MATHEMATICAL RIGOR
BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE

John P. Burgess & Silvia De Toffoli
with guest appearances by Benjamin Morison & Desmond Hogan
and virtually by Jeremy Avigad, Fenner Tanswell, Alan Baker

COURSE DESCRIPTION
Over the last century, the philosophy of mathematics has been primarily focused on the quest to establish logical foundations and to justify axioms. But there are also philosophical issues that have to do with how living, breathing human agents practice mathematics. Our seminar will explore the middle ground between the tidy abstract realm of mathematical theories and the messy concrete world of human mathematicians. While the correctness of a mathematical argument is nowadays often identified with its formalizability, traditional proofs frequently present gaps and involve various high-level inferences; they include diagrams as well as heterogeneous notations: in short, they are unlike formal proofs. What, then, is the relationship between formal and informal proofs? How can we explain our reliability in getting things right?

"Gray … is all theory, and green the golden tree of life."

from Russell & Whitehead Principia Mathematica

Fields Medalist Maryam Mirzakhani lecturing
TENTATIVE SCHEDULE
TUESDAYS 10:00-12:50 / 201 MARX HALL

WEEK 1 (SEP 07)  POSING THE QUESTION
Burgess *Rigor & Structure*, chapters 1 & 2
Steiner *Mathematical Knowledge*, chapter 3, section 3
optional supplementary reading Burgess "Proofs about Proofs" and "Foundational Work"

WEEK 2 (SEP 14)  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EUCLID
***Guest Appearance: Benjamin Morison***
Beere/Morison "A Mathematical Form of Knowing How: the Nature of Problems in Euclid's Geometry"

WEEK 3 (SEP 21)  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: KANT
***Guest Appearance: Desmond Hogan***
Hogan "Kant and the Character of Mathematical Inference"

WEEK 4 (SEP 28)  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EULER
Lakatos "Proofs and Refutations"
Steiner *Mathematical Knowledge*, chapter 3, section 4

WEEK 5 (OCT 05)  FORMAL vs INFORMAL PROOFS: A DEBATE AMONG PHILOSOPHERS, PART I
***Virtual Guest Appearances: Jeremy Avigad, Fenner Tanswell***
Avigad "Reliability of Mathematical Inference"
Tanswell "A Problem with the Dependence of Informal Proofs on Formal Proofs"
optional Azzouni "The Derivation-Indicator View of Mathematical Practice"

WEEK 6 (OCT 12)  FORMAL vs INFORMAL PROOFS: A DEBATE AMONG PHILOSOPHERS, PART II
Fallis "Intentional Gaps in Mathematical Proofs"
Andersen "Acceptable Gaps in Mathematical Proofs"

WEEK 7 (OCT 26)  FORMAL vs INFORMAL PROOFS: A DEBATE AMONG MATHEMATICIANS
Jaffe/Quinn "Theoretical Mathematics: Towards a Cultural Synthesis..."
Thurston "On Proof and Progress in Mathematics"
optional Replies to Jaffe/Quinn

WEEK 8 (NOV 02)  PROOFS AND JUSTIFICATION: A DEBATE AMONG PHILOSOPHERS
Paseau "What is the Point of Complete Rigour?"
De Toffoli “Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics”
Pelc “Why Do We Believe Theorems?”
optional Rav "Why Do We Prove Theorems?"

WEEK 9 (NOV 09)  PROOFS AND JUSTIFICATION: A DEBATE AMONG MATHEMATICIANS
Dehn “The Mentality of the Mathematician. A Characterization”
Zeilberger “THEOREMS FOR A PRICE: Tomorrow’s Semi-Rigorous Mathematical Culture”
Hales “Formal Proofs"

WEEK 10 (NOV 16)  COMPUTER ASSISTED PROOFS: THE 4-COLOR THEOREM
Appel/Haken “The Four Color Proof Suffices”
Detlefsen and Luker “The Four-Color Theorem and Mathematical Proof”
optional Tymoczko “The Four-Color Problem and Its Philosophical Significance”

WEEK 11 (NOV 23)  MATHEMATICS AND THE A PRIORI
Burge “Content Preservation” extracts
Burge “Computer Proofs and the A Priori”
De Toffoli “Diagrams and the a priori” (manuscript)
optional De Toffoli, “Who is Afraid of Mathematical Diagrams?”

WEEK 12 (NOV 30)  NON-DEDUCTIVE METHODS IN MATHEMATICS
*** Virtual Guest Appearance: Alan Baker •••
Fallis “The Epistemic Status of Probabilistic Proofs”
De Toffoli “Beliefs, Degrees of Beliefs, and ‘Probabilistic Proofs’” (manuscript)
Baker “Enumerative Induction in Mathematics: The Lure of Small Numbers” (manuscript)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>GRADUATE STUDENTS</strong></th>
<th><strong>UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Princeton philosophy graduate students seeking to earn a unit in connection with the seminar may write three short (1500± words) papers each related to one week's session, containing a clear and concise account of the main questions raised and the most important points about them made in the readings and discussion, plus a tentative conclusion favoring one or another position, or indicating further issues that would need to be explored.</td>
<td>The Office of the Dean of the College prohibits undergraduates officially enrolling in Philosophy graduate courses, but the ban can be worked around as follows:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papers will be due by 5 pm Princeton time 08 OCT (last class day before undergrad midterms) 23 NOV (last day before Thanksgiving break) 14 DEC (&quot;dean's date&quot;)</td>
<td>The interest student should obtain from their academic dean a form petitioning for a reading course that just happens to have the same instructors, readings, and meeting times as the graduate seminar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For one paper a student may substitute undertaking the oral presentation of one main reading for a given week, and leading / moderating the ensuing discussion, as per the department's oral presentation requirement.</td>
<td>The form will need to be signed by JPB (as instructor &amp; director of undergraduate studies). The form also calls for the department chair's signature, but JPB can take care of that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the student prefers, a single longer (3000± words) paper may be substituted for the last two papers, to be due 14 DEC with a brief preliminary draft due 23 NOV.</td>
<td>The form must then be submitted to the student's dean together with this syllabus highlighting the following statement about grading:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Undergraduates will graded based on the three papers as described under requirements for graduate students. Class participation will also be taken into account.*