. Sci.  Fei-Fei Li  S08
/PSY 594  Vision: from Neural Mechanisms to Computer Algorithms
PSY 511  Current Issues in Neuroscience  C. Brody, A. Ghazanfar  S08
NEU 593  Magnetic Resonance Imaging  R. Lee  F08
PSY 511  Current Issues in Neuroscience  C. Brody, A. Ghazanfar  F08
NEU 330  Intro to Connectionist Modeling  K. Norman  S09
/PSY 330
NEU 511  Current Issues in Neuroscience  C. Brody, A. Ghazanfar  F09
/PSY 511
NEU 511  Current Issues in Neuroscience  C. Brody, A. Ghazanfar  S10
/PSY 511

Presentations
“Object-Centric vs. Viewer-Centric Perception.” (COS 598B/PSY 594)  Fei-Fei Li  S08
“Object Perception in Context.” (COS 598B/PSY 594)  Fei-Fei Li  S08

MISCELLANEOUS

PHI 599  Dissertation Seminar  H. Halvorson  F07
PHI 599  Dissertation Seminar  T. Kelly  S08
PHI 599  Dissertation Seminar  H. Lorenz  F08
PHI 599  Dissertation Seminar  G. Harman  S09
PHI 599  Dissertation Seminar  S. Leslie  F09
Unit

German Reading Examination
A. Appiah, H. Lorenz  F05

Presentations

“Semantics in Visual Feature-Binding Theory.” (PHI 599)  H. Halvorson  F07
“The Nonspecificity of Attitude Reports: Philosophy, Linguistics, and Neuroscience.” (PHI 599)  T. Kelly  S08
“Attitude Reports and Cognition.” (PHI 599)  H. Lorenz  F08
“The Open Instruction Theory of Attitude Reports.” (PHI 599)  G. Harman  S09
“The Neglected Agenda of Methodological Naturalism in the Philosophy of Language.”  S. Leslie  F09

GENERAL EXAMINATION

J. Burgess
A. Appiah
E. Harman
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Matthew Strohl followed a special Classical Philosophy "track," the distribution requirements for which differ somewhat from those of the regular program. They are as follows: as well as fulfilling the requirements of the regular Philosophy Department program, students in the Classical Philosophy Program are required to satisfy an additional four units, including Greek and Latin sight and reading list examinations. (Students in the program must also demonstrate reading competence in French or German.) Students in the Classical Philosophy Program normally take the General Examination by the end of their sixth semester.

Since 1997, the General Examination—previously an oral examination alone—combines a written with an oral examination, administered by four members of the faculty, on the field within which the candidate proposes to write a dissertation. Students are encouraged to attend and participate in the work of seminars both before and after the General Examination, whether or not in the course of satisfying distribution requirements.

The following is a summary of the work done at Princeton by Matthew Strohl, arranged by area of philosophy, and chronologically within each area.

Gideon Rosen
Chair and Professor of Philosophy
# Matthew Strohl
## Work Done at Princeton

### Ancient Philosophy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI 501</td>
<td>Philosophy of Aristotle</td>
<td>B. Morison</td>
<td>F 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aristotle’s Physics VI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 500</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Plato</td>
<td>J. Cooper</td>
<td>S 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plato’s Parmenides (pt. I) and Sophist</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLA 526</td>
<td>Problems in Greek Philosophy</td>
<td>C. Wildberg</td>
<td>S 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Presocratics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 515</td>
<td>Topics in the History of Philosophy</td>
<td>J. Cooper</td>
<td>F 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stoic Ethics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 500</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Plato</td>
<td>H. Lorenz</td>
<td>S 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral Psychology in Plato’s Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 515</td>
<td>Topics in the History of Philosophy</td>
<td>J. Cooper</td>
<td>F 05</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Aristotle’s Politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 501</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Aristotle</td>
<td>H. Lorenz</td>
<td>S 06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perception in Aristotle’s De Anima</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 500</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Plato</td>
<td>A. Nehamas</td>
<td>F 06</td>
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<td>Plato’s Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 501</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Aristotle</td>
<td>H. Lorenz</td>
<td>S 07</td>
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<td>Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHI 515</td>
<td>Topics in Ancient Philosophy</td>
<td>J. Cooper</td>
<td>F 07</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philosophy as a Way of Life (Plotinus)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Units
- “Epicurus on Minimal Parts” (Independent work) | B. Morison | F 03
- “Epicurus’ Hedonism” (Independent work) | J. Cooper | S 04
- “Theoria and Eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics” (Independent work, written and oral examination) | J. Cooper, H. Lorenz | S 05

### Presentations
- “Aristotle’s Physics VI.1” (PHI 501) | B. Morison | F 03
- “The Moral Psychology of Plato’s Philebus” (PHI 500) | H. Lorenz | S 05

### Reading Groups
- Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I.4, IV.3 | F 03
- Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.1-14, X.1-5 | S/F 04
- Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Ethicists* | S 05
- Aristotle, *De Anima* I | F 05
- Aristotle, *De Anima* II.1-4 | S 06
- Epicurus, *Letter to Herodotus* | S/F 07
Special Requirements in Classical Philosophy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Semester</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek Sight Reading Examination</td>
<td>C. Wildberg</td>
<td>S 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Sight Reading Examination</td>
<td>J. Cooper</td>
<td>F 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Reading List Examination</td>
<td>J. Cooper</td>
<td>F 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Reading List Examination</td>
<td>J. Cooper</td>
<td>S 06</td>
</tr>
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Value Theory

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Semester</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI 719</td>
<td>First-year Seminar</td>
<td>G. Harman</td>
<td>F 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI 513</td>
<td>Topics in Recent Philosophy</td>
<td>A. Nehamas</td>
<td>F 04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units

- “Externalism and Reliable Moral Motivation” (PHI 719) G. Harman F 03
- “False Pleasure in the Philebus” (Independent work) H. Lorenz S 05

Presentations

- “Blackburn’s ‘How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist’” G. Harman F 03
- “Gibbard on Normative Revision” G. Harman F 03
- “Michael Smith on Externalism” G. Harman F 03
- “Sturgeon’s ‘Moore on Ethical Naturalism’” G. Harman F 03

Reading Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Semester</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early Modern Aesthetics</td>
<td>P. Guyer,</td>
<td>S 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Nehamas</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Metaphysics and Epistemology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Semester</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI 523</td>
<td>Problems of Philosophy</td>
<td>K. Bennett</td>
<td>S 04</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metaphysics of Mind</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units

- Written Examination for Metaphysics of Mind (PHI 523) K. Bennett S 04
- “Branching Psychology Continuity” (Independent work) P. Pettit S 04

History of Modern Philosophy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Semester</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHI 510</td>
<td>German Philosophy Since Kant</td>
<td>A. Nehamas</td>
<td>S 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unit

- “Hume’s Standard of Taste” (Independent work) A. Nehamas F 04
Logic

PHI 312  Intermediate Logic  J. Burgess  F 03
         Mathematical Logic and Gödel’s
         First Incompleteness Theorem

Unit

Intermediate Logic (PHI 312)  J. Burgess  F 03
         Problem sets and take-home examination

Miscellaneous

PHI 599  Dissertation Seminar  J. Burgess  S 07
PHI 599  Dissertation Seminar  H. Halvorson  F 07

Unit

French Sight Reading Examination  A. Appiah, J. Burgess  F 05

Presentation

“Aristotle’s Theory of Pleasure:
Nicomachean Ethics 1174b14-1175a3” (PHI 599)  J. Burgess  S 07

Projected Coursework

PHI 501  The Philosophy of Aristotle  H. Lorenz  S 08
         Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI
PHI 599  Dissertation Seminar  T. Kelly  S 08

General Examination

“Aristotle’s Theory of Pleasure”  J. Cooper (Chair)  S 06
         H. Lorenz
         A. Nehamas
         M. Smith
Sample Job Application Letters
Department of Philosophy  
University of Southern California

Dear Members of the Search Committee,

I am writing to apply for the tenure-track position in philosophy recently advertised by your department (Job #1078 in the JFP). My area of specialization is ancient philosophy and I am prepared to teach undergraduate courses (introductory and advanced) and graduate seminars in that area. I also have strong competence in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, and am prepared to teach undergraduate courses (introductory and advanced) in those areas.

I am currently a doctoral candidate in philosophy at Princeton University. In my dissertation, which I am writing under the supervision of Benjamin Morison and Hendrik Lorenz, I examine Plato's conceptions of opinion, knowledge, and understanding advanced in *Meno* and *Republic*. The project is at a very advanced stage: I have completed a full draft of the dissertation and am scheduled to complete all degree requirements, including dissertation defense, by early summer, 2013.

My dissertation forms part of a larger research project entitled “The Origin of the Concept of Knowledge.” Although ancient scholars and contemporary theorists almost universally agree that Plato and Aristotle concerned themselves with the analysis of knowledge, I think that this is a mistake. Plato and Aristotle were certainly interested in epistemology, and they presented theories of an important epistemic concept, which they call “epistēmē.” But epistēmē is much closer to the modern concept of understanding than to that of knowledge. Something like the modern concept of knowledge can be found in antiquity, but not until the work of a later group of thinkers: the Stoics. I describe this project in my application materials.

Please find included in my application materials my CV and a writing sample entitled “Explanation in the Epistemology of the *Meno,*” in which I lay out the fundamentals of my interpretation of the conception of understanding (epistēmē) presented in Plato's *Meno*. I also include a research statement and a record of my Work Done At Princeton (which serves as a transcript of graduate courses). My teaching dossier, which includes a teaching statement, student evaluations, and sample syllabi is available upon request.

I include six letters of recommendation, including one that especially concerns my undergraduate teaching and one from a professional contact from outside the Princeton Department.
I have always admired the scholarship of Professor Lewis. I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to cooperate with him in strengthening and expanding the work in ancient philosophy at USC.

Sincerely yours,
Whitney Schwab
Dear Members of the Search Committee:

I am writing to apply for the tenure-track position in philosophy recently advertised by your department (Job #734 in the JFP). My area of specialization is ancient philosophy and I also have strong competence in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. I am also fully capable of teaching courses in both Greek and Latin.

I am currently a doctoral candidate in philosophy at Princeton University. In my dissertation, which I am writing under the supervision of Benjamin Morison and Hendrik Lorenz, I examine Plato's conceptions of opinion, knowledge, and understanding in *Meno* and *Republic*. The project is at a very advanced stage: I have completed a full draft of the dissertation and am scheduled to complete all degree requirements, including dissertation defense, by early summer, 2013.

My dissertation forms part of a larger research project entitled “The Origin of the Concept of Knowledge.” Although ancient scholars and contemporary theorists almost universally agree that Plato and Aristotle concerned themselves with the concept of knowledge, I think that this is a mistake. Plato and Aristotle were certainly interested in epistemology, and they presented theories of an important epistemic concept, which they call “epistēmē.” But epistēmē is much closer to the modern concept of epistēmē than to that of knowledge. Something like the modern concept of knowledge can be found in antiquity, but not until the work of a later group of thinkers: the Stoics. I provide a description of this project in my application materials.

I am also passionate about teaching. I strongly agree with Plato and Aristotle that a mark of truly understanding a subject is being able to teach it well. I am especially excited about the possibility of teaching at a liberal arts college like Vassar. Since my time as an undergraduate, I have aspired to one day be the sort of teacher and mentor with a personal connection to students that you can only get in an intimate liberal arts setting. In such an environment you are able to provide undergraduate students with the level of attention necessary to help them develop their intellectual independence and their abilities to read, write, and think critically. I have had exposure to this sort of teaching through preceptorials at Princeton (small weekly discussion components of undergraduate courses with 10-12 students), where I've precepted courses in logic, ethics, and ancient philosophy. As a teacher, I have received uniformly strong student evaluations, which have consistently described me as “excellent,” “engaging,” “knowledgeable,” “extremely helpful,” “very responsive,” and as leading discussions that are lively and insightful” (I discuss my teaching interests and aims in more detail in my teaching statement).
Please find included in my application materials my CV and a writing sample entitled “Explanation in the Epistemology of the Meno,” in which I lay out the fundamentals of my interpretation of the conception of understanding (epistēmē) presented in Plato's Meno. I also include a summary of my dissertation, a summary of my Work Done at Princeton (which serves as a graduate transcript), a statement outlining my future research plans, and my teaching dossier (which includes my teaching statement, student evaluations, and sample syllabi).

I include six letters of recommendation, including one that especially concerns my undergraduate teaching and one from a professional contact from outside the Princeton Department.

I have strong personal ties to the New York area, with my family living near Poughkeepsie in upstate New York. I think that Vassar would be an ideal setting for me to teach and conduct research in philosophy. I thank you in advance for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,
Whitney Schwab
Dear Members of the Search Committee,

I am writing to apply for the Assistant Professor position advertised as #950 on the Jobs for Philosophers Online. I am a PhD candidate in philosophy at Princeton University, working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. In my dissertation, supervised by Gideon Rosen, I develop an ontological framework for relativism, and then apply the framework to ethics and the perceptible qualities. The dissertation is near completion, and I expect to defend by May 2013.

I have been a teaching assistant for courses in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In addition to these areas, I am prepared to teach courses in introductory logic, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

Please find enclosed my primary writing sample entitled “Relativity and Polyadicity,” in which I address the general question of what it is for one thing to be relative to another. Also included in this application are my CV, a dissertation summary, a second writing sample, and six letters of recommendation, including one that is concerned exclusively with my teaching.

Thank you for considering my application.

Sincerely,

Jack Spencer
Philosophy Search Committee
28 Westhampton Way
University of Richmond, VA 23173

Dear Members of the Search Committee,

I am writing to apply for the Assistant Professor of Philosophy position advertised as #518 in the Jobs for Philosophers. I am a PhD candidate in philosophy at Princeton University, working in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. In my dissertation, supervised by Gideon Rosen, I develop an ontological framework for relativism, and then apply the framework to ethics and perceptible qualities. The dissertation is near completion, and I expect to defend by May 2013.

I am a passionate teacher, committed to mentorship and undergraduate education. I believe in the small liberal arts college model: an intimate educational environment, unmediated by teaching assistants, in which students and professors are able to form the sort of personal connections that leads to genuine learning and understanding. I have received uniformly excellent student evaluations, and I will deliver the sort of high-level, hands-on, passionate teaching that students at the University of Richmond expect and deserve. I have been a teaching assistant for courses in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. I am prepared to teach courses in these areas as well as symbolic logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language.

My application includes a CV, a dissertation summary, a writing sample, a statement of future research, five letters of recommendation, including one that is concerned exclusively with my teaching, and a teaching dossier, which includes a teaching statement, student evaluations, and sample syllabi.

Thank you for considering my application.

Sincerely,

Jack Spencer
Philosophy Search Committee  
University of Mississippi  

Dear Members of the Search Committee,

I am writing to apply for the Assistant Professor position in the Philosophy of Mind, which you advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* volume 192 (job #75).

I am a PhD candidate in philosophy at Princeton University, working primarily in the philosophy of mind. My dissertation, supervised by Frank Jackson and Sarah-Jane Leslie, focuses on the nature of phenomenal concepts and the philosophical work that the phenomenal concepts can do in solving the mind-body problem. The dissertation is very near completion, and I expect to defend by May 2012.

The first half of my dissertation is an attempt to formulate and defend an adequate theory of phenomenal concepts. The second half turns to the philosophical uses of phenomenal concepts, and in particular, their potential for defending a plausible form of physicalism. My writing sample is a segment of the second half of my dissertation. In it, I argue against one of the most popular uses of phenomenal concepts: the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. According to this view, the epistemic and explanatory gaps between the phenomenal and the physical truths can be explained by the special nature of phenomenal concepts. I argue that this strategy cannot succeed, and in doing so propose a novel and highly attractive way of defending physicalism.

In addition to my research, I am passionate about teaching. At Princeton, I have TA’ed courses in logic, ethics, and philosophy of mind. I have received uniformly excellent student evaluations, which have consistently described me as “enthusiastic”, “energetic and dynamic”, “engaging”, “very approachable”, giving great comments on written work, and leading classes that keep students talking and thinking about the material even after the class has ended. Copies of the student evaluations I received from Philosophy of Mind and Introductory Ethics are included in my teaching dossier.

Since Princeton does not offer the ability to design and run your own class, I have sought out external teaching opportunities. In the summer of 2010, I team-taught a historical introduction to philosophy at Mercer Count Community College. This gave me the opportunity not only to design my own course, and deliver my own lectures, but to interact with a far more diverse student body than I interact with at Princeton (diverse in educational background, socio-economic status, and ethnicity). I found this to be an incredibly valuable experience, which I discuss at more length in my teaching statement.

Included in this application are copies of my CV, dissertation summary, writing sample, and teaching dossier (including a teaching statement, student evaluations from my two most recent classes, and sample syllabi).

The Princeton Philosophy Department has sent you a dossier which contains—in addition to my CV and dissertation summary—a record of my graduate work at Princeton, and letters of recommendation (including two evaluating my teaching abilities).

Thank you for considering my application.

Sincerely,

Helen Yetter Chappell
Dear Members of the Search Committee,

I am writing to apply for the Metaphysics and Epistemology Assistant Professor position, which you advertised in Jobs for Philosophers volume 191 (job #98).

I am a PhD candidate in philosophy at Princeton University, working primarily in the philosophy of mind. My dissertation, supervised by Frank Jackson and Sarah-Jane Leslie, focuses on the nature of phenomenal concepts and the philosophical work that the phenomenal concepts can do in solving the mind-body problem. The dissertation is very near completion, and I expect to defend by May 2012.

The first half of my dissertation is an attempt to formulate and defend an adequate theory of phenomenal concepts. The second half turns to the philosophical uses of phenomenal concepts, and in particular, their potential for defending a plausible form of physicalism. My writing sample is a segment of the second half of my dissertation. In it, I argue against one of the most popular uses of phenomenal concepts: the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. According to this view, the epistemic and explanatory gaps between the phenomenal and the physical truths can be explained by the special nature of phenomenal concepts. I argue that this strategy cannot succeed, and in doing so propose a novel and highly attractive way of defending physicalism.

I’m especially excited about the possibility of teaching at a small liberal arts college like Trinity. The absolute best aspect of my own undergraduate experience at Mount Holyoke College was the professors who were not only brilliant teachers, but also amazing and caring mentors outside of the classroom. Since I was an undergraduate, I’ve aspired to one day be one of those teachers and mentors, to be able to have the sort of personal connection with students that you can only get in an intimate liberal arts setting. I have had some exposure to this sort of teaching through preceptorials at Princeton (small weekly discussion components of undergraduate courses), where I’ve precepted courses in logic, ethics, and the philosophy of mind. As a teacher, I’ve received uniformly excellent student evaluations, which have consistently described me as “enthusiastic”, “energetic and dynamic”, “engaging”, “very approachable”, giving great comments on written work, and leading classes that keep students talking and thinking about the material even after the class has ended. (Copies of the student evaluations I received from Philosophy of Mind and Introductory Ethics are included in my teaching dossier.)

Since Princeton offers graduate students limited teaching opportunities (and does not offer the ability to design and run your own class), I have sought out external teaching opportunities. In the summer of 2010, I team-taught a historical introduction to philosophy at Mercer Count Community College. This gave me the opportunity not only to design my own course, and deliver my own lectures, but to interact with a far more diverse student body than I interact with
at Princeton. I found this an incredibly valuable experience, which I discuss at more length in my teaching statement.

Included in this application you'll find copies of my CV, dissertation summary, writing sample, and teaching dossier (including a teaching statement, student evaluations from my two most recent classes, and sample syllabi).

The Princeton Philosophy Department has sent you a dossier which contains—in addition to my CV and dissertation summary—a record of my graduate work at Princeton, and letters of recommendation (including two evaluating my teaching abilities).

Thank you for considering my application.

Sincerely,

Helen Yetter Chappell
October 10, 2016

Search Committee
USC School of Philosophy
Mudd Hall of Philosophy, MHP 113
3709 Trousdale Parkway
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0451

Dear Search Committee Members,

I am writing in application to your advertised position for Assistant Professor of Philosophy. I recently completed my doctoral work as a Ford Foundation Fellow in UC Riverside’s philosophy department, and I have just begun the second year of my appointment as the Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate in Bioethics at Princeton University’s Center for Human Values.

My primary areas of interest lie at the intersection of ethics and the philosophy of emotion. In particular, I am interested in how emotions and emotional processes impact moral deliberation and action, human agency more broadly, and our psychological connectedness to other persons and objects. While at Princeton, my research has focused primarily on two clinical populations—psychopaths and those who suffer from (certain forms of) addiction. Specifically, I examine how the attachment-related elements of these disorders bear on questions concerning moral agency, patient autonomy, and ethical treatment options. As my current research is an extension of my dissertation project on emotional attachment, I will give a brief description of that project here.

In my dissertation, I offer an account of a rich and ubiquitous, yet philosophically neglected phenomenon that I call security-based attachment. I employ insights from ancient Stoicism and Eastern philosophy, as well as empirical work from developmental and clinical psychology to articulate the attitude’s key marks and to distinguish it from related phenomena (e.g., caring). I then show that it has important implications for understanding emotion and agency. I argue that attachment helpfully illuminates both the types of relationship that undergird warranted grief and the particular brands of affect and agential impairment characteristic of grief’s phenomenology. Also, I argue that contra strong disinterested concern views of love, attachment represents a kind of self-interestedness that is not only permissible in, but essential to, some kinds of love.

My dissertation work has laid the foundation for a fruitful research program. I have already drafted three papers for publication from the project, two of which have been accepted for publication at highly regarded philosophy journals and one of which won first prize in an international essay competition on love and human agency.

My postdoctoral work will enable me to develop a series of articles on pathologies of emotional attachment. Psychopathy is a disorder in which the afflicted, among other things, have impaired capacities for forming emotional attachments to other persons, and certain forms of addiction represent what I refer to as hyper-attachment orientations. By exploring these pathologies, I hope to deduce implications for the ethics and efficacy of treating such disorders, competing conceptions of
well-being, the relationship between autonomous agency and moral responsibility, and the functions of attachment more broadly. This project is off to a very strong start. I recently published a peer commentary article on neurosurgical treatment for psychopaths in the *American Journal of Bioethics (Neuroscience)*, and my work on addiction and attachment resulted in a first prize winning entry in the 2016 International Neuroethics Society Essay Contest. I have also drafted three related papers which I plan to submit for review by the end of this academic year.

In addition to my work at the intersection of emotion and ethics, I also have strong research interests both in theoretical and applied ethics more broadly and the history of philosophy. My earlier work on ethics and computer games has received a number of citations by leading figures in the field and has led to an invitation to contribute to the forthcoming *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Technology*. My historical interests in philosophy include Nietzsche, 18th century British moralists, and Asian philosophy. I recently co-authored a piece with Maudemarie Clark on Nietzsche’s view of the value of community that appeared in two major anthologies.

My teaching, much like my own research, is marked by an appreciation for historical, empirical and interdisciplinary perspectives and an emphasis on the relevance of philosophy to our everyday lives. In my upper-division courses, where appropriate, I incorporate 1-3 interdisciplinary readings. For example, in my recent philosophy of emotion course, we read articles from *Neuroethics* and the *Oxford Companion to the Affective Sciences*. In my ethics courses, I try to begin each class with a short news article connecting that day’s topic to real world events. In a lecture on duties to aid, for example, we read about Hugo Alfredo Tale-Yax, a New York homeless man who, in 2010, was stabbed while saving a woman from an assailant and left to bleed to death on the sidewalk while passers-by stepped over him – some stopping to take pictures with their cellular phones. Such examples engender class discussion and deepen interest in the material. My teaching record – which includes nearly a decade of award-winning teaching experience in a large, urban school district, as well as at two universities with populous, multicultural student bodies – reflects a commitment to, and a capacity for, excellence in teaching in diverse student environments.

I think I’d make an excellent fit in USC’s philosophy department. I have a very strong, active research program, an accomplished record of teaching and professional service, and a commitment to employing philosophy to make a real difference in the lives of others. As the USC school of philosophy has a reputation for excellence in both teaching and research, as well as opportunities for meaningful service, I would be very excited to become a member of your thriving philosophical community. I am also quite confident that, if given the opportunity, I could serve as a genuine asset to it!

Thank you for your consideration,

Monique Wonderly  
Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate in Bioethics  
Princeton University Center for Human Values  
wonderly@princeton.edu
October 25, 2016

Search Committee
Department of Philosophy
Princeton University
1879 Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544

Dear Search Committee Members,

I am writing in application to your advertised position for Assistant Professor of Philosophy. I recently completed my doctoral work as a Ford Foundation Fellow in UC Riverside’s philosophy department, and I have just begun the second year of my appointment as the Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate in Bioethics here at the University Center for Human Values.

My primary areas of interest lie at the intersection of ethics and the philosophy of emotion. In particular, I am interested in how emotions and emotional processes impact moral deliberation and action, human agency more broadly, and our psychological connectedness to other persons and objects. While at Princeton, my research has focused primarily on two clinical populations – psychopaths and those who suffer from (certain forms of) addiction. Specifically, I examine how the attachment-related elements of these disorders bear on questions concerning moral agency, patient autonomy, and ethical treatment options. As my current research is an extension of my dissertation project on emotional attachment, I will give a brief description of that project here.

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My dissertation work has laid the foundation for a fruitful research program. I have already drafted three papers for publication from the project, two of which have been accepted for publication at highly regarded philosophy journals and one of which won first prize in an international essay competition on love and human agency.

My postdoctoral work will enable me to develop a series of articles on pathologies of emotional attachment. Psychopathy is a disorder in which the afflicted, among other things, have impaired capacities for forming emotional attachments to other persons, and certain forms of addiction represent what I refer to as hyper-attachment orientations. By exploring these pathologies, I hope to deduce implications for the ethics and efficacy of treating such disorders, competing conceptions of well-being, the relationship between autonomous agency and moral responsibility, and the
functions of attachment more broadly. This project is off to a very strong start. I recently published a peer commentary article on neurosurgical treatment for psychopaths in the *American Journal of Bioethics (Neuroscience)*, and my work on addiction and attachment resulted in a first prize winning entry in the 2016 International Neuroethics Society Essay Contest. I have also drafted three related papers which I plan to submit for review by the end of this academic year.

In addition to my theoretical and applied work on emotional attachment, I also have strong research interests in applied ethics more broadly and the history of philosophy. My earlier work on ethics and computer games has received a number of citations by leading figures in the field and has led to an invitation to contribute to the forthcoming *Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Technology*. My historical interests in philosophy include Nietzsche, 18th century British moralists, and Asian philosophy. I recently co-authored a piece with Maudemarie Clark on Nietzsche’s view of the value of community that appeared in two major anthologies.

My teaching, much like my own research, is marked by an appreciation for historical, empirical and interdisciplinary perspectives and an emphasis on the relevance of philosophy to our everyday lives. In my upper-division courses, where appropriate, I incorporate 1-3 interdisciplinary readings. For example, in my recent bioethics course here at Princeton, we read articles from professional philosophy journals, as well as related research from professional psychology and neuroscience venues. The students responded very positively, and the course was selected for a VPL special event – we will be having a panel discussion this spring focused on issues surrounding the seminar. In my philosophy of law and normative ethics courses, I try to begin each class with a short news article connecting that day’s topic to real world events. In a lecture on duties to aid, for example, we read about Hugo Alfredo Tale-Yax, a New York homeless man who, in 2010, was stabbed while saving a woman from an assailant and left to bleed to death on the sidewalk while passers-by stepped over him — some stopping to take pictures with their cellular phones. Such examples engender class discussion and deepen interest in the material. My teaching record – which includes nearly a decade of award-winning teaching experience in a large, urban school district, as well as at two universities with populous, multicultural student bodies – reflects a capacity for excellence in teaching in diverse student environments.

I think I’d make an excellent fit in Princeton’s philosophy department. I have a very strong, active research program that is both empirically informed and theoretically rigorous. I also have a distinguished record of exemplary teaching and service. I could add to your renowned research strengths in ethics, while aiding your efforts to facilitate fruitful dialogue across disciplines and to make positive contributions both to Princeton’s own philosophy students and the philosophical community broadly.

Thank you for your consideration,

Monique Wonderly
Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate in Bioethics
Princeton University Center for Human Values
wonderly@princeton.edu
Sample Teaching Dossiers
Teaching Philosophy

Joseph Rachiele

Introductory and upper-level philosophy classes should have distinct aims. In introductory classes, the primary purpose should be to teach students the method of philosophy: to clearly express a view and to analyze and evaluate arguments for it. The ability to perform these tasks well will benefit all students in their daily life. It will also be necessary for those who will take upper-level courses in philosophy. With the objective of teaching the philosophical method in mind, my introductory classes will focus on topics most likely to engage the interests and concerns of the students. In a general introductory class, I would focus on the compatibility of free will and determinism, arguments for and against the existence of God, and skepticism about the external world. The more the views discussed in class captivate students, the more effort the students will devote to learning how to think with care about these views. Selecting engaging topics makes it easy to promote a love for philosophical problems and thinking in one’s students.

It is nearly impossible to think clearly without the ability to express one’s thoughts clearly in the written or spoken word. Introductory classes should focus on fostering these abilities. But even the motivated students can find their first philosophy essay a daunting task. To help make this task more manageable, I give students many short writing assignments early in the semester with a lot of feedback and opportunities for revision. The short assignments are designed to teach the individual components necessary for writing a good philosophy paper: how to clearly and accurately state an author’s thesis, how to reconstruct an author’s argument, and how to offer considerations against one of his premises. In this sense, learning to write a philosophy is like learning to do mathematics. The skills one learns solving simple problems can eventually be put together to solve complex and interesting ones. I always begin my feedback on the short assignments with a statement of what the student did right. In order to improve, students need to understand where they succeeded just as much as they need to know where they fell short. To help the students put the skills taught in short assignments to use in writing a philosophy paper, I give them explicit guidance and feedback on planning and revising their essays.

Upper-level undergraduate courses can offer the opportunity to demon-
strate the value of the philosophical method in answering questions that students do not think of as philosophical. The philosophy of physics offers an opportunity in this regard. It allows one to demonstrate the value of the philosophical method to physics, a discipline that often appears anti-philosophical. Philosophical analysis and argument, for example, played a crucial role in physicists' development of theories space and time. What are acceptable analyses of the manifest image of space and time in terms of a more fundamental spatial and temporal structure? What is the minimal such structure we need to postulate in order to formulate our physical theories? Use of the philosophical method was essential to answering such questions. And its use will be essential to resolving the scientific problems at the heart of our most fundamental theories of matter, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. One can teach the philosophy of spacetime and quantum mechanics to upper-level undergraduate without using sophisticated mathematics. It will thereby be possible for any curious student to behold the power of the philosophical method to help make progress in even the hardest of the hard sciences.
Overview and Objectives

We seem to know a lot about what is right and wrong. But are there any general principles that explain why certain actions are wrong and others are right? We will focus on the two most influential accounts of such principles, Mill’s and Kant’s. We will also look at modern developments of these two views.

Prerequisites: None.

Requirements and Evaluation

There will be one short expository paper (2-3 pages) and two longer critical papers (5-7 pages). In addition, there will be paragraph-length writing assignments due every class. You will have the option of rewriting the paragraph-length assignments. The assignments are designed to give you the writing skills necessary to succeed on the longer papers. Your grade will be determined as follows:

- 20% Expository paper
- 60% Longer Papers
- 15% Paragraph-length assignments
- 5% In-class participation.

Administrative Issues

Late Assignments: Late work will be marked down 1/3 of a letter grade (from an A- to a B+, for example), unless there are legitimate extenuating circumstances.
Required Texts

- John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, *Utilitarianism and Other Essays*.
- Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.
- Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*
- Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*
- Other readings for the class will be made available on the course website.

Course Outline

1. Introduction and Consequentialism

   Lecture 1: Overview of the class.
   Lecture 2: Introduction to Mill.
   *Utilitarianism, chapter I*
   *Utilitarianism, chapter II (first two paragraphs) (pp. 276–8)*

   Lecture 3: The Good
   *Utilitarianism, chapter II (first half) (pp. 276–84)*
   *Utilitarianism, chapter IV (pp. 307–14)*

   Lecture 4: The Right
   *Utilitarianism, chapter II (second half) (pp. 284–98)*
   *Utilitarianism, chapter V (pp. 314–38)*

   Lecture 5: Criticisms 1
   Bernard Williams, *A Critique of Utilitarianism*
   John Rawls, *Classical Utilitarianism*

   Lecture 6: Criticisms 2: It’s Too Demanding!
   Shelly Kagan, *Constraints*
   *R. M. Hare, What’s Wrong with Slavery?*

   Lecture 7: The Response
   *Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality*

   Lecture 8: Can Railton’s Consequentialism Account for Our Partiality?
   *Neera Badhwar Kapur, Consequentialism and Friendship*
Lecture 9: Rule Utilitarianism to the Rescue?
*Richard Brandt, Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism*

2. The Deontological Alternative

Lecture 10: The Good Will and Moral Worth
*Groundwork, section I (first half) (pp. 1–12)*

Lecture 11: Moral Worth and Moral Duty
*Groundwork, section I (second half) (pp. 12–18)*

Lecture 12: The Categorical Imperative
*Groundwork, section II (first half) (pp. 19–34)*

Lecture 13: The Kingdom of Ends
*Groundwork, section II (second half) (pp. 34–51)*

Lecture 14: Challenges
*Susan Wolf, Moral Saints*
*Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck*

Lecture 15: A Modern Defense
*Christine Korsgaard, The Right to Lie*

3. Critique of Consequentialism and Deontology

Lecture 16: There are No Moral Principles
*Jonathan Dancy, Moral Particularism*

Lecture 17: Character
*Michael Stocker, The Schizophrenia of Modern Moral Theories*
*Bernard Williams, Persons, Character, Morality*

Lecture 18: The Nietzschean Critique
*Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy, Preface and First Essay*

Lecture 19: The Nietzschean Critique, Part II
*Friedrich, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Second Essay*

4. Virtue Ethics

Lecture 20: Aristotle: Teleology
*Nicomachean Ethics, book I*
Lecture 21: Aristotle: Virtues and the Mean
Nicomachean Ethics, book II
Nicomachean Ethics, book III

Lecture 22: Aristotle: Practical Wisdom
Nicomachean Ethics, book VI

Lecture 23: Aristotle: Virtue and Friendship
Nicomachean Ethics, book VIII
Nicomachean Ethics, book IX

Lecture 24: Virtue Ethics Today
Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices
Robert Loudon, On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics
Overview and Objectives

The scientific enterprise has experienced enormous success in understanding the world. But what explains this success? How do scientists select one theory over others? And how exactly do we distinguish science from “psuedoscience?” Science seems to postulate laws. What are these and how can they be used to explain various phenomena? Do the laws and explanations of the special science reduce to those of physics? Science postulates various unobservable entities like electrons. Should we believe that these entities exist? Or should we regard them as tools for making predictions about observable phenomena?

We will focus on these general philosophical questions about the practice of science and the picture of the world it gives us.

Prerequisites: One previous course in philosophy or consent of the instructor.

Requirements and Evaluation

There will be two critical papers (6-8 pages). In addition, there will be short-answer assignments due every week. Your grade will be determined as follows:

- 30% Short-Answer Assignments
- 25% Midterm Paper
- 35% Final Paper
- 10% In-class participation.

Administrative Issues

Late Assignments: Late work will be marked down 1/3 of a letter grade (from an A- to a B+, for example), unless there are legitimate extenuating circumstances.
Required Texts


- Additional readings for the class will be posted on the course website.

Course Outline

1. Introduction and the Demarcation Problem

   Lecture 1: Overview of the class. What is science? What is the philosophy of science? Why care?

   Lecture 2: History of the philosophy of science
   GS, Chapter 1.

   Lecture 3: Logical empiricism
   GS, Chapter 2.

   Lecture 4: Distinguishing science from “psuedo-science”
   Lakotos, I. “Science and pseudoscience”
   Thagard, P. “Why astrology is a pseudoscience.”

2. Laws, Explanation and Reduction

   Lecture 5: Laws of nature
   Chalmers, A. “Why should the world obey laws?”
   Beebee, H. “The non-governing conception of laws of nature.”

   Lecture 6: Laws continued

   Lecture 7: Explanation and the Covering Law Model
   Hempel, C. “Two basic types of scientific explanation.”

   Lecture 8: Explanations and the Covering Law Model, cont.
   GS, Sections 13.1 and 13.2.
   Woodward, J. “Scientic explanation” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

   Lecture 9: Unification
   Kitcher, P. “Explanatory unication.”
   GS, Sections 13.3 and 13.4
Lecture 10: Reduction
Fodor, J. “Special sciences (or: the disunity of science as a working hypothesis).”
Weinberg, Steven. “Two cheers for reductionism.” Chapter 3 of Dreams of a final theory.

Lecture 11: Case Study in Reduction: Causation
Russell, B. “On the notion of cause.” From Mysticism and Logic. Read 180, 185 (1st complete paragraph) - 189, 192 “I return now...” - 197, 201 “There is, in all these questions ...” - 203 “...known by memory.”

Lecture 12: Case Study in Reduction: Causation, cont.

Lecture 13: Case Study in Reduction: Causation, cont.

Lecture 14: Where Does Explanation Bottom Out?
Callender, C. “There is no Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past.” Chapter 12 of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science.

3. Theory Selection

Lecture 15: Skepticism about Induction
Hume, D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sections 4 and 5.

Lecture 16: More Problems with Induction
Goodman, N. “The New Riddle of Induction.”
GS, Chapter 3.

Lecture 17: Bayes’ Theorem and Probability
GS, Chapter 14
Talbott, W. “Bayesian Confirmation Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).” Selections.

Lecture 18: Continuation of Confirmation Theory
Talbott, W. “Bayesian Confirmation Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).” Selections.

Lecture 19: Selecting a Good Hypothesis
Lecture 20: Hypothesis Selection 2: Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing

Cohen, J. “The Earth is Round, p < 0.05”

Gliner, J. Leech, N. and Morgan, G. “Problems with NHST: What do the textbooks say?”

4. Should We Believe Our Scientific Theories?

Lecture 21: Should We Believe in Unobservable Entities
GS, Chapter 12.

van Fraassen, B. “Arguments concerning scientific realism.”

Lecture 22: The Problem of Underdetermination

Duham, “Physical theory and experiment (selections),”

Norton, “Must evidence underdetermine theory?”

Lecture 23: Anti-realism and Empiricism
GS, Chapter 15.

Lecture 24: Review
Teaching Philosophy

Jack Woods

The biggest challenge in teaching philosophy is teaching students how to approach philosophical problems. Students need both the ability to recognize when a problem is tractable and a set of tools for addressing such problems. Without the former, the tools they have seem useless; without the latter, all philosophical problems seem impossible. I have found that the best strategy for developing philosophical sophistication in my students is to have them do a large amount of philosophical thinking about particular problems. I have used several problems to do this: skepticism about the external world, the hard problem of consciousness, and the problem of partiality in ethics. I first show them how a problem, such as skepticism, resists straightforward resolution. I then demonstrate how to identify presuppositions of certain formulations of the problem, such as the thought that if we know something, we know that we know it. We then return to skepticism about the external world to see if it remains as intractable a problem absent this presupposition. Employing this approach throughout the course, students learn how to cull out smaller, more tractable problems, how to address them, and to bootstrap their responses to tractable problems into a better understanding of the intractable problem looming in the background.

In addition to learning how to identify and address tractable philosophical problems, students need to learn how to write about their attempts. This has an additional instrumental benefit: learning how to write clearly is a good way of learning how to think clearly. I emphasize clear, direct, unadorned prose. Though such prose does not always excite at first exposure, the ability to produce it underwrites more mature and lively writing styles. My method for teaching writing is straightforward: read a lot, write even more. I encourage frequent rewriting, often allowing students the opportunity to rewrite an earlier paper. I also give small writing assignments aimed at teaching students how to identify arguments, how to diagnose weak or unsupported premises, and how to recognize presuppositions of
a particular way of framing a problem. These smaller assignments are not usually graded, but they are discussed in class and each is returned with a set of comments emphasizing passages where they could be clearer. The aim is to teach my students to use the clarity of their writing as a tool to gauge how well they actually understand a topic.

On top of all this, students need to see that philosophical problems are lovable even when they are frustrating. The only way to convey this is to relentlessly display a love of philosophical problems to your students. A certain frustrated enthusiasm for the big problems and a clear joy at small advances encourages students to engage with the material of the course. If, at the end of a class, my students love deep philosophical problems, write about them clearly, and have some facility at identifying and addressing smaller subproblems, then my class has been an unqualified success. One of my proudest moments as a teacher was when an earnest, but struggling student found me after my ethics course to tell me that he was worried about his views on abortion as a result of the course. He said that while he had not exactly switched his position, he now thought that the issue was vastly more complicated than he had previously thought and that he needed to iron out his views on the moral status of a fetus and on the general right to life before he had a definite opinion on abortion.

I often take a historical approach to teaching philosophy, especially at the introductory level. One reason for this is that I, like many philosophers, have a deep love of the problems of ancient and modern philosophy and my excitement shows when teaching. Another is that the problems had a certain freshness when they were first addressed which it is sometimes hard to recapture in our current context. A third is that it is that studying the history of philosophy conveys a sense of the continual fascination of these problems. On the other hand, it is crucial to show students that philosophical problems are not a mere historical curiosity. To do this, contemporary work can be mixed in with historical readings and, moreover, students can be exposed to problems on which progress has been made. For example, when teaching ethics, I use contemporary formulations of consequentialism like those of J.J.C. Smart and Peter Railton to show students how a consequentialist could skirt objections that threaten Mill and Bentham’s accounts. Likewise, I use Christine Korsgaard’s work to show students how a Kantian could address what seem to be intolerable consequences of Kant’s view.
My teaching experience has been rather varied in location and student ability; I have taught at a community college and a prison, large and small state schools, and, of course, at Princeton. I have taught logic at both introductory and more advanced levels, ethics, standard introductory courses and specialty courses for philosophy majors. Across all of these contexts, my preferred method of philosophical teaching has remained effective; students do best when they learn to love the problems, to cut them into tractable subproblems, and to clearly and carefully address these tractable subproblems.

In my application you will find a summary of my teaching evaluations, a selection of handwritten comments on my courses, and a few sample syllabuses. I also have asked William Hanson to evaluate my teaching in his recommendation letter.
# Teaching Evaluations - Numerical Scores

## Minnesota

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Semester</th>
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**Minnesota Average** 5.98

## Normandale

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## Princeton

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<td>Phil 318</td>
<td>Spring 2009</td>
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<td>Phil 318</td>
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**Princeton Average** 3.64

**Overall Average (All Classes)** 0.8381676698

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Overall Average

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4
Comments from evaluations (verbatim)

Minnesota (TA: PHIL 1001 – Introduction to Logic; Spring 04)

- Always willing to help and made sure that a problem is understood. Section always made the lectures and material clear. Jack did an awesome job—it is very obvious how important to him it is that we learned and enjoyed logic.

- Was good at delivering the information, but could add more excitement.

- Very concerned about student understanding and liking a subject, even if it is a losing battle. At first he was too confusing for me to follow (spoke rapidly, moving quickly through problems) and sometimes went on tangents that did not really answer my original question. But very caring—I appreciate his genuine effort and availability to the students. I almost feel bad for not liking the class—his attitude and energy (though sometimes excessive) made me at least try to like it.

- Jack showed his concern for his students to do well and his knowledge of the material. Discussion classes were helpful because of going over proofs and symbolizations.

- Jack made the material as interesting as this insipid garbage can be...okay, some of it was fun, but the second book is a pain in the ass.

- Jack tries very hard to get classroom understanding, participation, even when there none to be found. Informative, funny, timely. A++++++++ would take class again.

- Jack really knew the material well and he made it very easy to follow examples. The way he taught was very helpful to me. Conclusion: Jack is a good TA.

- Jack is an exceptional instructor. Unfortunately, it is I, the student, who didn’t match his level. My failing of this class should in no way be conceived as Jack being a bad teacher. I will see him again b/c I will retake the course. Cya soon.

Minnesota (TA: PHIL 5202 – Symbolic Logic II; Spring 05)

- Excellent TA. Patient, knowledgeable, clear. I learned a lot from this class.

- Jack is an excellent TA. He always did his best to help me and I really appreciate it.

- Jack ALWAYS went over time which was frustrating for people who have another class to get to.

- I think Jack did a better job of making sense of 5202 even maybe than Professor Hanson.

- Jack was a very enthusiastic instructor. His energy and upbeat attitude helped make this difficult class more fun. As well, he was helpful in his explanations.
and attempts to explain things in different way if you didn't understand.

- Jack is a good TA. He presents the topics clearly and he has great knowledge of the subject matter and he is helpful outside of class.

**Minnesota (TA: PHIL 1002 – Introduction to Philosophy; Fall 05)**

- Jack was an awesome TA and would make a superstar professor. The discussions were structured in that he made sure to cover all the material from lecture and answer all student questions from lecture and the reading and had very informative and interesting digressions from assigned course material. He was also very easy to talk to in office hours and answered all of my questions without giving me the answers. He made me think and come to my own conclusions even when he was giving me the answers. He gets an A+.

- Jack is an extremely knowledgeable individual. His teaching style was excellent, he was always very enthusiastic about the material being covered and encouraged others to actively learn and be excited about the material as well. I enjoyed Jack very much and wish I had him again.

- Exceptional TA. Always made me understand the material after I was unclear from lecture. LOVED coming to this discussion section b/c of the teaching. Style was always fun. Awesome ways of explaining material!!! Use these same example types in anything else you teach, they were great. GREAT TA.

- He always kept things interesting. I especially enjoyed some of the examples: Space pirates. El Phantasmo. Keeps our attention! :)

- You are a great teacher and gave criticism that was very helpful. Made the material easier to understand. You are very good at explaining things in terms that are easy to understand for non-philosophy majors.

- Hearing you speak is a lot easier to learn from than the textbook.

- Jack is a very good instructor and does a good job putting difficult topics to understand in context to make them easier to understand.

- I didn't enjoy the topic much, but the TA presented it in a way that was simple and somewhat enjoyable.

- It was a good class that made you question a lot of things. Jack was a good TA who knew the material extremely well.

**Normandale Community College (Instructor: Introduction to Ethics; Fall 2006)**

- Teacher is really helpful.

- Gave examples that were really helpful. Too many examples of his respect for students to fit into this box. Jack is the best thing about the course.

- Always very happy to be here. Engages in meaningful conversations with the
whole class. Praises answers and corrects gently. Always has readings ready and they're always relevant. He changed my way of thinking for the better.

- Some of the books were confusing, but I know Jack didn't get a chance to choose them. Did a good job explaining them. The way he teaches is very detailed and helpful.

- Great professor, gets along with students well. Extremely nice guy. Best thing about the course: Jack Woods.

- He makes it so I understand, but it's always a bit boring. I like that it makes you think about morals and why they are morals because most people don't think about stuff like that.

- He is cool, he is nice, he is fast, he is descriptive, good teacher.

- He is good at making arguments for and against each side. It forces us to think deeply on the matter.

- Teacher always provides good examples and scenarios.

- He loves philosophy and it shows. It's a very interesting topic. He's very nice and approachable, intelligent too.

Minnesota (Instructor: Philosophy of Psychology; Fall 2006)

- Had a great time in this class. Jack was a great teacher and had a very good understanding of the course material and beyond.

- I would definitely take another course instructed by Jack. Papers were returned the next week with grades and comments, class participation was helpful and encouraged and Jack is very approachable. Great class, GREAT instructor.

- Jack was exceptionally knowledgeable which was of utmost benefit in a class featuring such complex and abstract material. The material has been confusing me since day 1, but I firmly believe this to be no fault of Jack's. Frankly, I blame Dennett.

- Had a great time in this class. Jack was a great teacher and had a very good understanding of the course material and beyond.

- Excellent

- I loved Jack—he had such amazing respect for his students and he definitely knows the material well. I would have liked to have spent less time on Functionalism and more time on the reading. The course title should also be changed from Philosophy of Psychology to Philosophy of Mind to better reflect the course material.

- The class was fabulous. Quite interesting, good to have at the end of the week.
This was a great class. The material was very complicated, but Jack always made it very clear in lecture. He is a great teacher.

Cogito ergo sum …. kind of curious why this was never mentioned. Good class, very flexible.

Class = good shit.

Philosophy isn’t really my strong suit, so this course was somewhat difficult for me. Jack was very willing to help me with papers outside of class, but as attendance was in no way required, I found myself unmotivated to attend the entire class.

Jack made a difficult and potentially boring subject interesting. He is knowledgeable and down to earth and approachable. My experience with the philosophy department has been spectacular.


Minnesota (TA: PHIL 5202 – Symbolic Logic II; Spring 07)

Jack is an exceptional TA.

Jack is an extremely knowledgeable teaching assistant. He clearly understands the material and he made it easy to ask questions since I knew I would get a clear response. I would recommend Jack’s classes to any of my fellow students and I am glad that I got a chance to work with him.

Princeton (TA: PHI 312 – Intermediate Logic)

Precepts were great overall, and Jack answered everyone’s questions very well. It would’ve helped a little if we’d covered material in precept at the same rate as it was covered in lecture: the precepts were a chapter ahead, which sometimes made things a bit difficult.

Jack is by far one of my favorite preceptors I’ve had all of Princeton. He really makes the material interesting and I love his enthusiasm. We went through problems together during precept. The only thing he might have been able to do better is encourage broad participation from everyone in precept. For example, usually one person would present each problem. It is important to make sure everyone in the class understood it even if the person who presented the solution acted like it was completely obvious. For example, he could re-explain it more slowly if someone explained it to the class but in a very non-thorough manner.

I felt that the precepts were less than helpful. Examples contained errors. I usually left convinced that either: 1. The preceptor (this is meant with as much respect as possible) did not fully understand the material. 2. The material was ridiculous. As a case in point, I have trouble believing that everything is as it should be when it takes two blackboards to "prove" things as blatantly obvious as a = b and Rb imply Ra.
● Jack was a good preceptor. He was easily approachable and VERY helpful!
● responsive, accessible, good problems
● Fantastic. Clear, helpful, very knowledgeable, always available for consultation.

Princeton (TA: PHI 318 – Metaphysics)

● The precepts were helpful

● Fantastic discussions. Great preceptor.

● Jack was a really good preceptor who did a great job really examining arguments in depth. I learned a lot from the way that he analyzed the papers that we read, but I think the biggest problem in the precept was that it resulted in him lecturing a bit too much (there was very little participation in the precept)

● Precepts were helpful. I would much rather have come to precept three times a week than go to lecture the other two times. Usually they were dominated by the same 2-3 people talking every week; it was only annoying when they were trying to impress others by using examples/terms/theories from other classes.

● Precepts addressed main issues in the course but didn't seem to contribute that much to my understanding.

● Jack was always energetic, but sometimes discussions didn't really get anywhere, and the material wasn't necessarily clearer than before.

● Jack ran a good precept. He helpfully analyzed the philosopher's arguments, in a different way than Fara, and would address issues not brought up in lecture. Structure of precepts was a little loose and free. It would've been helpful to hash and rehash the readings and the philosophical implications of our readings.

● Engaging, helpful, clarified many things for us. Wish that more students in our precept would speak up, but what can you do?
Introduction to Moral Philosophy
Jack Woods

Course Description - The goal of this course is survey-level knowledge of the central questions in moral philosophy. We will start with questions about the foundations of moral philosophy. Are moral properties features of the world? Are they subjective? Objective? Something in-between? Does the moral domain have any distinctive features that makes its study especially difficult? What are we saying when we say something is wrong? Once we have seen how these sorts of debates go, we will explore two of the most prominent views about which acts are right and which are wrong: consequentialism and Kantian ethics. Studying these two views and criticisms of them will occupy a large part of the course. The last unit of the course will deal with applied ethics. We will look at three topics of perennial interest: Sex, abortion, and obligations to the dead.

Course Prerequisites - None. We will spend some time during the course discussing how to write about philosophical issues.

Texts
- Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
- John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism
- J.J.C. Smart and B. Williams: Utilitarianism: For and Against
- Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, Peter Railton: Moral Discourse and Practice (MDP)

In addition to these four books, there will be a packet of articles. There are also some readings marked as optional. These readings cover points I may mention in the course; I do not expect you to read them. They are significantly harder than the majority of the course material. However, I am willing to discuss them given student interest.

Course Schedule

Metaethics & Moral Psychology – Weeks 1 to 5

- Introduction
  no reading

- The Euthyphro Dilemma and Divine Command Theory
  Plato's *Euthyphro* (Packet)
  Jonathan Berg's 'How can Morality Depend on Religion?' (Packet)

- Morality and Motivation
  Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature* (selections) (Packet)
  Michael Smith's *The Moral Problem* (selections) (Packet)

- Moral Naturalism
  Gilbert Harman's 'Ethics and Observation' (MDP)
- Moral Non-Naturalism
  G.E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* (selections from the introduction) (MDP)
  Russ Schaefer-Landau's *Moral Realism: A Defense* (selections) (Packet)

- Skepticism about Morality: Error Theory
  J.L. Mackie's 'The Subjectivity of Values' (MDP)

- What is Moral Discourse about: Non-Cognitivism

- What is Moral Discourse about: Realism
  Peter Railton, Allan Gibbard, Stephen Darwall's 'Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends' (MDP)
  Peter Railton 'Moral Realism' (selections) (Optional)
  Richard Boyd's 'How to be a Moral Realist' (selections) (Optional)

**Consequentialism and Critics thereof** – Weeks 5 to 7

- The Basic View
  John Stuart Mill's *Utilitarianism* Ch. 1,2
  J.J.C Smart's *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (selections)

- Consequentialism and *HOW* to act
  John Stuart Mill's *Utilitarianism* Ch. 3,4
  Bernard Williams's *Utilitarianism: For and Against*
  Peter Railton's 'Alienation, Consequentialism, and Morality' (selections) (Optional)

- Partiality and Projects
  Bernard Williams's *Utilitarianism: For and Against*
  Peter Singer's 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality' (Packet)

- The Consequentialist Calculus, Fairness, and Alienation Again
  Thomas Nagel's 'Moral Luck' (Packet)
  John Taurek's 'Should the Numbers Count?' (Packet)
  Bernard Williams's 'Persons, Character, and Morality' (Optional)

**Kantian Ethics and Critics thereof** – Weeks 8 to 10

- The Basic View
  Ursula K LeGuin's 'The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas' (Packet)
  Immanuel Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*
  Onora O'Neill's 'A Simplified Account of Kant's Ethics' (Packet)

- Internal and External Reasons
  Immanuel Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*
  Bernard Williams's 'Internal and External Reasons'
  Christine Korsgaard's 'Skepticism about Practical Reason' (MDP)

- Keeping the View, Dropping the Kant
  Philippa Foot's 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives'
  Michael Smith's *The Moral Problem* (selections) (MDP)
- Liars and other Good People
  Immanuel Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*
  Rae Langton's 'Duty and Desolation'
  (Packet)

*Ethical Problems* – Weeks 11 to 13

- Sexual Morality: Is there any?
  Alan Goldman's 'Plain Sex'
  Robin West's 'The Harms of Consensual Sex'
  (Packet)
  (Optional)

- Abortion: the basic dispute
  Judith Jarvis Thomson's 'A Defense of Abortion'
  Don Marquis's 'An Argument that Abortion is Wrong'
  (Packet)
  (Packet)

- The Dead: Should we honor my will? Even if I want all of my enormous fortune used to build the largest possible ice statue of myself? In Death Valley?
  Walter Ott's 'Are there Duties to the Dead?'
  George Pitcher's 'The Misfortunes of the Dead?'
  (Packet)
  (Packet)

*Recap – Week 14*

*Coursework* – The work for the course will consist of a few very short writing exercises and three longer papers of about 1500 words each. For the final, you will revise one of these pieces of writing in light of my comments. The final paper should be no more than 2000 words. The goal in these papers is clarity. If you can display a clear understanding of the topic to be addressed *and* you address that topic and *only* that topic in a reasonably straightforward fashion, you can expect to do well. The first writing exercise will give you an idea about what this means. You should view each writing exercise as a practice run at writing clear, straightforward prose.
Consider the following argument:

(1) If I become a professional philosopher, I will be poor.
(2) If I do not become a professional philosopher, I will be poor.
(3) I will either become a professional philosopher or I won't.

with the conclusion:

(C) I will be poor.

If (1-3) are all true, then the C must also be true. Moreover, the fact that C must be true if (1-3) are has nothing to do with the meaning of the non-bolded words in the above.¹ Compare:

(1) If Jack went to the store, he purchased mustard.
(2) Jack went to the store.

With the conclusion:

(C) Jack purchased a condiment.

If (1-2) are true, C must also be true, but this involves facts about what 'mustard' and 'condiment' mean. We can abstract from these sorts of facts and talk only about the logical form of sentences. We can give the form of an argument by ignoring the particular meaning of the non-logical (here, non-bolded) expressions. We will study logical form by theorizing about a small class of logical expressions such as 'if', 'not', 'or', and so on. Once we have an account of logical form, we can study logical consequence, or the relationship that holds between premises and conclusion of an argument where the truth of the conclusion is guaranteed by the truth of the premises in virtue of logical form.

Formal languages allow us to precisely model the logical form of arguments and systems of proof for these language enable us to demonstrate that some sentence follows from some other sentences in virtue of logical form. Learning to “translate” natural language arguments into these formal languages and to do proofs thus gives us tools to recognize the underlying formal properties of natural language, honing our sense of what follows from what and giving us an answer, sometimes, to why something follows from something else. To study logical form and logical consequence, we will construct formal languages in which to represent natural language and collections of rules for constructing proofs that certain sentences in our formal language are logical consequences of some other sentences.

¹ Well, almost nothing. The non-bolded words have to be grammatically appropriate.
We will construct two different formal languages. The first, the *sentential calculus*, is a simple formal language adequate to formalize arguments like the example above. However, it is incapable of representing boring arguments like:

(1) Everyone who has a sister has a sibling.  
(C) Everyone without a sibling does not have a sister.²

as well as exciting arguments like:

(1) Every long-tailed marmot is an animal.  
(C) Every tail of a long-tailed marmot is the tail of an animal.

To represent these sorts of arguments, we will need a more expressive formal language. This new language, the *predicate calculus*, is adequate to represent a very wide class of arguments in natural language. Learning to do proofs in predicate logic will give us a very powerful tool for showing something argued for to be a logical consequence of what it is argued from. We will also learn how to demonstrate in many cases that a conclusion is not a logical consequence of some premises by generating intuitive counterexamples.

As we familiarize ourselves with these formal languages we will see—though usually not prove—how they relate to the sort of arguments we give in natural language and to the relationship of logical consequence we want to represent. Serious results in this vein such as soundness, completeness, and compactness will be discussed although the proofs will have to wait for a further course.

**Homework**

Learning to “speak” a formal language is not entirely dissimilar from learning to speak a new natural language. It is essential to practice formalizing natural language sentences and to construct proof after proof after proof. The more exercises you do, the better off you will be. I will thus assign a lot of practice problems each week. I will not grade every problem (though you will not know in advance which problems I will grade.) You are expected to write up your own solutions, but I have no objection to you discussing how to solve a problem with classmates before writing up your homework.

The assessment for this course will consist of 9 homework exercises and 3 take-home exams. Expect to have either homework or a take-home exam due at the beginning of the first class each week. Late homework will not be accepted except under extreme and verifiable circumstances. Instead, I will drop the lowest two scores on the homework exercises, averaging the rest. The 3 take-home exams will be difficult and time-consuming. I do not recommend waiting until the last minute to start working on them. Rather, after the take-home exams are distributed, read through them carefully and allow yourself time to work through possible solutions to the problems before attempting to solve them in a final form.

Your grade for the course will be broken down as follows: Homework problems (30%), take-home exams (60%), and class participation (10%). I will occasionally distribute extra-credit problems during class. Those not attending will miss such opportunities in addition to their class participation grade suffering.

² For a fun initial exercise, try to figure out which word(s) in this argument should be bolded.
Textbook

All material you will be expected to know will be covered in class, but there are a pair of textbooks which will be helpful for reminding yourself of various details and for additional exercises. For this purpose, we will use Howard Pospesel's two books: *Propositional Logic* and *Predicate Logic*. I will supplement these with handouts throughout the course. If you miss a class, be sure to email me to get the handout(s) and assignments that you may have missed.

Rough Schedule (subject to revision)

August 30th: Introduction
Week 1: More introduction; sentential connectives
Week 2: Sentential connectives; truth-tables;
Week 3: Translations; finding counterexamples;
Week 4: Sentential proofs; first take-home exam distributed
Week 5: Proofs, proofs, and more proofs; first exam due
Week 6: Inadequacy of the sentential calculus; quantifiers
Week 7: Proofs in the predicate calculus
Week 8: More on proofs in the predicate calculus; relations
Week 9: Nested quantifiers; interesting proofs; second take-home exam distributed
Week 10: Identity; second take-home exam due.
Week 11: Interesting translations
Week 12: Finding counterexamples in the predicate calculus
Week 13: More on proofs in the predicate calculus
Week 14: Basic Metatheory; final take-home distributed
Finals Week: Final take-home due

College Policies

The course will adhere to throughout to all binding TCNJ policies, including with respect to Attendance ([http://www.tcnj.edu/~academic/policy/attendance.html](http://www.tcnj.edu/~academic/policy/attendance.html)), Academic Integrity ([http://www.tcnj.edu/~academic/policy/integrity.html](http://www.tcnj.edu/~academic/policy/integrity.html)), and the Americans with Disabilities Act ([http://policies.tcnj.edu/policies/viewPolicy.php?docId=8082](http://policies.tcnj.edu/policies/viewPolicy.php?docId=8082)).
Philosophy of Mathematics
Jack Woods

Course Description - The goal of this course is survey-level knowledge of the philosophy of mathematics. We will start by reading Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* in its entirety. This book, more than anything else, is the lens through which we now see the philosophy of mathematics. Understanding it is crucial to understanding almost all of the other work we will read. We will then cover three famous positions from the early part of the 20th century: Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. We will end the course by looking at a few modern views and concerns, touching on nominalist views, structuralist views, and Crispin Wright's neo-logicist project.

Prerequisites - Success in this course requires a small degree of mathematical and/or logical sophistication. It also requires a fair bit of philosophical sophistication. If you have not taken at least an introductory logic course or, if you have taken introduction to logic, but barely remember it, please come talk to me so that we can figure out how you can best approach these sometimes difficult readings. If you have not taken a philosophy course or two before, you also need to come talk to me. I will hold a few optional meetings for students who want to work through some of the basic formal details presupposed in the reading.

S. Shapiro *Thinking about Mathematics* (TM)
G. Frege *Foundations of Arithmetic*

Stewart Shapiro's *Thinking about Mathematics* provides a bird's eye view of most everything we cover. I will assign sections of it for each unit of the course (this will be marked with "[TM §]" next to the title of the unit). We will supplement it with readings from Benacerraf and Putnam's anthology and some papers and handouts distributed in class. Some recommended readings for the course, such as Dummett's *Elements of Intuitionism*, are prohibitively expensive. I will distribute photocopies of short sections from these and place full copies on reserve in the library.

Course Schedule - Revisable in terms of student interest and progress

1: Logicism – Frege [TM 5.1,5.2]
   Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic*

2: Logicism – Carnap [TM 5.3]
   Carnap's 'The Logicist Foundations of Mathematics' (BP), Hempel's 'On the Nature of Mathematical Truth' (BP)

   Recommended – Quine's 'Truth by Convention' (BP)
3: **Intuitionism – Brouwer** [TM 7.1-7.3]
   - Brouwer's 'Intuitionism and Formalism' (BP), Heyting's 'The Intuitionist Foundations of Mathematics' (BP), handout on Glivenko's theorem and the double-negation translation
     
     *Recommended* – Heyting's *Intuitionism: an Introduction* (on reserve)

4: **Intuitionism – Dummett** [TM 7.4]
   - Dummett's 'The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic' (BP)
     
     *Recommended* – Dummett's *Elements of Intuitionism* [Introduction, Ch. 1, 7.1] (on reserve), Burgess's 'Dummett's Case for Intuitionism' (distributed)

5: **Formalism – The Hilbert Program** [TM 6]
   - Hilbert's 'On the Infinite' (BP), John von Neumann's 'The Formalist Foundations of Mathematics' (BP), handout on Gödel's incompleteness theorems
     
     *Recommended* – Curry's 'Remarks on the Definition and Nature of Mathematics' (BP), Detlefsen's 'Formalism' (distributed)

6: **Platonism, Nominalism, and Fictionalism** [TM 8, TM 9]
   - Quine and Goodman's 'Steps towards a Constructive Nominalism' (distributed), Field's 'Science Without Numbers' (selections distributed), Benacerraf's 'Mathematical Truth' (BP)
     
     *Recommended* – Burgess and Rosen's *A Subject with No Object*, especially the introduction (on reserve), Burgess's 'Mathematics and Bleak House' (distributed)

7: **Structuralism** [TM 10]
   - Benacerraf's 'What Numbers Could Not Be' (BP), Hellman's 'Structuralism' (distributed), Dedekind’s 'What Are Numbers and What Should They Be?' (selections distributed)
     
     *Recommended* – Resnik's *Mathematics as a Science of Patterns* (on reserve), Shapiro's *Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology* (on reserve)

8: **Neo-Logicism** [TM 5.4]
   - Crispin Wright's *Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects* (selections distributed), Boolos's 'Is Hume's Principle Analytic?' (distributed), handout on possible interpretations of Hume's principle
     
     *Recommended* – Fraser MacBride's 'Speaking with Shadows: A Study of Neo-Logicism' (on reserve)

**Coursework** – The work for the course will consist of a few short writing exercises—one on each section of the course—and one longer term paper of about 3000 words. You must submit a draft of the term paper by the 10th week of the course. This will be returned with comments which I expect to be addressed in the final version of the paper.
Sample Research Statements
RESEARCH STATEMENT

Domenica G. Romagni

CURRENT RESEARCH

My main current research project is my dissertation, entitled The Hard Problem of Consonance and Its Influence on 17th Century Philosophy. It focuses on the subject of musical consonance, defined as a property that is possessed by a particular collection of musical intervals (i.e. two pitches sounding simultaneously) in virtue of which a listener perceives them as pleasant-sounding. Explaining the nature of musical consonance in the 17th century involved examining the relationship between mathematical structures in the world and our qualitative perceptions, which had profound consequences for issues in fundamental ontology and philosophy of mind. While this subject has long interested historians of science and musicologists, it has been relatively ignored by philosophers. In the dissertation, I argue for four conclusions: (1) The problem of defining the cause and nature of musical consonance - understood as a question for natural philosophy - served to help undermine the broadly Neo-Aristotelian ontology of earlier centuries. This is because developments in music theory and musical practice in the late 16th century posed insurmountable obstacles for a hallmark of their theory: a commitment to forms and formal causes. Moreover, the way in which the Neo-Aristotelian framework was weakened helped to set the groundwork for key movements in the 17th century: materialism and dualism. (2) The problem of consonance is of special importance for understanding Descartes’ philosophy and is particularly relevant to his theory of sense perception, since it highlights both the representational and motivational content of sensory ideas. I argue that Descartes commentators have largely overlooked the motivational component and develop a novel interpretation of Cartesian sense perceptions as mental states representing bio-functionally salient features of the subject’s environment, which often carry a motivational ‘valence’. (3) The debate between Mersenne and Kepler on the nature of consonance highlights an oft-overlooked theoretical virtue: a theory’s potential for explanatory depth. This virtue can indicate a theory’s preferability despite its possessing explanatory gaps, so long as these gaps are located in the right junctures in theoretical space. And, finally, (4) given our current understanding and intuitions, musical consonance is best characterized in terms of the complexity of the stimulus rather than the appraisal of the listener. I am currently converting sections from the dissertation into papers in order to prepare them for publication. I plan to send one of these papers out by the end of 2017 and to have two more sections ready to send out in 2018.

My other current research includes, first, a paper on Descartes’ epistemology, co-authored with Dr. Simon Shogry (Brasenose College, Oxford), which discusses the influence of Stoic epistemology on Descartes’ theory of judgment. The influence of the Stoics on Descartes’ epistemology has been tacitly recognized by many commentators, despite the fact that there has been little written on the subject. The general view is that Descartes’ ‘doxastic voluntarism’, or his theory that ideas in the intellect must be ‘assented to’ by the will in order to become beliefs, was inspired by a similar view held by the Stoics, who first introduced the notion of ‘assent’ (sunkatathesis) into the philosophical lexicon and deployed it systematically in their epistemological and psychological theorizing. Moreover, commentators generally agree that Cartesian ‘clear and distinct perceptions’ and the assent that they demand from the will may have been inspired by the Stoic notion of kataleptic impressions, which, as we learn
from one colorful passage, ‘all but drag us by the hair to assent’ (SE AM VII.257). However, one notable dissimilarity is that, while the Stoic kataleptic impression is paradigmatically a sensory impression, Cartesian ‘clear and distinct perceptions’ are rarely so, if ever. Bearing this in mind, we argue that Descartes’ notion of a ‘clear and distinct perception’ bears a hitherto-unremarked similarity to the Stoic prolepesis, or ‘natural notion’, which is not only a similarity that lies deeper to the heart of each respective theory, but which also explains some of the other more surface-level similarities between the two traditions.

I also have a paper, forthcoming in The Blackwell Companion to Spinoza, on Spinoza's aesthetics. In the paper, I discuss the various views on Spinoza's aesthetics that have been formulated. One of the most prominent views on Spinoza with regard to aesthetics is that Spinoza's basic philosophical framework precludes him from having a theory of aesthetics. This claim is largely based on remarks Spinoza makes in the Appendix to Part I of the Ethics, where he discusses how we go wrong in our application of terms like ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘beautiful’, and ‘ugly’. I go on to argue that Spinoza’s remarks in this passage have been misinterpreted and that we really can understand Spinoza as having a theory of aesthetics, so long as we understand his central aesthetic concept to be perfection rather than beauty, much in the same way that we can understand Spinoza to have an ethical theory, properly understood.

**Future Research**

In future, I hope to both continue the work I have started in my dissertation, as well as pursue research in related areas. The general topic of my dissertation is a fruitful one and the work I have completed in the dissertation only scratches the surface. In particular, it is limited to investigating the work of theorists primarily in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. My immediate future research plans involve expanding the scope of my investigation by looking at figures working in the British tradition at the time. In particular, I plan to investigate Francis Bacon's discussions of sound in his work, the Sylva Sylvarum. We know that Marin Mersenne translated this work and I believe that we can trace the influence Bacon's ideas on sound through Mersenne to Descartes. In turn, there is evidence that Newton's work in his Opticks was influenced by Mersenne. I mean to investigate Newton’s comments on this topic in the Opticks and focus particularly on his claim that there is a possible correlation between the frequency ratios of musical intervals and the color spectrum. I locate the source of this speculation in Marin Mersenne’s Harmonie Universelle, where Mersenne expounds on the scientific utility of sound as a mathematically quantifiable sensory stimulus and suggests it serve as a model for investigating the stimulus for other sensory modalities. Thus, the main goal of this project will be to show the influence of music theory on philosophical developments in the 17th century across continents. This will enable historians of philosophy to have a much fuller and richer understanding of the intellectual shifts that occurred in this time period.

My dissertation also includes a new proposal for how we ought to define musical consonance, which has wide-ranging ramifications for issues in philosophy of perception. I believe that my definition of musical consonance as being characterized by the complexity of the stimulus, which is supported by a body of neuroscientific research, can weigh in on the current debate on cognitive penetration. In particular, the notion that the recognition of a chord's musical function or sonic structure can demonstrate in a novel way how our beliefs and knowledge about musical structure can inform our perceptual states. I also hope to
contribute to the current philosophy of perception literature by investigating our perception of sonic timbre or tone quality, which is closely related to the phenomenon of consonance and dissonance. Timbre is the sonic profile of the sound stimulus and is the quality that accounts for, say, the difference in the character our perception of a violin and a flute playing the same pitch in the same register. Philosophers have not discussed sonic perception in general and the phenomenology of our perception of timbre has had the least treatment, although there have been some notable exceptions (e.g. Casey O'Callaghan, Isaac Alistair, Robert Pasnau, and John Kulvicki). I hope that investigating our perception of this auditory quality can complement and inform research that has already been going on for some time on the details of our perception of color.

The work I plan to pursue that is more removed from my dissertation includes work on Descartes’ philosophy of mind and contemporary aesthetics. I plan to undertake a study of Descartes’ theory of the passions, which includes sensory and emotional states, in order to make sense of Descartes’ discussion of the content of these ideas. In particular, I plan to distinguish between four features any passion will have on the Cartesian picture (its proximate cause, its content, its referent, and its valence) and argue that the Cartesian passions are individuated by the relationships between these four characteristics. I also have plans to contribute to the contemporary aesthetics literature with a discussion of the aesthetic phenomenon of ‘wrongness’ in music. The quality I call ‘wrongness’ involves the occurrence of unexpected events in the course of a musical experience. It is a phenomenon that everyone has experienced and that musicians have referenced often, but has had little treatment in the philosophy of music literature and the aesthetics literature more broadly. In the course of researching, I hope to isolate and define the phenomenon and show that the fact that we seem to distinguish wrongness from mistakes indicates that our understanding of musical meaning largely relies on the dynamic interaction of ranked syntactical structures. These will have been learned implicitly in the course of our musical acculturation and will work alongside pragmatic indicators like tone quality, dynamic or loudness, and articulation.
RESEARCH STATEMENT

Domenica G. Romagni

CURRENT RESEARCH

Dissertation: The Hard Problem of Consonance and Its Influence on 17th Century Philosophy

Why is it that certain musical constructs sound pleasant to us, while others sound unpleasant? While this question might strike one as a question about personal taste or preference, relegated largely to the field of aesthetics, it had a much broader range of application in the 17th century, intersecting with fields such as natural philosophy, physical mechanics, mathematics, cognition, and perception. My dissertation focuses on the subject of musical consonance, defined as a property that is possessed by a particular collection of musical intervals (i.e. two pitches sounding simultaneously) in virtue of which a listener perceives them as pleasant-sounding. Explaining the nature of musical consonance in the 17th century involved examining the relationship between mathematical structures in the world and our qualitative perceptions, which had profound consequences for issues in fundamental ontology and philosophy of mind. While this subject has long interested historians of science and musicologists, it has been relatively ignored by philosophers. In the chapters that make up my dissertation, I argue for four conclusions: (1) The problem of defining the cause and nature of musical consonance - understood as a question for natural philosophy - served to help undermine the broadly Neo-Aristotelian ontology of earlier centuries by posing insurmountable obstacles for this paradigmatic case of formal causation. In overlooking the role played by musical consonance and choosing to focus primarily on other developments, such as those in the field of physical mechanics, historians of philosophy are missing a large part of how and why this shift occurred. (2) The problem of consonance is of special importance for understanding Descartes’ philosophy, which is supported by his interest in the phenomenon throughout his career. It is especially relevant to his theory of sense perception, since it highlights both the representational and motivational content of sensory ideas. (3) The debates centered on the problem of consonance can shed light on the kinds of explanatory virtues theorists valued at the time. In particular, the debate between Mersenne and Kepler highlights what I call a theory’s potential for explanatory depth, which signifies a theory’s preferability despite its possessing explanatory gaps, so long as these gaps are located in the right junctures in theoretical space. And, finally, (4) given our current understanding and intuitions, musical consonance is best characterized in terms of the complexity of the stimulus rather than the appraisal of the listener. Defining musical consonance in terms of the complexity of the stimulus allows for the variety of roles consonance might play across cultures and time periods, while still retaining a principled distinction between intervals in each class. It also sits better with the empirical evidence on the issue and offers a position that reconciles the two dominant contemporary stances on the issue: innatism and culture-relativism.
Music Makes the World Go ‘Round: Music and Philosophy in the 17th Century

The first chapter in my dissertation introduces the 17th century conception of musical consonance and demonstrates how this phenomenon helped to prompt the development and acceptance of a dualist ontology. The role that musical consonance played in this shift was tied to the dominant theory of sensory perception at the time: a broadly Neo-Aristotelian theory in which an object emits a ‘sensible species’, propagated through a material medium, that strikes the sense organs and transmits the ‘accidental form’ of the object in question to the rational soul. The example of the perception of a consonant musical interval is an interesting study for this model. On the one hand, it was a paradigmatic case – Aristotle uses the octave and its frequency ratio (2:1) as his example of a formal cause in the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. However, sonic perception in general was something of a red herring for this theory of sense perception, since sound seemed to be in danger of being reducible to motion. The reigning explanation in the centuries leading up to the 17th for why only a small collection of these intervals is perceived as consonant was that, since certain proportional relationships were seen at the time as ‘privileged’ in nature, we perceive the perfection of the ‘form’ (i.e. the frequency ratio) of the consonant intervals with pleasure. At the end of the 16th century, a number of practical requirements (e.g. new instrumental designs) and theoretical discoveries (e.g. frequency ratios only apply to string length, but not other parameters like string tension) made this model virtually untenable. The problem that each posed was largely the same: the claim that the frequency ratio serves as the ‘form’ of the interval in question could not account for the new discoveries being made. With the support it lent to a theory of forms and formal causes dispensed with, the reduction of sound to motion was left unimpeded. I argue that this result was important to broader developments in fundamental ontology.

Descartes’ Audition: A Sonic Test Case for Cartesian Sense Perception

The second chapter of my dissertation examines Descartes’ theory of sense perception as applied to the problem of consonance. The issue of consonance is especially relevant to Descartes because (1) it was an issue which informed much of his early theorizing and (2) it is particularly suited to bring out the complex representational structure of Cartesian sensory ideas. In this chapter, I argue that this class of Cartesian ideas primarily represents bio-functionally salient features of objects in the subject’s vicinity (i.e. features that are relevant to the subject’s survival and continued well-being). I also argue that these are often accompanied by a qualitative, motivational valence that modifies the primary representation. The perception of musical consonance offers especially strong support for my conclusion for two reasons. The first is that it is one of the only secondary qualities that was known at the time to have an empirically supported and mathematically quantifiable physical basis (i.e. pulses of air whose frequency relationships could be formulated as whole-number ratios), serving as a prime concrete example of Descartes’ claim that all of our perceptions are underpinned by physio-mechanical interactions. The second is that, by definition, the perception of consonance has a valence (i.e. a perceived positive or negative quality). In this chapter, I show how Descartes understands the perception of a consonant interval as the formation of a sensory idea that is a representation of a particular configuration of air (described by its frequency ratio) combined with a positive valence. The object of the sensory idea is fixed by its potential bio-functional salience, and its valence is established through a process akin to classical conditioning. Since Descartes defends an amodal theory of sensory perception, my findings in the case of musical consonance can be extended to Cartesian sensory perceptions more broadly. The conclusions I draw thus allow me to flesh out Descartes’ nuanced and robust theory of sensory perception and demonstrate the oft-overlooked importance of this doctrine within his larger body of work.
Theoretical Virtues in the 17th Century: Mersenne and Kepler's Competing Theories of Musical Consonance

The third chapter of my dissertation focuses on a specific debate between two theorists, Marin Mersenne and Johannes Kepler, each of whom proposed a new solution to the problem of consonance. The scientific community at the time almost universally preferred Mersenne’s theory over Kepler’s, despite its possessing a number of explanatory gaps that were fully acknowledged by Mersenne and his contemporaries. Why is it that theorists preferred Mersenne’s theory, despite these seeming shortcomings? The fact that it ended up being the more correct theory (serving as an early forerunner to Hermann von Helmholtz’s theory), even though it was not obvious at the time, makes this question even more pressing. After dismissing the more familiar theoretical virtues that Mersenne’s theory might have been seen to possess over Kepler’s, such as simplicity, empirical falsifiability, and unificatory potential, I introduce the notion of ‘potential for explanatory depth’ and argue that this virtue accounts for the scientific community’s convergence on Mersenne’s theory. Possessing this virtue is a matter of having surface explanatory gaps but, surprisingly, these gaps turn out to be indicators of preferability. The gaps in a theory that possesses a potential for explanatory depth are privileged because they are located at the right junctures in theoretical space. The particular debate between Mersenne and Kepler on the nature of consonance is suited to introducing this concept since the preferred theory in the debate (Mersenne’s) can’t be explained by appealing to other more familiar virtues. The issue of consonance thus enables me to elucidate this theoretical virtue that I argue was at play in deciding between theories in the 17th century and, further, that might help us more generally to identify preferable theories in their nascent stages. I hope to develop this conception in more detail in the future as part of a larger project that focuses on the problem of theory choice from an impoverished epistemic perspective.

Musical Consonance Now

In the final chapter of my dissertation, I briefly discuss the evolution of theories of consonance between the end of the 17th century and the present day. I then present a summary of the current literature on this phenomenon, philosophical and otherwise. Finally, I argue for a new conception of musical consonance that characterizes this phenomenon in terms of the complexity of the stimulus rather than the appraisal of the listener. I believe that there are two principal types of theories about the nature of musical consonance today. The ‘innatist’ maintains that the distinction between consonance and dissonance is something that we naturally perceive and, while our reaction to, or tolerance of, dissonance can change with acculturation, we generally retain some kind of natural preference for consonant intervals over dissonant ones. In contrast, the ‘culture-relativist’ maintains that any preference that we might have for one collection of intervals or another is solely the product of cultural forces. The new definition of consonance I argue for proposes a way of reconciling these two positions. In recasting the focus away from listener appraisal and toward the stimulus itself, I am able to capture the desirable elements of both kinds of theories without falling prey to their pitfalls. If we understand consonance as primarily being defined by the complexity of the stimulus, we can still capture the distinction that the innatist is thinking of and that we seem to intuitively identify. However, by refraining from thinking of consonance as inherently ‘pleasant’ we can allow for differences in the use of consonance and dissonance in musical practice across cultures and time periods that the culture-relativist uses as evidence for her position.
PLANS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The list directly below catalogues some (tentative) titles and descriptions of papers I hope to publish in connection with my future research projects. In addition to these, I envision undertaking a full-length book project that takes my dissertation as a point of departure and gives a full-fledged account of how the problem of musical consonance influenced philosophical theorizing in the 17th century.

1. The Influence of Stoic Epistemology on Descartes’s Theory of Judgment (in progress with Simon Shogry, Braesnose College, Oxford)
The influence of the Stoics on Descartes’ epistemology has been tacitly recognized by many commentators, despite the fact that there has been little written on the subject. The general view is that Descartes’ ‘doxastic voluntarism’, or his theory that ideas in the intellect must be ‘assented to’ by the will in order to become beliefs, was inspired by a similar view held by the Stoics, who first introduced the notion of ‘assent’ (sunkatathesis) into the philosophical lexicon and deployed it systematically in their epistemological and psychological theorizing. Moreover, commentators generally agree that Cartesian ‘clear and distinct perceptions’ and the assent that they demand from the will may have been inspired by the Stoic notion of kataleptic impressions, which, as we learn from one colorful passage, ‘all but drag us by the hair to assent’ (SE AM VII.257). However, one notable dissimilarity is that, while the Stoic kataleptic impression is paradigmatically a sensory impression, Cartesian ‘clear and distinct perceptions’ are rarely so, if ever. Bearing this in mind, we argue that Descartes’ notion of a ‘clear and distinct perception’ bears a hitherto-unremarked similarity to the Stoic prolēpsis, or ‘natural notion’.

2. ‘The Influence of Musical Consonance on Descartes’ Mature Theory of Sense Perception’
Aside from Descartes specialists, many aren’t aware of Descartes’ work on music theory, let alone that the first work that he wrote, his Compendium Musicae, was on this topic. Those that are aware of this interest of Descartes’ are not sure what to make of it. The questions of (1) what the Compendium is supposed to be when considered on its own (aside from a gift to Isaac Beeckman) and (2) how the views expressed in this work relate to Descartes’ more mature thought have puzzled most commenters. I plan to tackle these two questions and, in doing so, hope to show how the topic of music theory laid the groundwork for his later theories of sensory perception.

3. ‘Quantifying the Senses: Musical Consonance and Its Influence on Newton’s Theory of Color’
Isaac Newton’s theory of color is well-known and its foundation in his prism experiments has been discussed throughout the literature on the history of philosophy of science. Commenters have been less interested in his views on the nature of sound. I mean to investigate Newton’s comments on this topic in the Opticks and focus particularly on his claim that there is a possible correlation between the frequency ratios of musical intervals and the color spectrum. I locate the source of this speculation in Marin Mersenne’s encyclopedic work on music, the Harmonie Universelle, where Mersenne expounds on the scientific utility of sound as a mathematically-quantifiable sensory stimulus and suggests it serve as a model for investigating the stimulus for other sensory modalities.
The idea that the quality of musical consonance is connected somehow to the complexity of the sonic stimulus has been around since Antiquity, although of course the details of the view have changed over time regarding the exact nature of this stimulus and the way the level of its complexity is processed. There is a body of current neuroscientific research that supports a version of this thesis, where the stimulus is understood as the sound waves comprising the musical interval and its complexity is understood as the relative coincidence of the frequencies of the waves. In this project, I plan to investigate the philosophical significance of these findings, especially with regard to cognitive penetration theses in current philosophy of perception.

5. ‘A Systematic Treatment of Rule-Breaking In Music: How Can Wrong Notes Be Right?’
Crunchy. Sick. Nasty. Wrong. These are just a few of the words musicians use to describe a particular musical experience. The particular experience I have in mind is what I call 'wrongness' and its occurrence is something we are all aware of, whether one's musical preferences ally with punk rock or with the late greats like J.S. Bach or Telemann. To put it plainly, 'wrongness' is a unique musical phenomenon that involves the occurrence of unexpected events in the course of a musical experience. It is an occurrence that can be surprising, unsettling, shocking, or breathtaking, just to name a few, but the one thing that all cases of ‘wrongness’ have in common is the re-ordering of musical expectation. While this is a phenomenon I think all listeners would recognize, there has been virtually no treatment of the concept in the philosophy of music literature or the aesthetics literature more broadly. In this paper, I plan to give a full account of ‘wrongness’ and sketch what ramifications this concept has for a theory of musical meaning in general.
Diversity Statements
DIVERSITY IN THE CLASSROOM

In my capacity as an educator, I am committed to a learner-centered environment. I believe that honoring this commitment involves recognizing that my students are individuals that have different backgrounds and different life circumstances that are not always accommodated by our institutional practices. These different backgrounds and life circumstances may carve along demographic lines (e.g. race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, etc.), but may also involve other differences (e.g. differences in learning styles, levels of comfort with public speaking, employment status, parental status, etc.). It is of the utmost importance for me to keep these differences in mind when engaging with my students, both in and outside the classroom. In my time at Princeton, I have been a part of the group MAP (Minorities And Philosophy) and have attended a number of reading groups and workshops organized by this group that focus on gender disparity in philosophy and other disciplines and how we as educators might encourage and engage minority students. Through these initiatives, as well as through my own contemplation and practice, I have compiled a number of strategies for achieving my goal of making sure all of my students are able to get the most they can out of my classes. In the sections below, I will outline some of these strategies and the experience I have had in implementing them.

The first broad area in which I implement strategies for engaging a diverse student body is focused on combating implicit bias and stereotype threat. One strategy that I have used with the goal of combating implicit bias is the practice of anonymous grading. I have found that this practice has not impaired any of my other teaching practices (i.e. grading to reflect improvement) and, somewhat to my chagrin, I have found it to be effective in that I have been surprised by how well (or badly) a student has done when compared with my expectations before revealing the student’s identity. It is possible that I still might have been surprised by the quality of a particular paper had I not practiced anonymous grading. The fact remains, though, that employing this practice enabled me to focus specifically on the quality of the student’s work without any preconceptions interfering with my assessment. Of course, it is not always possible to practice fully anonymous grading. For instance, in cases where each student crafts their own topic or in smaller classes where students have discussed their paper ideas with me one-on-one, the authors of the assignments will hardly be anonymous. However, I feel that it is the case that, in certain settings (e.g. a large class exam where each student is responding to the same questions) the practice can be very effective. I find that it is also effective in making the students feel like their work is being assessed fairly and according to its merit. This other advantage of anonymous grading can assist in combating stereotype threat, since students are aware, consciously or unconsciously, that their work will be assessed in a way that is divorced from their identity as a member of a particular demographic group.

Another strategy I use to combat stereotype threat is to diversify the readings and examples I use in class. Of course, it is important to do this in an appropriate way. For instance, I wouldn’t want to tokenize authors or sacrifice time spent discussing canonical works and figures. I try to avoid making these mistakes by presenting readings by authors from different demographic groups throughout the semester and showing how they are in genuine dialogue with the figures that we have historically focused on in the canon. A perfect example of this is Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia,
since, in addition to providing the opportunity to include a philosophical contribution that was made by a woman in the period, the two figures were in an actual dialogue with one another. Not all examples are as literal as this, but where an actual correspondence is not present, I can still present figures from different traditions that focus on canonical topics. For instance, in discussing atomism, I might include readings from the Buddhist and Hindu traditions, both of which deal with this topic extensively, and discuss how these philosophers are treating the issue in a significant and rigorous way.

In addition to these strategies to combat implicit bias and stereotype threat, I also use a variety of strategies that promote the inclusion and active participation of all of my students. One way of doing this is to solicit examples from the students themselves. This gives them the opportunity to demonstrate their own expertise and express to me what they find important and interesting. I also might leave open time at the end of the class and solicit topics from the students. This helps them feel like their interests are important and gives them the opportunity to exercise autonomy over their learning. Another way I try to make sure students feel included is to reach out to students individually. At the beginning of the semester, I give all of my students the opportunity to let me know anything about them that they feel is important. As much as possible, I continue to interact with my students on an individual level by reaching out to those students who seem like they might need encouragement or students I think are doing especially well. This kind of individual interaction is especially important for students who are members of under-represented groups or students who might have a learning disability or even students who might just be particularly shy. I also try to be sensitive to my students’ individual needs with regard to how I structure and assess class participation. In addition to encouraging students to speak up in class, I give students other kinds of opportunities to participate, such as using online discussion boards to encourage students who might be more comfortable expressing themselves in writing. I have also found that, when appropriate, breaking students up into small groups helps to get them engaged in the issues and that, whenever we reconvene as a class, more students have more to contribute. Finally, I try to be flexible with deadlines so that students who have other commitments, such as jobs or families, are not unfairly punished for their extracurricular situations. Of course, deadlines are important and they help students learn how to structure their time. I take both of these things into account by giving hard deadlines, but making sure the students know that I am extremely generous with extensions, so long as they have planned and let me know ahead of time. All of these strategies contribute to a classroom environment that is more inclusive and where students feel like they are getting the most out of their time studying philosophy, regardless of whether they decide to continue in the field. I also find that using these strategies can help encourage students to major in the field, since they demonstrate to the students that philosophy is something that they can succeed in and something that is relevant to them as individuals.