The goal of this seminar is to explore the possibility that values – ways in which things might be good or bad, or better or worse than other things – might lie at the foundation of ethics and the theory of rational choice and practical reason. In particular, we shall explore the possibility of non-consequentialist theory that is grounded on a conception of values.

The seminar will be divided into four parts: (1) conceptual issues, about the nature of value-concepts; (2) formal issues, about the measurement and aggregation of value; (3) issues about values and practical reason; (4) issues about values and morality.

One recurrent theme that we will explore is whether, in understanding the nature and structure of the various different values, we can make use of some of the formal tools that have been developed by decision theorists. (This theme will be especially prominent in the topics for Weeks 2, 4, 5, 6, and 10.) In Weeks 7, 8, and 11, we will investigate whether in understanding the structural relationships between values, we can make use of some of the formal tools that have been developed by social choice theorists; the issue of how to accommodate non-consequentialist intuitions will be prominent in Weeks 3, 9, and 12.

Assessment
To get credit for this seminar, you should write either one term paper of 5000-6000 words, or two papers of 2500-3000 words. You should come to meet with the instructor early in the semester to devise a plan for how to meet the requirements for getting credit for the course.

Schedule of Topics

Part I: Conceptual issues – the nature of value-concepts

1. **6 February**
   What value-concepts are there? How do they work? A classic view and one of its critics
   - Hurka, *British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing*, Chap. 2
   - Geach, “Good and Evil”

2. **13 February**
   Towards a better account of value concepts?
   - Thomson, “The Right and the Good”
   - Wedgwood, “The Unity of Normativity”
   - Wedgwood, “Values First?”
3. 20 February
The ontology of value: Are values primarily exemplified by states of affairs, or by concrete items, or …? What is the difference between consequentialist and non-consequentialist views?
- Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*, Chap. 2
- Zimmerman, *The Nature of Intrinsic Value*, Chap. 3
- Portmore, *Commonsense Consequentialism*, Chap. 3
- Pettit, “Consequentialism”

4. 27 February
Is goodness is reducible to betterness? Is the “fitting attitude equivalence” correct? If it is correct, what is its significance?
- Broome, “Goodness is reducible to betterness”
- Bykvist, “No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis Fails”
- Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, “The Strike of the Demon”
- Wedgwood, “The ‘Good’ and the ‘Right’ Revisited”

5. 6 March
The varieties of value: Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value, final vs. instrumental value, simple vs. complex value, etc.
- Zimmerman, “Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value”
- Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness”
- Hurka, *Virtue, Vice, and Value*, Chaps. 1–2
- Pettit, *The Robust Demands of the Good*, Preview and Chap. 1

Part II: Formal issues – the measurement and aggregation of value

6. 13 March
The measurement of value: Value and expected value
- Broome, *Weighing Goods*, Chaps. 5–6
- Joyce, *Foundations of Causal Decision Theory*, Chap. 2

7. 27 March
The aggregation of value
- Broome, *Weighing Goods*, Chap. 10
- Mongin and Pivato, “Social Evaluation under Risk and Uncertainty”
Part III: Values and Practical Reason

8. 3 April
   Values and reasons for action
   - Snedegar, *Contrastive Reasons*, Chaps. 1–2
   - Raz, *Engaging Reason*, Chap. 2

9. 10 April
   The distinctive values of acts: Double effect; the doing / allowing distinction; etc.
   - Wedgwood, “Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action”
   - Wedgwood, “Defending Double Effect”

10. 17 April
    *Akrasia* and value: Choice, and uncertainty
    - Wedgwood, “Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem”
    - Wedgwood, “Akrasia and Uncertainty”

Part IV: Values and Morality

11. 24 April
    How do moral values relates to other values?
    - Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, Concluding Chapter
    - Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”
    - Wedgwood, “The Weight of Moral Reasons”

12. 1 May
    The distinctive character of moral value
    - Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*, Chap. 4
    - Wedgwood, “Two Grades of Non-Consequentialism”

References
Geach, “Good and Evil”, *Analysis* 17, no. 2 (December 1956): 33–42.
Wedgwood, Ralph “Must rational intentions maximize utility?” *Philosophical Explorations*, 20, sup. 2 (2017): 73–92.